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Abstract.
Septimius Severus, according to Cassius Dio, told his sons to enrich the soldiers 
and  look  down  on  all  other  men  (Cass.  Dio  77.15.2).  This  recognised  the 
perceived importance of the army in establishing and maintaining the legitimacy 
of an emperor. This thesis explores the role of the army in the legitimation of 
emperors. It also considers whether there were other groups, such as the Senate 
and people, which emperors needed to consider in order to establish and maintain 
their position as well as the methods they used to do so. Enriching the soldiers 
was  not  the  only  method  used  and  not  the  only  way  an  emperor  could  be 
successful.  The  rapid  turn  over  of  emperors  after  Septimius'  death,  however, 
suggests  that  legitimacy  was  proving  difficult  to  maintain  even  though  all 
emperors all tried to establish and maintain the legitimacy of their regime.
The concept of legitimate authority is explained in relation to legitimacy theory 
put forward by Max Weber who was one of the earliest to espouse a theory of 
legitimacy and remains influential,  although his work is not without its critics. 
There  are  three  principles  espoused  by  Weber  which  allowed  emperors  to 
establish and maintain their legitimacy. These are legally proclaimed authority, 
traditional  authority  and  charismatic  authority.  By  using  these  categories,  the 
importance of each type to  the emperors and how they sought to  use them is 
discussed and conclusions reached about the importance of the army and other 
groups in the legitimation process.
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1Introduction:
This thesis will explore how Roman emperors during the third century sought to 
legitimate  their  regimes  and maintain  this  legitimacy.  The  sources  of  political 
legitimacy,  as  espoused  by  Max  Weber's  work  on  the  subject,  are  traditional 
authority, legal authority and charismatic authority. Regimes can be considered 
legitimate on any one of these three grounds.1 Dio claims Septimius told his sons 
to  μονοε τε,  το ς  στρατιώτας  πλουτίζετε,  τ ν  λλων  πάντων  καταφρονε τεὁ ῖ ὺ ῶ ἄ ῖ  
(Cass. Dio 77.15.2)2 as this was the way he believed that they could legitimate 
their regime and maintain their legitimacy. Enriching the soldiers alone, however, 
was not sufficient for a regime to gain and maintain its legitimacy and this thesis 
has discussed that,  although enriching the soldiers was an essential part of the 
emperor's role, there were other factors which were important. Therefore, the role 
of the army and the role of enriching the soldiery in the legitimation process, in 
regard to the three bases of legitimate authority which Weber espoused has been 
considered. The roles of the other factors, such as the people, the Senate and the 
actions of the emperor, have also been considered in relation to these bases. These 
categories  of  legitimation allow the  attempts  of  the emperors  to  establish and 
maintain their legitimacy to be assessed.  
Emperors needed to be regarded as legitimate in order to establish themselves in 
power. The ways they did this and the groups from which they sought legitimacy 
1 M. Weber and S.N. Eisenstadt. On Charisma and Institution Building. (Chicago, 1968), p. 46.
2 'Be harmonious, enrich the soldiers and look down on all other men'
2have been explored, as were which methods worked and which did not and for 
whom. The reasons that certain methods worked for some but not for others has 
also been explored. Conclusions have been drawn from non-literary as well as the 
literary evidence that survives, such as coinage, which shows how these men tried 
to represent themselves and legitimise their regimes. The reliability and value of 
the relevant ancient literature was considered when investigating these emperors. 
The various emperors and their regimes are not uniformly represented within the 
sources, however, because the opinion that the author held of these men colour 
how they are depicted within the texts, as does the reliability of the sources which 
the surviving literature itself used.3 
Weber's  work  is  the  starting  point  for  many  of  the  works  on  theories  of 
legitimacy.4 Weber is important because he was one of the most important social 
thinkers at the beginning of the twentieth century and was renowned in Germany 
during his lifetime. He provides a framework for understanding legitimacy5 but 
3 The  Historia  Augusta,  for  example  is  not  regarded  as  a  reliable  source  (E.J.  Kenny,  Latin 
Literature, (Cambridge, 1982), p. 725) yet it is the source with the most detail for the post-Severan 
period as both Dio and Herodian are no longer writing about events by this time. Dio did not like 
Caracalla (for example Dio 77.14.1) or  Elagabalus (for example see 80.17.1)  and the  Historia 
Augusta is negative towards Gallienus  (HA Gall. 4.3). The  Historia Augusta, however, is highly 
complimentary about  Claudius  Gothicus  (HA Claud. 2.1-2) while  Herodian presents  a  largely 
positive view of Severus Alexander (Herodian 6.9.8).
4 Weber and Eisenstadt  (1968),  pp.  xii-xiii.  D. Beetham,  The Legitimation of  Power (London, 
1991), p. 8 and  I.L Horowitz, ‘The Norm of Illegitimacy – Ten Years Later’ in B. Denitch, ed., 
Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks of Analysis (London, 1979), p. 23. Also W. 
Connelly, 'Introduction: Legitimacy and Modernity' in W.Connelly (ed.), Legitimacy and the State 
(Oxford, 1994), p. 8.
5 J.G. Merquior, Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the theory of Legitimacy. (London, 1980), p. 
207.
3not a blueprint for a perfect society.6 His framework proposes the possibility of 
developing an intelligible conceptual theory which makes history understandable.7 
Consequently,  using his  theory rather than an abstract  one not concerned with 
historical comparison will produce understanding on evidence rather than abstract 
ideas.8 
After  the  second  world  war  his  influence  also  spread  throughout  the  western 
world.9 The  scholar  most  responsible  for  Weber's  influence  extending  outside 
Germany  is  Talcott  Parsons  and  his  analysis  of  Weber's  concepts  have  been 
influential  on  modern  sociology.10 Other  scholars,  such  as  Lipset,  Schaar, 
Habermas, are all influenced by Weber even though their theories diverge from 
his.11 A great strength of Weber is that his empirical contributions to sociology 
have been unparalleled in any era.12 He wanted his work to be able to illuminate 
specific  historical  circumstances13 and  this  is  the  reason  Weber's  theory  is 
appropriate when considering third century Rome. 
6 V.  Murvar,  'Introduction:  theory  of  liberty,  legitimacy  and  power:  new  directions  in  the 
intellectual and scientific legacy of Max Weber'. In V. Murvar (ed.), Theory of Liberty, Legitimacy 
and Power:  New Directions in the Intellectual  and Scientific Legacy of  Max Weber,  (London, 
1985a), p. 4. 
7 Murvar (1985a), p. 4.
8 Murvar (1985a), p. 4.
9 W. Heydebrand, 'Introduction' in M. Weber,  Sociological Writings,  edited by W. Heydebrand, 
(New York, 1994), p. vii.
10 P. Hamilton, Max Weber: Critical Assessments, Volume 1, (London, 1991), p. 7.
11 Connelly (1994), p. 8.
12 J. Rex, Discovering Sociology: Studies in Sociological Theory and Method, (London, 1973), p. 
124.
13 Rex (1973), p. 126.
4The views Weber espoused on politics remain valid in spite of changing times 
which means his theories are transferable across generations and this also makes it 
possible to discuss the Roman world using his legitimacy theory.14 He anticipated 
empirical  testing  of  his  theory  by  looking  at  evidence  from  history  and  the 
contemporary world.15 It was his view that the three types of legitimacy which he 
proposed  could  help  to  explain  the  relationship  between those in  positions  of 
power and those subject to them.16 Therefore, this thesis has analysed the evidence 
from the third century in relation to Weber's three types of legitimacy17 and this is 
the reason for doing so.  The characteristics of his work, therefore,  need to be 
considered. Weber believes that it is because claims to legitimacy are based on 
rational grounds that regimes are able to establish their  legitimacy if  they can 
prove  themselves  to  be  effective.  He  was  concerned  with  the  process  of 
legitimation and the ways which regimes were able to dominate those subject to it 
and maintain their legitimacy.18 The regimes of the third century had problems 
establishing and maintaining their legitimacy which is why using Weber's theory 
of  legitimacy  is  relevant  and  the  evidence  from  the  time  can  establish  the 
effectiveness of the various regimes during the period.
14 N. Yamawaki, 'Rethinking Weber's Ideal Types' in L. McFalls (ed.),  Max Weber's 'Objectivity'  
Reconsidered,  (Toronto, 2007),  pp.  216-217. Weber's  political  theories relate to power politics 
which  Yamawaki  argues  is  relevant  to  a  conflict-ridden  world  rather  than  one  seeking  to 
understand other cultures (p. 217). Conflict was, however, a regular feature of life in the Roman 
empire and the supremacy of Rome undeniable to those ruling the empire.
15 V. Murvar, 'Patrimonialism, modern and traditionalist: a paradigm for interdisciplinary research 
on rulership and legitimacy. In V. Murvar (ed.),  Theory of Liberty, Legitimacy and Power: New 
Directions in the Intellectual and Scientific Legacy of Max Weber, (London, 1985b), pp. 40-41.
16 R. Bendix and B.S. Turner, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. (London, 1998), p. 300.
17 Murvar (1985b), p. 41.
18 Murvar (1985b), p. 41.
5The three principles which Weber identified that allow regimes to acquire this 
effectiveness are; (1) tradition, (2) a positive proclamation, the legality of which is 
beyond  question  because  it  has  been  (a)  agreed  to  voluntarily  by  all  those 
concerned, or (b) imposed by some group over the others on the basis of their 
being perceived to be a legitimate authority and therefore able to claim obedience, 
or  (3)  the  personal  charisma  of  the  leader.  Legitimacy in  regard  to  this  final 
criterion rests upon the devotion to a specific person; in the case of Rome, this is 
the emperor.19 Since these factors allow a regime to rule effectively, they serve to 
foster a belief in those subject to it in its legitimacy. Consequently, those in power 
can  be  considered  legitimate  because  they  are  regarded  to  be  so.20 This  is 
important because regimes which are not legitimate do not have the people over 
which they are trying to rule acquise to their commands.21 
For Weber, tradition was a belief in the acceptance of the ways which had existed 
in a society throughout generations and those exercising authority did so on the 
basis  that  they  had  the  right  to  do  so  provided  that  they  are  bound  by  such 
traditions.22 The people who obeyed their  commands,  therefore,  accepted their 
19 M. Weber,  Basic Concepts in Sociology, translated and introduced by H. P. Secher (London, 
1962),  pp.  81-83.  Also  see  M.  Ciacci,  ‘Legitimacy  and  the  Problems  of  Goverance’ in  A. 
Moulakis, ed.,  Legitimacy: Proceedings of the Conference Held in Florence June 3 and 4, 1982 
(New York, 1986), p. 22. Weber emphasised that the categories were not descriptive categories but 
sociological  tools  and  that  the  belief  that  sustains  legitimacy  was  not  simply  defined  or 
constructed.
20 M. Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Tubingen, 1958), p. 493.
21 M. Weber, D.S Owen, T.B. Strong and R. Livingstone,  The Vocation Lectures, (Indianapolis, 
2004), p. 34.
22 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by G. Roth and C. 
6right of command and were obedient to the person occupying the traditionally 
authoritative position.23 In Rome, the on-going presence of an emperor meant that 
his  position was one of traditional authority.  He was a man from a Senatorial 
background who was expected to administer the empire and ensure its security. 
He was also responsible for ensuring that the law was adhered to and the gods 
respected. His Senatorial background ensured that he was adhering to an even 
longer tradition of this class of men providing the political, military, judicial and 
religious leaders of Roman society and having the auctoritas and imperium with 
which to fulfill each of these roles. The role of men of Senatorial class, therefore, 
is  consistent  with  the  powers  which  they were  designated  in  accordance  with 
traditional rules and their rules are obeyed as a result of their traditional status.24 
As  is  the  case  with  all  models,  however,  different  scholars  have  different 
perspectives about its worth. There are criticisms of Weber and these have been 
explored in more detail in the next chapter. Weber is criticised for ignoring the 
moral qualities or foundations of a regime,25 which means that tyrannical regimes 
can  be  regarded  as  legitimate.26 However,  as  some  tyrannical  regimes  are 
recognised  as  such,  any  theories  exploring  legitimacy  must  take  these  into 
account. Critics, such as Beetham, also question the aspects of legitimacy which 
Wittich (New York, 1968), p. 215.
23 Weber (1968), pp. 215-216.
24 Weber (1968), p. 226.
25 See R.  Grafstein,  ‘The Failure of  Weber’s  Concept  of  Legitimacy’,  Journal  of  Politics,  43 
(1981), p. 456 and K. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, (Oxford, 1980), p. 109 for 
examples of such criticism.
26 R. Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, 1990), p. 25.
7Weber identified and whether it is valid to consider them in such a way.27 There is 
also criticism for the failure to include a measure which is associated with the 
values  or  policies  that  the  regime  espouses.28 The  absence  of  this  measure  is 
understandable since regimes which fail to gain acceptance for their policies risk 
being de-legitimated anyway and, consequently, it does not need to be included. 
The aim of any regime should be to bolster the belief in it rather than merely to 
maintain  its  initial  support  base  in  case  it  alienates  a  part  of  it  and  suffers 
delegitimation.  For  Weber,  whether  or  not  the  commands  a  regime  issues  are 
obeyed indicates that the command is perceived to be valid.29 There has to be a 
two-way relationship  between  the  ruler  and  the  ruled  because  those  who  are 
subordinate need to believe that those who are dominant have the right to exercise 
authority.30
Ancient Sources
The  mid-third  century  is  a  period  that  is  not  well  served  by  ancient  source 
material. Cassius Dio’s history terminates during the reign of Severus Alexander 
and  Herodian’s  imperial  biographies  stop  with  the  deaths  of  Balbinus  and 
Maximus Pupianus in 238. This means that they cover all or most of the Severan 
era and they are the best literary sources for this period. They do, however, both 
have weaknesses that need to be considered when drawing conclusions from the 
27 Beetham (1991), p. 24.
28 Barker (1990), p. 38.
29 Weber (1968), p. 946.
30 Weber (1962), p. 20. Also see Beetham (1991), p. 18. He believes that the expression of this 
belief needs to be explicit through, for example, acclamation, swearing allegiance or voting in 
elections. This means that the subordinate are contributing to legitimacy.
8material contained within them.31 Dio’s chronology is not always correct and he 
sometimes  contradicts  himself  as  a  result.32 For  example,  he  stated  that 
Diadumenianus was made πρόκριτος τ ς νεότητοςῆ  (princeps iuventutis) and Κα σαρῖ  
(Caesar) by the Senate (Cass. Dio 78.17.1) but later stated that he was named 
Κα σαρ (ῖ Caesar) by the troops (Cass. Dio 78.19.1) and places this declaration at 
the time when Macrinus was passing through Zeugma on his expedition against 
Parthia (Cass. Dio 78.40.1). He is also influenced by his dislike of Caracalla and 
Elagabalus so that his representations of both of these men need to take this into 
account.33 He is an important source, however, and his account of Macrinus’ reign 
is valuable in that he provides an insight into Roman affairs and thoughts at the 
time the new emperor was away in the east.34
Herodian also, on occasion, witnessed the events he describes but there are errors 
in his work which someone witnessing the events being described should not have 
made,  such  as  the  conflation  of  the  two  Parthian  campaigns  that  Septimius 
undertook.35 He claims γ  δ' στορίαν ο  ἐ ὼ ἱ ὐ παρ' λλων παραδεξάμενος γνωστόνἄ ἄ  
τε κα  μάρτυρον ὶ ἀ (Herodian 1.1.3), but never cites the sources of his information 
so that this statement cannot be critically assessed.36 Although Herodian is vague 
31 For examples see  F. Millar,  A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford, 1964), p. 163 for Dio and  T.D. 
Barnes, The Sources of the Historia Augusta (Brussels, 1978), pp. 82-83 for Herodian. Barnes also 
investigates the veracity of the Historia Augusta in detail throughout.
32 R. Syme, 'The Son of the Emperor Macrinus'. Phoenix. Vol. 26, No. 3. Autumn, 1972, p. 277.
33 P.  Southern,  The  Roman  Empire  From  Severus  to  Constantine (London,  2001),  p.  51  for 
Caracalla and Millar (1964), p. 169 for Macrinus.
34 Southern (2001), p. 55.
35 Barnes (1978), pp. 82-83.
36 Barnes (1978), p. 83.
9and imprecise at times, it is not necessarily the case that he is always inferior to 
Dio and the two works can be compared and contrasted to gain greater insight into 
events.37 
The weaknesses of the Historia Augusta also need to be taken into account and 
there is much scholarship – most particularly by Barnes38 and Syme39 – on the 
failings,  and  occasional  strengths,  of  this  work.  It  does  contain  some  good 
information although this is amongst other details which are not reliable.40  Nor, 
unlike Herodian and Dio, was it contemporary to the events it describes and so the 
author was reliant on written sources for his information.41 The exact sources that 
were  used  cannot  easily  be  discovered  which  makes  their  reliability  open  to 
debate and in spite of its own claims, it is likely to have been written some time in 
the second half of the fourth century.42 Therefore, the  Historia Augusta must be 
used  with  caution  as  a  source  and independent  corroboration  is  helpful  when 
drawing conclusions that rely on this work. It does have some similarities to Dio 
and Herodian at times, but also diverges from them. It is not necessarily always 
37 Barnes (1978), p. 84. 
38 Barnes (1978) is his main work which considers the sources which the Historia Augusta drew 
upon and what this means about its veracity for modern scholarship.
39 R. Syme,  Historia Augusta Papers (Oxford, 1983) is his book which raises issues about the 
reliability and otherwise of the Historia Augusta.
40 Barnes (1978), p. 89.
41 Syme (1983), pp. 12-13.
42 See Barnes (1978), pp. 15-16, 17-19 and also pp. 77-78 for a discussion about why it cannot 
have been written during the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine as it claims. Barnes, as well as 
hypothesising  that  due  to  linguistic  idiosyncrasies,  literary  quirks  and  interests,  intellectual 
attitudes, and social and political opinions that it was the work of a single author rather than the six 
which it claims to be, says that it is easy to establish that the date of composition must be after 360 
because of the author’s knowledge of Victor, among others, who was writing after this time.
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the case that this divergence makes it inferior to the two Greek authors on every 
occasion and this  will  be due to the source of information that its author was 
consulting for that particular time.43 It is one of the few sources for the period 
after Dio’s and Herodian’s accounts end (although with periodic gaps) so it must 
be  used,  however  cautiously.  The  epitomisers  Zosimus,  Eutropius,  Festus  and 
Aurelius Victor also provide overviews of this era, but offer little of substance. 
The  Historia  Augusta ceases  prior  to  Diocletian,  leaving  the  epitomisers  to 
continue their brief discussions of Diocletian and his successors. There are also a 
number of panegyrics, the Panegyrici Latini, from which evidence can be drawn 
not only for Diocletian but also his immediate successor, while Lactantius and 
Eusebius also provide some information for this period. Their texts need to be 
treated  carefully  because  they  are  Christian  authors  and  have  very  different 
perspectives  from  the  other,  pagan,  authors.44 One  advantage  which  the 
Panegyrici Latini have is that they have not been altered after they were finalised 
to  make  them more  acceptable  to  new  regimes  that  came  in.45 For  example, 
Maximian’s representation in the panegyrics is not altered later after he turned 
from ally to a foe of Constantine once Constantine had defeated Maxentius and 
later Licinius to establish his own power and legitimate right to rule.46 Nor is there 
43 Barnes (1978), p. 89. He believes that the Historia Augusta must have been drawing on a Latin 
source or sources for the early third century which described the same period as the two Greek 
writers. There is, however, no reason that they could not have again been Greek sources. That they 
do not survive does make the assessment of their reliability more difficult.
44 A. Cameron, The Later Roman Empire: AD 284-430. (London, 1993), pp. 15-18.
45 C.E.V Nixon and B.S Rodgers,  In Praise of the Later Roman Emperors (Berkeley, 1994), pp. 
33-34.
46 C.E.V Nixon, ‘Latin Panegyric in the Tetrarchic and Constantinian Period,’ in B. Croke and 
11
a consistent version of Constantine’s march on Italy to fight Maxentius within the 
panegyrics of 313 and 321. This was not the case with other sources, such as 
Eusebius  whose  Ecclesiastical  History which  was  revised  regularly  as  the 
political circumstances changed.47
Legitimacy in Rome during the Severan Dynasty
Regimes  need  legitimacy in  order  to  ensure  that  they are  the  established  and 
unchallenged sources of authority within a state,48 which allows them to govern 
effectively and ensure that there is sufficient compliance from the populace with 
their commands. Those regimes which are not considered to have the legitimate 
right to rule, in contrast, face challenges from one or more of the various elements 
that  make up a society,  generally the aristocracy or elite,  the military and the 
masses.49 There are many different issues that modern social science identifies as 
defining what it means for a regime to be legitimate.50 
Just as there are a broad range of governmental styles from the autocratic to the 
democratic, so there are also numerous variations on the theories and definitions 
A.M. Emmett, eds., History and Historians in Late Antiquity (Sydney, 1983), pp. 95-96. There is 
no attempt, for example, to play Constantine up and Maximian down throughout the series of 
panegyrics in which Maximian is represented in 289, 291, 307 and 310.
47 Nixon (1983), pp. 95-96.
48 C.  Kadushin,  ‘Power  Circles  and  Legitimacy  in  Developed  Societies’ in  B.  Denitch,  ed., 
Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks of Analysis (London, 1979), p. 132.
49 Beetham (1991), p. 139 states that disorder and insecurity can be either a product of inadequate 
legitimacy or a cause. The disorder that results prior to a regime becoming legitimate is a product 
of its illegitimacy, whereas any disorder subsequent to a regime acquiring legitimacy can cause the 
regime to be delegitimised. 
50 Barker (1990), p. 21. 
12
of legitimation.51 This means that not all scholars can agree about what types of 
regime can achieve legitimacy. Beetham, for example, does not acknowledge that 
a regime established by a military coup can ever achieve legitimacy.52 In Rome, to 
dismiss  regimes  that  began  in  this  way  is  to  question  whether  legitimacy  is 
actually achievable in the Roman world.  However,  legitimacy was achievable. 
Emperors, such as Septimius Severus and Diocletian,  were able to govern and 
govern  effectively.  The  people  of  Rome were  sovereign  and consequently the 
level  of  support  enjoyed  within  the  populace  allows  the  legitimation,  de-
legitimation or illegitimacy of emperors to be evaluated. Therefore, a theoretical 
framework which applies to the Roman Empire needs to be able to explain how 
regimes  came  to  be  accepted  as  legitimate,  even  in  the  cases  where  their 
provenance was in a military coup. This framework, therefore, allows the success 
or failure of regimes to become established and legitimised to be assessed and 
explained. 
51 Barker (1990), p. 21. Whether there can be said to be a distinct form of legitimacy that can be 
described as political is something that is debated, but Barker (1990), pp. 98-99 believes that it 
does exist and conceptualises the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. 
52 Beetham (1991), pp. 233-240. Beetham is discussing the coup as having replaced a democratic 
regime and the military, consequently, as not having a role in the governing of the state prior to its 
intervention. He believes that military regimes have neither an authoritative source for their power 
or any form of popular consent. This was not always the case in Rome, however, as military men 
who were  declared  emperor  would normally seek  Senatorial  approval  for  their  assumption of 
power and, therefore, give the Senate a role as an authorising source in such matters. Emperors, 
regardless of how they came to power, would often seek popular consent. Beetham (1991), p. 21 
believes  that  his  criteria  for  legitimacy  are  sufficient  to  describe  legitimacy  in  all  historical 
societies, past and present. However, by claiming that regimes cannot achieve legitimacy if they 
come to power through a military coup, he is  decrying the legitimacy of many of the Roman 
emperors, who, in their time were accepted and established as the rulers of the Roman people in 
spite of having started the process of their legitimation as a usurping regime. R. Syme,  Tacitus 
(Oxford, 1958), pp. 547-548.
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The approach taken to consider the legitimacy of regimes during the third century 
has been undertaken in Chapter One by considering the theory associated with the 
legitimacy of  regimes.  In  Chapter  Two,  the  nature  of  the  proclamation  which 
allowed  an  emperor  to  take  power  and  be  legally  in  the  position  has  been 
investigated.  Chapter  Three  has  looked  at  the  traditional  expectations  of  the 
emperor, with the charismatic nature of legitimacy investigated in Chapter Four. 
The performance of the emperors during the period from Septimius until the death 
of Constantine has been considered in relation to these legitimating factors where 
there is sufficient evidence to draw conclusions as to whether individual emperors 
met  these  expectations  and  whether  there  were  any  changes  to  either  the 
expectations or the methods used to meet them during the course of the troubled 
middle of the third century.  The emperors during this time, such as Gallienus, 
generally did their best to keep the empire together and to secure their power, but 
it  was  not  until  Diocletian  and  his  foundation  of  the  tetrarchy,  and  then  the 
Constantinian line which followed, that the imperial position was stabilised. 
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Chapter 1: Weber’s Theories of Legitimacy and their Application
The  proclamation  of  an  emperor  had  to  occur  through  a  legal  source  and 
obedience had to be owed to this source. To carry the weight of legality it needed 
to  be an impersonal  order  which was legally established.1 The  Roman Senate 
consisted  of  former  holders  of  offices  on the  cursus  honorum.  Each  member, 
therefore, had at one point held the legal authority to act in some way for the 
Roman state. Consequently it was a body of great tradition and importance and it 
would give its approval for a new emperor and could also declare emperors who 
were failing to be hostes, enemies of the state.2 
The Roman army too was an impersonal order and was the legal, military arm of 
the state.3 Its authority to make such proclamations of legitimacy or to withdraw 
its support for an emperor did not have a legal basis but there was no question that 
it  was  able  to  claim  obedience  from  the  people  and  the  Senate  (Cass.  Dio 
57.24.5).4 That  the  military had  this  obedience  from the  Senate  meant  that  it 
effectively had the body which traditionally made such proclamations under its 
control. The army's own proclamations eventually came to carry so much more 
1 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by G. Roth and C. 
Wittich (New York, 1968), pp. 215-216.
2 Maximinus Thrax is an example of an emperor who was declared hostes (HA Max. 15.2), while 
the majority of third century emperors were acclaimed by the Senate.
3 J.B. Campbell. The Emperor and the Roman Army 31 BC – AD 235. (Oxford, 1984), p. 182.
4 Tiberius, for example, gave the Senate an example of power of the Praetorian Guard in order to 
show where power lay in the state. ν δ' ο ν τ  τότε  Τιβέριος τ ν το  δορυφορικο  γυμνασίανἐ ὖ ῷ ὁ ὴ ῦ ῦ  
το ς βουλευτα ς,  σπερ γνοο σι τ ν δύναμιν α τ ν,  πέδειξεν,  πως κα  πολλούς  σφας καῖ ῖ ὥ ἀ ῦ ὴ ὐ ῶ ἐ ὅ ὶ ὶ 
ρρωμένους δόντες μ λλον α τ ν φοβ νται. ἐ ἰ ᾶ ὐ ὸ ῶ
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weight  that  newly appointed  emperors  did  not  even bother  to  seek Senatorial 
approval for the position.5 The declining importance of the Senate is one of the 
issues  that  has  been  considered  when  the  proclamation  of  legal  legitimacy is 
considered.
Acceptance  through  a  proclamation  from  either  the  army  or  the  Senate  – 
preferably both – enhanced the legitimacy of any regime. This has been discussed 
more fully at a later point in this thesis. The Senate believed that it had the power 
to anoint emperors, but it was usually the legions who appointed them.6 The role 
and importance of both has been considered when determining how a regime tried 
to  legitimate  itself  as  has  whether  these  groups  declined  as  a  legitimating 
authority at various times. Tacitus observed that the backing of the army was the 
secret to gaining and maintaining power (Tac.  Hist, 1.4-5),7 but the Senate still 
had a role to play in the maintenance of stable rule within the empire or, at any 
rate, believed that it did. 
5 Macrinus was an example of an emperor who acted based on the army’s proclamation rather than 
wait until he was invested by the Senate (Dio 79.16.2). The appointment of the child, Gordian III, 
also shows the power which soldiers could have over the Senate since they helped to instigate his 
promotion in league with the Senatorial appointees, Pupienus Maximus and Balbinus (Herodian 
7.10.6-9). There is no mention at all  in the sources of Carus seeking acknowledgement of his 
position by the Senate even after his proclamation by the troops. See Zos. 1.71 and Aur. Vict. 
Caes. 38.
6 In the period under discussion, Septimius Severus provides an example. He became emperor 
when the troops acclaimed him as such (HA Sev 5.1) and was later named as emperor by the 
Senate when he was closing in on Rome with his army (Dio 74.17.4).
7 evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri.
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Charismatic legitimacy is focused on the individual rather than the office which 
the individual holds.8 Emperors, therefore, needed to be seen as having exemplary 
characteristics. These included martial success and relationships with the divine,9 
which meant that they were obeyed because of the trust which the people had in 
them.10 Maximinus  Thrax  was  acclaimed  by the  troops  because  of  his  heroic 
abilities  (Herodian  7.1.6)11 but  once  these  were  shown  to  be  fallible  the 
charismatic  nature  of  the  legitimacy  which  he  had  was  destroyed  and  his 
overthrow soon followed  (Herodian  8.5.3-9).12 Victory titles  were  a  means  of 
promoting  martial  success  since  they  incorporated  the  vanquished  opponent’s 
name into that of the victorious emperor, whilst other charismatic virtues such as a 
religious  aura  can  be  seen  in  the  promotion  of  the  emperor  as  increasingly 
removed from the people. This culminated with Aurelian being considered to be 
dominus et deus and the obeisance which was shown at the court of Diocletian.13
8 Weber (1968), p. 215.
9 C. Noreňa, ‘The Communication of the Emperor’s Virtues’, The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 
91 (2001), p. 146.
10 Weber (1968), pp. 215-216.
11 Μαξιμ νος μελλεν π  Γερμανο ς διαβήσεσθαι· μα γ ρ τ  τ ν ρχ ν παραλαβε ν ε θέωςῖ ἔ ἐ ὶ ὺ ἅ ὰ ῷ ὴ ἀ ὴ ῖ ὐ  
πολεμικ ν  ργων  ρξατο,  κα  δι  σώματος  μέγεθος  κα  σχ ν  [στρατιωτικ ν]  κα  μπειρίανῶ ἔ ἤ ὶ ὰ ὶ ἰ ὺ ὴ ὶ ἐ  
πολεμικ ν δοκ ν πιλελέχθαι ργοις τ ν δόξαν κα  τ ν τ ν στρατιωτ ν πόληψιν πιστο τοὴ ῶ ἐ ἔ ὴ ὶ ὴ ῶ ῶ ὑ ἐ ῦ
12 φἐ '  α ςἷ  κε νοςἐ ῖ  κενούμενος ργ ςὀ ῆ  μ λλονᾶ  νεπίμπλατοἐ .  χρ σθαιῆ  δὲ κατὰ τ νῶ  πολεμίων οὐ 
δυνάμενος,  κόλαζεἐ  το ςὺ  πλείστους τ νῶ  γουμένωνἡ  τ νῶ  δίωνἰ  στρατιωτ νῶ  ςὡ  νάνδρωςἀ  καὶ 
θύμωςῥᾳ  προσφερομένους τῇ τειχομαχίᾳ. θενὅ  α τὐ ῷ περιεγένετο πρ ςὸ  μ νὲ  τ νῶ  ο κείωνἰ  μ σόςῖ  τε 
καὶ ργήὀ ,  παρὰ δὲ τ νῶ  ντιπάλωνἀ  πλείων ἡ καταφρόνησις.  συνέβαινε δὲ το ςῖ  κυλησίοιςἈ  πάντα 
πάρχεινὑ  κπλεαἔ  καὶ πιτηδείωνἐ  φθονίανἀ ,  κἐ  πολλ ςῆ  παρασκευ ςῆ  ςἐ  τ νὴ  πόλιν πάντων 
σεσωρευμένων σαὅ  νἦ  νθρώποιςἀ  καὶ κτήνεσιν ςἐ  τροφ ςὰ  καὶ ποτὰ πιτήδεια·ἐ  ὁ δὲ στρατ ςὸ  
πάντων < νἦ >  νἐ  σπάνει,  τ νῶ  τε καρποφόρων δένδρων κκεκομμένωνἐ  καὶ τ ςῆ  γ ςῆ  πὑ '  α τοὐ ῦ 
δεδ ωμένηςῃ .
13 RIC V.1 Aurelian 305 has the legend IMP DEO ET DOMINO AURELIANO AVG 
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Charisma could be an important element in an emperor's legitimation because it 
was the quality which allows an individual to exercise authority and influence 
over other people. This charisma was necessary to impress all elements of Roman 
society, not just the general populace, and could draw attention to the emperor and 
his achievements in the form of triumphs or victory titles which proclaimed the 
successes  that  the  emperor  enjoyed  over  the  enemies  of  Rome.14 This  is  the 
category that can explain incidences of legitimacy that do not fit into either of the 
traditional or legal categories.15 Legitimacy is a fluid concept that can change over 
time and it can be either gained or lost.16 Consequently,  it  is possible for new 
14 The full name of Diocletian on the edict  on maximum prices,  for example, was  Imp(erator) 
Caesar  C.  Aurel(ius)  Val(erius)  Diocletian]us  P(ius)  F(elix)  Inv(ictus)  Aug(ustus),  p[o]nt(ifex) 
max(imus), Germ(anicus) max(imus) VI, Sarm(aticus) max(imus) IIII,  Persic(us) max(imus) II, 
Britt(anicus) max(imus), Carpic(us) max(imus),  Armen(icus) max(imus),  Medic(us) max(imus), 
Adiabenic(us) max(imus), trib(unicia) p(otestate) XVIII, coss(ul) VII, Imp(erator) XVIII, p(ater) 
p(atriae), procoss(ul) shows the extent to which promoting ones positions, successes in battle and 
religious qualities could be taken. See S. Lauffer,  Diokletians Preisedickt, (Berlin, 1971), p. 90ff 
for this reference to Diocletian and the text of the price edict.
15 P. Weber-Schäfer ‘Divine Descent and Sovereign Rule: A Case of Legitimacy? in A. Moulakis, 
ed., Legitimacy: Proceedings of the Conference Held in Florence June 3 and 4, 1982 (New York, 
1986), pp. 90-91.
16 F. Ferrarotti, ‘Legitimacy, Hegemony and Domination: Gramsci – With and Versus Lenin’, in B. 
Denitch, ed., Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks of Analysis (London, 1979), p. 
105. Also see S. Treggiari, ‘Divorce Roman Style: How Easy and How Frequent Was It?’ in B. 
Rawson, ed.,  Marriage, Divorce and Children in Ancient Rome (Canberra, 1991), p. 33, who is 
discussing the Digest 39.5.31pr. The concept of legitimacy could change in the Roman world and 
this can be seen in the nature of Roman relationships. It was possible for a couple to transform 
their  relationship  from  one  of  concubinage  to  marriage  merely  by  changing  their  attitude. 
Therefore, they were able to transform their relationship into one into which legitimate children 
can be born. This was not the case whilst their relationship was merely one of concubinage. The 
ability of freedmen upon manumission to legitimate children that had been illegitimate up to that 
point also shows that the concept of legitimacy was not a fixed idea in the Roman world and law 
(P.R.C. Weaver, ‘The Status of Children in Mixed Marriages,’ in B. Rawson, ed.,  The Family in  
Ancient Rome: New Perspectives (London, 1986), p. 161). Conclusions about legitimacy in the 
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crises to occur that allow another leader to come in and take command who would 
then  be  required  to  go  through  the  process  of  legitimation  himself.17 The 
overthrow of Severus Alexander and the appointment of Maximinus Thrax is one 
example of this (Herodian 6.7.9-7.1.6).
The  traditional  nature  of  the  position  of  emperor  meant  that  the  reverence  in 
which the position was held allowed for the continued survival  of  the empire 
through periods of internal upheaval and external pressure. This survival was also 
a testament to the ability of its institutions, which created a suitably universal idea 
throughout  its  vast  landmass  of  what  it  meant  to  be  part  of  the  empire.18 
According to Ammianus, it was Rome’s glory that guaranteed the respect of those 
throughout  the  empire  for  the  Senate  and  the  Roman  people  (Amm.  Mar. 
14.6.6).19 The Caesars for their part were required to act in a manner that befitted 
the dignity of the imperial office, as it had been entrusted to their management, 
(Amm.  Mar.  14.6.5)20 and  any  loyalty  showed  to  them  was  primarily  an 
Roman family can be used to draw conclusions for the status of an emperor because in imperial 
Rome the emperor was indeed the ultimate father, the pater patriae. In terms of political theory, 
Polyb.  (6.4)  states  that  when  one  man  rule  develops  and  corrects  its  defects,  it  can  then  be 
considered to be kingship, which is the superior version of one man rule, showing that the nature 
of an office was also considered to change over time.
17 M. Weber,  Basic Concepts in Sociology, translated and introduced by H. P. Secher (London, 
1962), pp. 20-21.   
18 C. Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (Berkeley, 2000), pp. 
40-41.
19 per omnes tamen quotquot sunt partes terrarum, ut domina suscipitur et regina et ubique patrum 
reverenda cum auctoritate canities populique Romani nomen circumspectum et verecundum.
20 ideo  urbs  venerabilis  post  superbas  efferatarum  gentium  cervices  oppressas  latasque  leges 
fundamenta libertatis et retinacula sempiterna velut frugi parens et prudens et dives Caesaribus 
tamquam liberis suis regenda patrimonii iura permisit.
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expression of loyalty to the Roman state.21 The Roman government advertised the 
history of  the empire  and the common political  ideology as  something that  it 
shared with those subject to it,  with the emperor being the one constant upon 
which expressions of this ideology could concentrate.22
This means that there can be a distinction made between the loyalty to the office 
of the emperor and to the person of specific emperors. During the third century 
the failures of emperors in battle was taken to indicate the unworthiness of that 
particular  man  rather  than  the  imperial  system  per  se,  with  there  being  no 
suggestion that anyone within the empire wanted to change this. Indeed, the keen 
competition to  become emperor  can be seen to  enhance the legitimacy of  the 
system and the position as the competitors were seeking to operate within this 
system rather than searching for alternate methods of governing.23 By this time, 
well over two centuries had elapsed since Augustus had won possession of the 
Roman state and so the position had become entrenched. Therefore, the passage of 
time and the nature of the imperial position itself helped to enhance the legitimacy 
of  those who were raised to  it.  Not every usurper  that  was declared emperor, 
however, was automatically legitimised by their declaration, so other factors do 
need  to  be  taken  into  account  in  conjunction  with  the  traditional  element  of 
legitimation.
21 S.K. Drummond and L.H. Nelson, The Western Frontiers of Imperial Rome, (New York, 1994), 
p. 197.
22 Ando (2000), p. 23.
23 Ando (2000), p. 45. See also D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London, 1991), p. 145. It 
is generally the failings of the regime itself rather than the political system of the state that causes 
delegitimation.
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An example of a usurper who was never a legitimate emperor is Carausius since 
he was not acknowledged outside of Britain by the other emperors or the wider 
army. Carausius  rebellaret (Eutr. 9.21-22). He is also described as a  pirata in a 
panegyric to Maximian (Pan. Lat. 10.12.1-2), although he is not mentioned by 
name. This was a standard practice with usurpers,24 with Diocletian and Maximian 
at best tolerating his rule which is alluded to by Aurelius Victor (Caes. 39.39).25 
The campaign by Constantius against Carausius’ successor, Allectus, shows that 
affairs  in  Britain  were  not  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  imperial  college  and  the 
ongoing  desire  to  remove  the  self-proclaimed  emperor  there  shows  that  the 
members  of  the  recognised  imperial  college  did  consider  them no  more  than 
usurpers. The eighth of the Panegyrici Latini, for example, celebrates Constantius’ 
eventual success in reclaiming the island and returning it to imperial rule so not 
recognising the regime which had been ruling there (Pan. Lat. 8(5).13.1-18.4).
A usurper would need to prove himself successful in order to be proclaimed by 
the whole of the army or by the Senate and, consequently,  legitimacy was not 
something  that  was  acquired  at  the  moment  of  the  acclamation.  Considering 
Weber’s  criteria  for  legitimation  in  regard  to  such  a  proclamation,  it  was  not 
necessary for an emperor to receive this from all of the different elements that 
24 C.E.V Nixon and B.S Rodgers, In Praise of the Later Roman Emperors (Berkeley, 1994), p. 72, 
n. 42.
25 solique Carausio remissum insulae imperium.
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made  up  Roman  society.26 Although  this  was  desirable,  he  merely  needed 
sufficient support from the strongest elements of the society.27 
The Senate had the legitimate authority to confirm the emperor’s  imperium. The 
army was also a source of legitimate authority, as it too represented Roman power, 
albeit  by  virtue  of  its  martial  nature  rather  than  the  traditional  pre-eminence 
enjoyed by the Senate through its long-established role as an advisory council 
made up of the wealthy men of Roman society who had held magistracies. Both 
these groups believed that it was their unanimous acclamation that was required to 
select an emperor28 and it was one or the other that did select them. 
According  to  Dio,  Septimius,  in  his  advice  to  Geta  and  Caracalla,  was 
unequivocal that the army was the agent of legitimation (Dio 77.15.2). However, 
events through the third century showed that the Senate still had a role to play 
although this  did diminish throughout  the century before becoming negligible. 
Initially, however, to achieve legitimacy, an emperor needed the support of both. 
Only  then  would  they  be  shown obedience  and  not  be  threatened  –  however 
26 M. Weber. Sociological Writings. (New York, 1994a), p. 11. It could be imposed by those who 
were able to claim the obedience of the other groups. 
27 Ando (2000), pp. 25-26. An example of a usurper how managed to become a legitimate emperor 
through his acceptance by the strongest sections of Roman society is Septimius Severus. He was 
initially a usurper when proclaimed by his troops with Didius Julianus in power but he was then 
legitimated through his acceptance by the Senate. However, he did not have the universal backing 
of the army. He was not able to achieve this until he had dealt with the other contenders for the 
empire. See Dio 74.14.3-77.17.4 for the evidence of Septimius' rise to power.
28 Ando (2000), p. 30.
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temporarily (for some were quickly de-legitimised) – by the possibility of one of 
these groups establishing a rival for his position.29
Because imperial  power is,  by nature,  arbitrary,  it  was important  that  the new 
regime did not draw attention to this fact. To do so, opponents who were not part 
of the former regime were vilified as brigands and public enemies rather than 
being  labelled  as  usurpers.30 This  was  because  an  emperor  could  never 
acknowledge the possibility that he once might have had a similarly uncertain 
foundation to his regime that those attempting to usurp his position enjoyed upon 
their attempted assumption of power.31 It was necessary for there to be a show of 
legality. Augustus, for example, apparently claimed that he was prepared to lay 
aside his power and allow Rome to revert to its Republican form (Cass. Dio 53.4) 
which in turn led to him receiving power from the Senate rather than taking it for 
himself (Cass. Dio 53.11-12). This showed respect for the institutions and laws 
which preceded him and allowed there to be the illusion of continuity.32 Once a 
new  regime  had  allied  itself  with  those  who  had  military  power  in  order  to 
alleviate the possibility of being challenged, it would then seek to secure support 
29 Beetham (1991, p. 209) defines delegitimation to be ‘a process whereby those whose consent is 
necessary to the legitimation of government act in a manner that indicates their withdrawal of 
consent’  and  this  withdrawal  needs  to  be  widely  known  (p.  210).  Examples  are  mass 
demonstrations, strikes and acts of civil disobedience, which can damage the ability of a regime to 
rule.
30 Nixon and Rodgers (1994), p. 25.
31 Ando (2000), p. 30. 
32 R. Syme, Tacitus (Oxford, 1958), p. 408.
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throughout the populace and use the allies it had to help promote its legitimacy 
with these other groups.33
Weber  does  not  pass  judgement  upon whether  a  particular  political  system is 
desirable or not, as he believes the desire to legitimate itself is the aim that any 
kind of regime tries to achieve.34 Barker praises Weber’s theory for describing 
conduct and for using a concept of legitimacy that explains the ability of the state 
or a regime to rule rather than explaining or justifying the obedience of those 
subject to it, so giving an understanding of how regimes justify their power to 
themselves.35 Mention should be made, however, that not everyone believes that 
Weber’s model should be accepted and looking at some criticisms can then be 
used to show why, in fact, Weber’s model is worth using. 
Critics  think  that  by  deeming  it  possible  for  a  regime  to  be  legitimised  just 
because  those  subject  to  it  believe  that  it  is  ignores  the  moral  qualities  or 
foundations  of  a  regime.36 These,  they assert,  must  be  considered  because  by 
failing  to  do  so  Weber  allows  the  possibility  of  tyrannical  regimes  gaining 
legitimacy.37 However, a set of principles that can be applied universally is what a 
theory should be seeking in order to give it widespread application. To fail to do 
33 R. Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, 1990), p. 117.
34 Barker (1990), p. 77.
35 Barker (1990), pp. 199-200. Also see Weber (1994a), pp. 28-29.
36 See R.  Grafstein,  ‘The Failure of  Weber’s  Concept  of  Legitimacy’,  Journal  of  Politics,  43 
(1981), p. 456 and K. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, (Oxford, 1980), p. 109 for 
examples of such criticism.
37 Barker (1990), p. 25.
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so risks producing a theory based on the evidence to prove a certain point rather 
than all the evidence that could be used to prove a general point, and consequently 
provides too narrow a view on what can constitute legitimacy. 
Beetham qualifies his criticism of Weber by stating that legitimacy should exist 
not because it  is  believed to do so but because it  can be justified in terms of 
beliefs which conform to the people’s or society’s values or standards.38 He is also 
critical of the three aspects identified by Weber as he believes that they are all 
made  into  self-sufficient  types  of  legitimacy  rather  than  being  aspects  that 
combine to make up legitimacy.39 Fault with Weber is also found by others, such 
as  Habermas,  who  believe  that  legitimacy  cannot  arise  from  within  the 
government and administration alone, but that it requires something further from 
outside  the  political  system  to  justify  it  in  rational  terms.40 Weber’s  model, 
therefore, according to Barker needs extending to include what he calls a ‘value 
rational  legitimacy’,  which  is  associated  with  the  values  or  policies  that  the 
regime propounds.41 
38 Beetham (1991), p. 11. Beetham (1991), pp. 15-24 defines what he considers legitimacy to be. 
The three aspects that he believes all need to be present are (1) conformity to established rules, 
which can be (2) justified by referring to beliefs that the subordinate and dominant within the 
society both share and (3) evidence that the subordinate consent to their relationship with the 
dominant. These aspects all ensure that there is acceptance of and obedience to a regime. Views 
such as Beetham’s are seeking to build on Weber’s foundation in order to iron out the kinks. For 
example, aspect (2) of Beetham (see 1991, p. 17) is similar to the idea of legality established by 
Weber as both require power to be derived from a valid source of authority. Therefore, Weber’s 
principles will form the basis for the theory of legitimacy to be used in this study.
39 Beetham (1991), p. 24.
40 J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis trans. by T. McCarthy, (London, 1976), pp. 101-102.
41 Barker (1990), p. 38.
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Weber does not include a notion of a value rational legitimising factor because his 
conception  of  authority  is  not  morally  based  and so  he  did  not  consider  it  a 
necessary inclusion.42 Any regime that is truly reprehensible will struggle to foster 
the belief amongst those subject to it that it is legitimate, or will be quickly de-
legitimated. There may be sufficient belief within certain circles, usually those 
closest to the regime who form its power base, that are enough to provide it with 
some legitimacy, but without more broad support, this risks being lost.  The aim 
of any regime should be to bolster the belief in it rather than merely to maintain 
its initial support base in case it alienates a part of it and suffers delegitimation. 
The right of emperors to rule, and consequently the security of their legitimacy, 
required  that  there  be  some belief  within  the  society  of  their  right  to  do  so, 
otherwise they would merely be relying upon force to assert their will. To assess 
whether a regime has acquired legitimacy or not, it is necessary to evaluate the 
level of public support and compliance that it enjoys.43 This can be measured by 
its  ability  to  ensure  that  its  commands  are  obeyed.44 For  Weber,  the  fact  its 
42 Barker (1990), p. 53. Also see Weber (1994a), pp. 31-32.
43 R.  Rose,  ‘Dynamic  Tendencies  in  the Authority of  Regimes’,  World Politics XXI (4)  (July 
1969): pp.  606-607. 
44 F. Rosen, ‘Legitimacy: A Utilitarian View’ in A. Moulakis, ed., Legitimacy: Proceedings of the 
Conference Held in Florence June 3 and 4, 1982 (New York, 1986), p. 69. Rosen (1986, p. 75) 
emphasises  that  Bentham does  not  aim to establish that  representative  democracy is  the  only 
legitimate  form of  government,  because  every government  which  is  obeyed  by the  people  is 
legitimate. The concept of obedience is apparent in Weber’s definition of dominance, whereby he 
states that domination (or the authoritarian power of command) is the way in which rulers are able 
to influence the behaviour of those they rule in such a way as to make it seem as though they 
considered what was commanded by the ruler to be the reason for their conduct through their own 
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commands are being obeyed is not necessarily sufficient to indicate that there is 
obedience, but the fact that there is obedience does suggest that the command is 
perceived to be valid.45 This requires consensus and unity amongst the powerful 
groups in the society about the value of their political institutions.46 Legitimacy 
involves a two-way relationship between the ruler and the ruled which requires 
there to be some belief from the subordinate about the right of the dominant to 
exercise  that  authority.47 The  different  elements  that  make  up  a  society  have 
different needs and beliefs, so it is the perceptions of those sections of society that 
are dominant, rather than those over whom power is exercised, that are the most 
important.48 
Ideally,  the emperors would make sure that  they kept both the nobles and the 
people  happy,  but  this  was  not  always  easily  achieved.  As  Cassius  Dio  has 
Septimius state,  and also as espoused by Tacitus a century before him, it  was 
important for emperors, especially new ones, to keep the soldiers happy first and 
foremost (Cass. Dio 77.15.2/Tac. Hist. 1.4-5).49 Therefore, ensuring the support of 
free will,  rather than any imposition. This can, when looked at  from the other perspective, be 
called obedience rather than domination. See Weber (1968), p. 946.
45 Weber (1968), p. 946.
46 G. Lowell Field and J. Higley, ‘Elites, Insiders, and Outsiders: Will Western Political Regimes 
Prove Non-Viable?’ in B. Denitch, ed.,  Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks of  
Analysis (London, 1979), pp. 141-142.
47 Weber (1962), p. 20. Also see Beetham (1991), p. 18. He believes that the expression of this 
belief needs to be explicit through, for example, acclamation, swearing allegiance or voting in 
elections. This means that the subordinate are contributing to legitimacy.
48 J. Rothschild, ‘Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe’ in B. Denitch, ed., Legitimation of  
Regimes: International Frameworks of Analysis (London, 1979), p. 51.
49 See Tac. Hist. 1.4.  evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri.  Since the 
troops had the power to make or break a regime, the emperor needed to ensure they were kept 
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the powerful groups could mean that a regime out of favour with the mass of the 
population could still preserve its legitimacy.50 This does not mean that a regime 
has to be supported by the whole of society to be considered legitimate.  It still 
may be considered so provided there are sufficiently powerful elements within the 
society willing to continue to acknowledge its legitimacy and those elements that 
do  not  explicitly  support  it  still  either  implicitly  accept  the  regime’s  right  to 
exercise its  authority through their obedience or are not in a position for their 
beliefs  to  be  of  consequence.51 The  willingness  to  submit  to  orders,  whether 
implicitly or explicitly, on the part of those who are subordinate can be for any 
number  of  diverse  and  individualistic  reasons,  which  can  include  habit,  self-
interest or a sense of pressure from either the wider community in general or more 
specifically those in the positions of power.52 Sometimes this compliance is tacit 
as a combination of custom, tradition and law means the individual is not even 
aware that he or she is submitting to orders.53 
happy or there was the possibility that they would rebel, as noted by Tacitus (Hist. 1.5)
Miles urbanus longo Caesarum sacramento imbutus et ad destituendum Neronem arte 
magis  et  impulsu quam suo ingenio traductus,  postquam neque dari  donativum sub nomine 
Galbae promissum neque magnis  meritis  ac praemiis  eundem in pace quem in bello locum 
praeventamque gratiam intellegit apud principem a legionibus factum. 
This would help to explain why Dio considered that Septimius would advise his sons 
μονοε τε, το ς στρατιώτας πλουτίζετε, τ ν λλων πάντων καταφρονε τε ὁ ῖ ὺ ῶ ἄ ῖ (Cass. Dio 77.15.2).
50 Rothschild (1979), p. 51. 
51 T.  Schabert,  ‘Power,  Legitimacy and  Truth:  Reflections  on  the  Impossibility  to  Legitimise 
Legitimations of Political Order’ In A. Moulakis, ed., Legitimacy: Proceedings of the Conference 
Held in Florence June 3 and 4, 1982 (New York, 1986), pp. 102-103. Also Barker (1990), p. 113.
52 Ciacci (1986), pp. 22-23.
53 Weber (1962), p. 83.
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There are three interlinked components that Barker identifies which help ensure 
that a regime’s commands are obeyed; reward, belief and coercion.54 Rewards for 
obedience can be given either for the general benefit of society but are more often 
used to strengthen its position with its support base.55 The belief in a regime’s 
legitimacy can be shown through some positive assertion but it is not necessarily 
required in order for this to be so as legitimacy can be derived from habit.56  The 
great  majority of the people,  if  their  lives  are  undisturbed,  generally show an 
acceptance of the regime change by continuing on with the normal routine of their 
lives.57 Barker  argues  that  this  unquestioned  acceptance  of  authority  makes 
habitual legitimacy the most characteristic form of legitimacy and, just because 
there is no overt show of acceptance of the regime’s right to govern, it is a mistake 
to believe that a regime is not being recognised as legitimate.58 
The role that coercion and fear play in helping a regime acquire legitimacy is open 
to  debate.  For  Weber,  a  distinguishing  feature  of  a  state  is  that  it  enjoys  a 
monopoly  over  the  means  of  coercion,59 with  enforcement  being  the  ultimate 
54 Barker (1990), p. 37.
55 A. Moulakis, ‘Introduction’ in A. Moulakis, ed.,  Legitimacy: Proceedings of the Conference  
Held in Florence June 3 and 4, 1982 (New York, 1986), p. 4. 
56 Barker (1990), pp. 31-32. Beetham (1991, pp. 150-151) argues that the consent of the governed 
needs to be explicitly given, although he also believes that in ‘traditional’ societies, such as many 
medieval monarchies where the privileged and propertied had rights which the greater mass of the 
populace did not, it was possible for consent to be given on behalf of others. Those involved in the 
political arena in these societies was quite small and their consent was taken to include that of the 
subordinates and dependents.
57 N. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by G. Bull (London, 1981), p. 36.
58 Barker (1990), p. 33.
59 Weber (1984), p. 33.
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sanction upon which governments are able to call.60 He does not, however, define 
the  use  of  this  monopoly as  legitimate  in  all  circumstances  since  it  may not 
always be so considered by those forced to submit to it61 and, whilst Barker agrees 
that fear plays a necessary part in governance, he points out that this should not be 
the  only  reason  that  there  is  compliance.62 Regimes  that  are  perceived  to  be 
maintaining their power through their direct dependence upon force and coercion 
enjoy little legitimacy.63 Indeed, Moulakis would argue that if this was the only 
reason that there was obedience, a regime could not be regarded as legitimate at 
all.64 It is the recognition that the fear of force exacts, in the form of obedience, 
rather than the force alone which allows a regime to be recognised as legitimate.65 
The  imperium which  they  held  allowed  the  Roman  generals  to  enforce  their 
commands and gave them the legal basis with which to do so.
Coercion and legitimacy, therefore, cannot be considered to be mutually exclusive 
and, since they are both characteristics of governments, they serve to sustain each 
60 Barker (1990), p. 50. Also see pp. 129-130.
61 Barker (1990), p. 56.
62 Barker (1990), pp. 129-130.
63 Lowell Field and Higley (1979), pp. 141-142. Also see Polyb. (6.4) who considers that one-man 
rule is only kingship if it  is voluntarily accepted by its subjects and governed by an appeal to 
reason  rather  than  by fear  or  by force:  ο τε  γ ρ  π σαν δήπου  μοναρὔ ὰ ᾶ χίαν  ε θέως  βασιλείανὐ  
ητέον, λλ  μόνην τ ν ξ κόντων συγχωρουμένην κα  τ  γνώμ  τ  πλε ον  φόβ  κα  βίῥ ἀ ὰ ὴ ἐ ἑ ὶ ῇ ῃ ὸ ῖ ἢ ῳ ὶ ᾳ 
κυβερνωμένην.
64 A. Moulakis, ‘Introduction.’ In  Legitimacy: Proceedings of the Conference Held in Florence 
June 3 and 4, 1982, edited by A. Moulakis, (New York, 1986), pp. 3-4.
65 M. Cranston, ‘From Legitimism to Legitimacy’ in A. Moulakis, ed., Legitimacy: Proceedings of  
the Conference Held in Florence June 3 and 4, 1982 (New York, 1986), p. 38.
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other.66 It is possible to argue, as Rosen does,67 that legitimacy, given the broad 
range of meanings given to the term, can be claimed by even those regimes which 
are tyrannical by nature. This is because they claim moral ‘rightness’ for the laws 
they institute through the force of their arms and the terror they inspire whereby 
they are able to gain the obedience of sufficient or sufficiently powerful elements 
of the populace.
It is necessary, however, to take the attitude of those subject to the regime into 
account.  It  is  not necessary for submission to  be based on faith in a  regime’s 
legitimacy as loyalty can be simulated, but the fact that its subjects play by its 
rules  does  suggest  that  there  is  faith  in  the  system  of  government  that  is 
operating.68 Regimes  that  seek  to  govern  from  principles  that  those  being 
governed  do  not  accept  find  that  their  attempts  at  coercion  are  resisted,  not 
because of their violence alone, but because of the very unacceptability of the 
principles.69 Therefore, if the nature of the government, regardless of the form that 
it takes, is sufficiently acceptable to gain the obedience of the populace, whether 
simulated or not, a regime should be able to claim that it is ruling legitimately. 
Rome  itself  was  a  society  in  which  force  and  coercion  had  always  played  a 
66 Barker (1990), p. 132. See also Beetham (1991), p. 139. The relationship between coercion and 
legitimacy is complex and the use of force when used to suppress deeply held grievances can 
erode rather than bolster legitimacy. At other times legitimacy can be eroded when the state is seen 
to fail to use force to suppress the expression of grievances by parts of the population.
67 Rosen (1986), p. 67.
68 Ando (2000), p. 374.
69 Barker (1990), pp. 134-135. See also Beetham (1991), p. 35. Legitimate power is limited power 
because those in the positions of power are only able to maintain their power by respecting the 
rules  and  principles  upon  which  their  legitimacy  is  accepted.  To  transgress  is  to  risk 
delegitimation. These rules define the duties and obligations of the powerful and the subordinate.
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significant  role.  Events  such  as  the  foundation  of  the  city  and  Augustus’ 
establishment of the empire were both enmeshed with violence.70 Therefore, to 
dismiss the possibility of legitimacy being able to have some basis in violence is 
to dismiss the possibility of the legitimacy of the Roman government.
 
Regimes regularly try to bolster their own legitimacy through the use of rituals, 
propaganda and education, usually because of their insecurity.71 They can include 
appeals to non-political sources such as to divine sanction, where they will seek, 
through their propaganda, to associate themselves with certain gods.72 Polybius 
believed that Rome’s approach to religion held the state together and was adopted 
for the sake of the common people because it served to restrain them from any 
lawless  desires  that  existed  (Polyb.  6.56).73 The  oaths  that  were  taken  were 
expected to galvanise the state and prevent unscrupulous behaviour (Polyb. 6.56). 
Therefore, tying themselves to certain gods and diligently performing rituals for 
the gods that were important within the state allowed Roman emperors to be able 
to enhance their prestige and consequently the legitimacy of their regimes in the 
70 See Livy 1.6-10 for some instances of the violence associated with Rome's founding such as the 
murder of Remus and the rape of the Sabine women. Suet. Aug. 15 and 17 contain examples of the 
violence in the power struggle preceding the establishment of the empire.
71 Barker (1990), p. 145. Also see p. 156.
72 Barker (1990), p. 27. An example of this would be the association the Diocletian and Maximian 
had with Jupiter and Hercules (Aur. Vict. Caes. 39).
73 λέγω δ  τ ν δεισιδαιμονίαν· π  τοσοὲ ὴ ἐ ὶ ῦτον γ ρ κτετραγ δηται κα  παρεισ κται το το τ  μέροςὰ ἐ ῴ ὶ ῆ ῦ ὸ  
παρ' α το ς ε ς τε το ς κατ' δίαν βίους κα  τ  κοιν  τ ς πόλεως στε μ  καταλιπε ν περβολήν. ὐ ῖ ἴ ὺ ἰ ὶ ὰ ὰ ῆ ὥ ὴ ῖ ὑ ὃ  
κα  δόξειεν  ν  πολλο ς  ε ναι  θαυμάσιον.  μοί  γε  μ ν  δοκο σι  το  πλήθους  χάριν  το τοὶ ἂ ῖ ἶ ἐ ὴ ῦ ῦ ῦ  
πεποιηκέναι. ε  μ ν γ ρ ν σοφ ν νδρ ν πολίτευμα συναγαγε ν, σως ο δ ν ν ναγκα ος ἰ ὲ ὰ ἦ ῶ ἀ ῶ ῖ ἴ ὐ ὲ ἦ ἀ ῖ ὁ 
τοιο τος τρόπος ... πε  δ  π ν πλ θός στιν λαφρ ν κα  πλ ρες πιθυμι ν παρανόμων, ργ ςῦ ἐ ὶ ὲ ᾶ ῆ ἐ ἐ ὸ ὶ ῆ ἐ ῶ ὀ ῆ  
λόγου, θυμο  βιαίου,ἀ ῦ
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eyes  of  the people.  Gallienus,  for example,  was promoted as the intermediary 
between the gods and men on his coinage and in inscriptions.74 Perceived external 
threats can also be used by a regime to augment their standing within the state or 
justify actions undertaken that require explaining.75 
Legitimacy is something that regimes can lose as well as acquire, although to lose 
it is never their goal. The theoretical and moral grounds that can create legitimacy 
can also be the grounds for its denial. This is because norms are only justifiable 
when  some  form  of  rational  consensus,  whether  actual  or  potential,  exists.76 
Therefore crises of legitimation occur when people can no longer explain why 
they  ought  to  obey and  mass  loyalty  cannot  be  maintained.77 This  should  be 
adjusted from mass to sufficient loyalty, however, as not every legitimate regime 
will have mass loyalty to begin with. 
74 L. de Blois. 'Traditional Virtues and New Spiritual Qualities in Third Century Views of Empire, 
Emperorship and Practical Politics' in Mnemosyne, Vol 47 No 2, April 1994, pp. 173-174. ILS 548, 
for example, promotes his piety – Gallieno ... cuius inuicta uirtus sola pietate superata est – and 
especially ILS 550 when he is claimed to be Inuicto imperatori Pio Felici Gallieno Augusto, dis  
animo uoltuque compari. Also see RIC V.1 Gallienus 81 for an example of a coin displaying the 
relationship between Gallienus and Victory, who is crowning him on the coin's reverse.
75 Barker (1990),  p.  150. An example is  Septimius’ Persian invasion immediately after he had 
defeated Niger (Cass. Dio 75.2.2). This took attention away from the civil war which had taken 
place and refocused the army and people on the threats which existed to Rome from beyond its 
borders.
76 Habermas (1976), p. 111.
77 Habermas (1976), p. 46. Beetham (1991), p. 119 gives some examples. These include the failure 
of  a  policy  that  was  considered  important,  hardships  being  imposed  on  the  people,  national 
humiliation or the death or disability of the leader. This last reason can especially cause problems 
when the regime relies on the charisma as the main principle of its legitimation.
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Weber's  categories  for  legitimate  authority  can  be  used  in  order  to  establish 
whether the regimes throughout the third and first half of the fourth centuries were 
legitimate. These categories were important factors which were needed in order to 
give a regime the requisite level of support and obedience throughout the society 
which the regime governed. Regimes, therefore, could be established on the basis 
of  one  or  even  on  a  combination  of  Weber’s  principles.  To  be  considered 
legitimate it was necessary for there to be sufficient belief within the populace 
that a regime had a legal and traditional right to rule that would prevent it being 
challenged by any groups that did not believe in its right to govern. This belief 
needed to be held not only by those in power, but also by other powerful and 
dominant groups within the society.  This belief  was represented by obedience, 
whether explicit or implicit, that ensured compliance to the regime’s commands. 
Obedience  could  be  obtained  through  rewards,  their  expectation,  or  through 
coercion. It could not, however, rely solely on coercion as there needed to be a 
desire on the part of those who were obedient to be so.
 
Defining the legitimation of imperial regimes within Weber’s framework means 
that criticisms and defences of his work will equally apply to those works that are 
guided by his. The strength of his framework is, however, that it can be used to 
assess many different regime types and adjusted for differences in time and place. 
Therefore, setting a framework that espouses modern western democracy as the 
ideal type of regime does not suit a society such as Rome that is so far removed in 
time  and  ideology.  Applying  modern  western  liberal  conceptions  of  what 
constitutes legitimacy rather than formulating a framework that can accommodate 
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regimes of different types and historical periods disregards the perceptions that 
the Romans themselves had of their system of government and those within their 
system.  The  Romans  did  consider  some  men  to  be  legitimate  leaders  whose 
commands were to be obeyed, whilst being well aware of the concept of usurpers 
who did not command such widespread respect.
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Chapter 2: Legally Proclaimed Legitimacy
Legitimate regimes need to be proclaimed by an authoritative source.1 The belief 
in the legality of the authoritative source occurs when there are rules which are 
conformed to and for which there is an accepted procedure.2 Those who do not 
concur, however, can be willing to acquise to the will of the majority. The Roman 
army was not the majority but legitimacy can be achieved by minorities who do 
seek to impose an order on the majority,3 which occurs when the majority submit.4 
This was the case with the army in Rome. It was an authoritative source of power 
and there was a belief in the legitimacy of this authority.5 The obedience shown to 
an emperor was based on the authority he had received from the authoritative 
source.6 The people and army had been willing to submit to the Senate's will in 
Rome's past and the Senate continued to hold some vestage of their power. It was 
not, however, any longer the sole authority in regard to legitimating regimes. 
The Senate’s powers had been waning prior to the imperial period and, although it 
continued to exist,  the nature and importance of the Senate as an authoritative 
source needs to be examined. This has been necessary in order to test how much 
influence  it  retained  in  the  legitimation  process  at  the  beginning  of  the  third 
1 M. Weber. Sociological Writings. (New York, 1994a), p. 12.
2 M. Weber. The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. (New York, 1947), pp. 329-330.
3 Weber (1994a), pp. 31-32.
4 Weber (1994a), p. 32.
5 Weber (1994a), p. 32.
6 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
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century  and  what  changes  took  place  thereafter.  In  contrast,  in  third  century 
Rome,  the most  important  source was the army.7 The power of the army had 
meant that it was the major force behind the appointment of emperors long before 
the period under discussion.8 The nature of any relationship between the army and 
the Senate,  therefore,  also needs  to  be considered to see whether  there  was a 
cooperative role in the legitimation process and how important it was. 
Regimes throughout the third century struggled to establish and maintain their 
legitimacy. Commodus had no natural  successor so his death was followed by 
instability  and civil  war  (Zos.  1.7.1-1.8.2).  Various  candidates  emerged in  the 
twelve months following his death and all of these men had the support of parts of 
the  army.  Of  these  candidates,  however,  only  Septimius  Severus  managed  to 
legitimise his regime over the longer term and win the support of the whole of the 
army (Herodian 3.6.8). As well this support, he also gained the backing of the 
Senate (Cass. Dio 76.8.5). The backing Septimius received from the Senate was 
not overwhelming in its enthusiasm (Cass. Dio 76.8.5) but that he did receive it 
meant that its resources and influence were not put behind a potential rival. 
Prior to the third century, the men who had become emperor were all from the 
Senatorial order. This changed during the third century and the social status of the 
men who rose to become emperor varied. There continued to be some men, such 
7 C.S. Mackay, Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History, (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 279-280.
8 This went back to Augustan times and can be seen clearly in times of instability such as the civil 
wars of AD 68-69 and again after the death of Domitian. See Tacitus’ History for the instability of 
AD 68-69 and especially Tac. Hist 1.4.
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as  Valerian,  Tacitus,  Pupienus  Maximus  and  Balbinus,  who  rose  to  become 
emperor  from  amongst  the  Senate’s  ranks,  but  there  were  others,  such  as 
Macrinus, Maximinus Thrax and Diocletian who were army men with neither an 
illustrious ancestry nor even necessarily Senatorial status of their own.9 For all of 
these emperors during this time, regardless of their social background, the army 
was  the  most  important  source  of  power  and,  consequently,  had  the  most 
important role in their legitimation.10 Septimius Severus was declared emperor by 
his troops (Zos. 1.8.1)11 and this was not a new phenomenon.12 The power the 
army had to promote men to become emperor was one that was never successfully 
removed from them and emperors had managed to secure their legitimacy after 
having been declared by the troops far back in the first century, with Vespasian 
being a notable example of this.13 
9 A. Chastagnol, Le Senat Romain à l’Époque Impériale (Paris, 1992), p. 203 and also p. 207.
10 M. Hammond, 'The Transformation of the Powers of the Roman Emperor from the Death of 
Nero in AD 68 to that of Alexander Severus in AD 235' in Memoirs of the American Academy in  
Rome. 1956. Vol. 24, p. 63. This was the case by the end of the second century.
11 Τ ς δ  γερουσίας ε ς τ  διασκοπ σαι τίνι ῆ ὲ ἰ ὸ ῆ δέοι παραδο ναι τ ν ρχ ν ναβαλλομένης, Σεβ ροςῦ ὴ ἀ ὴ ἀ ῆ  
ναδείκνυται βασιλεύςἀ
12 Vespasian provides an example of this.  Vespasian’s acclamation occurred while Vitellius was 
emperor  in Rome and when the two Egyptian legions declared for  him with the Judaean and 
Syrian legions following suit (Tac.  Hist.  2.79-81). He dated his rule from this time rather than 
when the Senate accepted him as the legitimate emperor in December 69 (Tac. Hist. 4.3). Although 
he  was  initially usurping  power,  he  was  quickly able  to  establish  his  legitimacy through  the 
requisite  sources.  There  are  parallels  between  this  and  Septimius’ acclamation  whilst  Didius 
Julianus was the incumbent emperor in Rome.
13 As mentioned above in note 12.
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The speed with which Septimius moved after Pertinax’s death suggests he had 
been awaiting his opportunity.14 It was an advantage to be prepared and ensure 
that  the troops  were supportive  since  the  major  problem facing  any would-be 
emperor was to ensure that enough troops were sufficiently loyal to him so that 
they would not declare for their general against him.15 Therefore, it was necessary 
to have the backing of other generals in order to remove the likelihood that they 
would  also  challenge.  As  a  wealthy  Senator,  Septimius  had  connections  and 
clients,  all  of  whom he  would have expected  support  and information from.16 
Information  and assistance  from these  supporters  is  what  had  allowed him to 
survive Commodus and succeed Pertinax.17 His strategic marriage to Julia Domna 
would also have helped since it served to enhance his support network with those 
who  were  tied  to  her  family.18 All  an  ambitious  man  needed  was  the  right 
opportunity and the right support and, given the unpopularity of Commodus and 
his  erratic  behaviour,  it  would  have  seemed  likely  that  an  opportunity  would 
arise,19 although the exact moment that the imperial position might come vacant 
was uncertain.
14 A. Birley, Septimius Severus: The African Emperor (London, 1971), p. 158.
15 Most usurpations came about because a general had the support of his troops who would declare 
him emperor. Postumus, for example, was a general in Gaul whose army acclaimed him emperor 
(HA Tyr.  Trig.  3)  but  he never received any recognition from the armies outside of Gaul and 
Gallienus remained the legitimate emperor.
16 T.D.  Barnes,  'The  Family  and  Career  of  Septimius  Severus',  Historia:  Zeitschrift  für  Alte  
Geschichte. 1967. Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 98.
17 P. Southern,  The Roman Empire From Severus to Constantine (London, 2001), pp. 29-30. See 
HA. Sev. 5.3 for the precaution he took to make sure his rear was protected whilst he marched on 
Rome. It would seem from the lack of resistance he faced that he had done this groundwork.
18 B. Levick,. Julia Domna: Syrian Princess. (London, 2007), p. 24.
19 F. Meijer, Emperors Don’t Die in Bed, (London, 2004), pp. 63-65.
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Herodian’s discussion of the events surrounding Septimius’ promotion, by using a 
term that has implications of robbery and rapine ( ρπάσαι), indicate that he isἁ  
aware of the illegitimacy of Septimius’ seizure of power (Herodian 2.9.3).20 At 
this  point,  then,  he cannot  have been  considered  to  have  met  any of  Weber’s 
principles for establishing his regime’s legitimacy.21 At the time of his acclamation 
the declaration by the army cannot be considered to have been a declaration by a 
legitimate authority. The group which recognised Septimius was only a part of the 
Roman army since other parts supported other men. It was, however, more than 
just his own troops who supported Septimius, with the generals on the Rhine and 
Danube encouraging their troops to declare for him (HA Sev 5.3). The  Historia 
Augusta should be considered reliable on this occasion because these legions were 
honoured by Septimius on his coinage.22 This meant that his network of support 
was effective and he had gathered quite a firm base from which to launch his bid 
for power.23 
The proximity of these supporters meant that,  in spite of the threat from other 
contenders, he was able to deal with Julianus while being protected in his rear. 
Didius Julianus had been recognised as emperor,  in spite of having effectively 
20 ο τος  τοίνυν  παρ  τ ν  γγελλόντων  πυνὗ ὰ ῶ ἀ θανόμενος  τ ν  ωμαίων  ρχ ν  μετέωρον  φερομένηνὴ Ῥ ἀ ὴ  
ρπάσαι, καταγνο ς το  μ ν θυμίαν το  δ  νανδρίαν, ... το ς πράγμασιν.ἁ ὺ ῦ ὲ ῥᾳ ῦ ὲ ἀ ῖ
21 Weber (1947), pp. 328-329.
22 H.  Mattingly,  Coins  of  the  Roman  Empire  in  the  British  Museum:  Volume  V Pertinax  to  
Elagabalus (Oxford, 1950), p. lxxxii
23 A. Birley, The African Emperor: Septimius Severus (London, 1988), pp. 97-98.
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bought the imperial title (Cass. Dio 74.11.3-6).24 He had not, however, established 
firm support from enough bases amongst the Praetorians and the Senate so they 
were  unlikely  to  join  his  forces  to  oppose  Septimius  on  his  behalf.  Julianus 
attempted  to  put  pressure  on both  of  these  groups  to  support  him (Cass.  Dio 
74.16.1-3), but they both ended up opposing him (HA Did. Iul. 8.6-7). The other 
contenders for power were not in a position to tackle Septimius as he marched 
towards Rome and may well have been happy to let one of Septimius or Julianus 
eliminate the other. Septimius was protected from Pescennius Niger by Niger’s 
distance from Rome since he was in the east (Cass. Dio 74.14.3). Niger was more 
concerned with securing allies in the east than marching on Rome when he heard 
of Septimius' coup.25 
There was also the threat from Clodius Albinus in Britain, if indeed Albinus had 
thrown his hat in the ring this early.26 The exact timing of Albinus’ declaration 
remains uncertain. He, however, was also far from Rome and, if he did present an 
immediate  threat,  the  armies  on  the  Rhine  could  have  countered  his  advance 
(Herodian 2.9.12). Neither of these other contenders had sufficient backing within 
the army away from their sphere of influence to allow them to tackle any other 
would-be emperor immediately.27 Instead, the distance that separated these three 
24 Being the highest bidder for the imperial title did not lend his regime credibility, but he was in 
Rome and had received recognition for his status from the requisite sources – the army and the 
Senate. Cass. Dio (74.12-13), however, being someone who did not like Julianus, points out that 
he secured the imperial powers from the Senate under duress. With the army’s backing, however, 
the Senate’s lack of enthusiasm did not stop him from being legitimated.
25 Levick (2007), p. 24. 
26 Hammond (1956), p. 111.
27 Levick (2007), p. 40. Niger had ten legions, all of which were based in the east. He did not have 
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men  from one  another  allowed  them to  gather  their  support  and  devise  their 
strategies  to  prepare  for  the  clashes  amongst  themselves  that  were  inevitably 
coming. 
A declaration by a minority of the army in favour of their commander, as had 
occurred for Septimius, was also a common feature of the post-Severan era. Some 
of these commanders managed to secure their  legitimacy, whereas others were 
never recognised by more than their own troops or a small geographic portion of 
the empire. Postumus, for example, was never recognised outside the regions he 
controlled (HA Tyr. Trig. 3.4.5/Zos. 1.38.2). It was an advantage for those who 
aspired to take power, should the opportunity arise, to be with the emperor when 
he went on campaign since he had a large army with him and it was often military 
failures  that  led  to  de-legitimation  and  usurpation.28 The  size  of  this  army, 
therefore,  gave  the  incoming  emperor  a  chance  to  gain  the  acceptance  of  a 
significant portion of the military immediately since the greater the acceptance 
from the army as a whole, the more secure the regime's base. Those with only a 
small portion of the army supporting them were unable to secure their regimes as 
any armed allies as support in the west. The west was under Septimius' command as he was, at this 
time, allied with Albinus and, consequently, had the support of all those legions. Once Niger had 
been defeated and Septimius turned against Albinus, Septimius had all of the legions from the east 
and many of those from the west under his command. Albinus too was lacking armed support from 
outside of the regions he controlled (pp.38-40).
28 See J. B. Campbell, War and Society in Imperial Rome 31 BC – AD 284 (London, 2002), p. 120 
and A. Birley, 'Making Emperors. Imperial Instrument or Instrumental Force?' in P. Erdkamp (ed.), 
A Companion to the Roman Army, (Malden, MA., 2007), pp. 389-390.
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shown by the ultimate failure of Postumus and Carausius to achieve acceptance of 
their claims throughout the empire.29
Incoming emperors often took care to avoid being held responsible for the death 
of  their  predecessor  unless  they had  defeated  them in battle,  with  the  respect 
Philip the Arab showed towards Gordian III being an example  (HA Gord 31.3). 
When the preceding emperor had died in mysterious circumstances it would have 
been detrimental to establishing the legitimacy of their own regime to have been 
implicated. The fallen emperors may have been de-legitimated in the eyes of those 
who were the authoritative source but they were not universally unpopular and 
their  demise was lamented by some as was the case with Caracalla (Herodian 
4.13.7). Those who were proclaimed were often in the vicinity of the emperor 
they replaced,  so it  would  seem likely that  some of  them,  such as  Macrinus, 
Maximinus  Thrax  and  Philip  the  Arab,  were  complicit  in  their  predecessor’s 
downfall.30
Philip the Arab may or may not have been involved in the demise of Gordian III. 
It  is  not  possible  to  say  for  sure  because  there  are  conflicting  stories  in  the 
sources.31 Philip did, however, treat Gordian’s memory with the greatest respect. 
He transported his ashes back to Rome and oversaw Gordian’s deification (HA 
29 K. Stobel, 'Strategy and Army Structure between Septimius Severus and Constantine the Great' 
in P. Erdkamp (ed.), A Companion to the Roman Army, (Malden, MA., 2007), pp. 269-271.
30 J.B. Campbell, The Roman Army: A Sourcebook, (London, 1994), p. 191.
31 See D. MacDonald, 'The Death of Gordian III: Another Tradition'. Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte  
Geschichte. 1981. Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 502-508 for discussion about this conflict.  Also see  HA. 
Gordians 30.8, Eutr. 9.2, Aur. Vict. Caes. 27 and Zos. 1.18-19
43
Gord. 31.3).32 That he considered this to be the right thing to do shows that there 
were still elements of Roman society that had regard for Gordian and that he had 
not  become  de-legitimised  to  such  an  extent  that  his  standing  could  be 
disregarded.  This  means  that  what  Philip  did  was,  in  part,  reverence  to  his 
predecessor and the position of emperor but, by doing so, he was also trying to 
make sure that  he removed any suspicion that he might have played a role in 
Gordian’s  death.  Other  emperors  also  chose  to  deify  their  predecessors. 
Trebonianus  Gallus  allowed  the  deification  of  Decius  (Eutr.  9.3),  which  was 
another case of attempting to remove suspicion of complicity in his  death,  an 
accusation which Zosimus makes of him (Zos. 1.23.2).33 
Macrinus  owed  his  elevation  upon  Caracalla’s  murder  to  the  army  that  was 
present  in  the  east  (Herodian  4.14.1-3),  although  he  did  not  take  the  throne 
immediately upon Caracalla’s death since he did not want to be accused of killing 
him in order to succeed him (Cass. Dio 79.11.4). Macrinus found himself in a 
difficult position since he received his support from the army, but he also needed 
to curb imperial expenditure because Caracalla’s extravagance had depleted the 
treasury to such an extent that he could not afford to pay new recruits at the levels 
set by Caracalla (Cass. Dio 79.12.7). Although he tried to be careful and did not 
remove the privileges of those who had served under Caracalla, his measures did 
result  in  disaffection.34 His  shaky hold on power became even more so when 
32 appellato igitur principe Philippo et Augusto nuncupato Gordianum adul<e>scentem inter deos 
rettulit.
33 ε ςἰ  τὸ νεωτερίζειν ὁ Γάλλος τραπε ςὶ  πικηρυκεύεταιἐ  πρ ςὸ  το ςὺ  βαρβάρους,  κοινων σαιῆ  τ ςῆ  
πιβουλ ςἐ ῆ  τ ςῆ  κατὰ Δεκίου παρακαλ νῶ .
34 H.M.D. Parker, A History of the Roman World from AD 138 to 337, (London, 1935), p. 99. New 
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relatives  of  the  Severans  began promoting  their  own candidate  for  the  throne 
(Cass. Dio 79.12.7 and 79.23.4) and the presence of the large imperial army began 
to  work against  him.35 Dio states that  he may have survived longer  if  he had 
waited until the army had been dispersed before introducing his measures and, if 
he had done so, it would have made it a lot more difficult for the dissatisfaction 
towards him to spread so quickly (Cass. Dio 79.29.1). 
Maximinus Thrax and Philip the Arab, like Macrinus, benefited from being with 
the  imperial  army  when  their  predecessor  was  overthrown  since  they  were 
promoted to  power and gained broad acceptance for  their  position from these 
troops.36 Maximinus was declared emperor because the troops knew him better 
than Severus Alexander, or anyone else close to his imperial person, since he had 
risen  through  their  ranks  (Herodian  6.8.1-7).  Other  men,  however,  such  as 
Carausius, Postumus and Regalianus who were not with the imperial entourage 
when their troops declared in their favour all succeeded to an extent in gaining 
some recognition but never extended it across the empire as a whole to legitimate 
their regimes.37 
recruits were taken on at the rates of pay made under Septimius which meant they did not benefit 
from rises Caracalla awarded the army. See Cass. Dio 79.12.7.
35 Parker (1935), p. 99. 
36 See P. Khuri Hitti, History of Syria: Including Lebanon and Palestine, (Piscataway, NJ. 2004), p. 
345 and P. Southern,  The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History, (Santa Barbara, CA, 
2006), p. 126.
37 R. MacMullen,  Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest and Alienation in the Empire 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 212-213. See HA Tyr. Trig. 10.1-2 for Regalianus, Aur. Vict. Caes. 
33 for Postumus and Aur. Vict. Caes. 39 for Carausius.
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Matters were far from simple for an emperor who was seeking to establish his 
rule.  Whereas  Constantine  was  an  obvious  candidate  to  push  his  imperial 
credentials because he was the son of an Augustus, Diocletian had not been. Both 
men, however, did have to create a situation which they could take advantage of. 
An obvious candidate or not, Constantine’s accession, like Septimius’ had been, 
was illegitimate at the time (Zos. 2.9.1).38 He was promoted by the troops at a 
time  when  the  army was  not  regarded  as  the  authoritative  source  capable  of 
proclaiming an emperor  since  promotion  was then  at  the behest  of  the senior 
emperors. The speed of Constantine’s flight from Galerius’ court to his father’s 
and the precautions he took to make sure he could not be hindered (Zos. 2.8.3)39 
showed  that  he  either  distrusted  Galerius  or  he  took  these  measures  to  cast 
Galerius in a bad light by making it look like he was seeking to harm him.40 Either 
way, it was not an open or warm relationship that he was presenting with one of 
the legitimate Augusti of the day and one which suggests he was not expecting to 
be promoted into the imperial college. This was understandable considering he 
had already been passed over on Diocletian and Maximian's retirements. 
38 N. Lenski, 'The Reign of Constantine' in N. Lenski (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Age 
of  Constantine.  (Cambridge,  2006),  p.  61.  Constantine's  elevation was through the  agency of 
Constantius' praetorian guard rather than the imperial college. It was not a universal acclamation, 
just as Septimius' initial proclamation had not been universally declared (Zos. 1.8.1)
39 ξορμ σαι  δ  πρ ς  τ ν πατέρα Κωνστάντιον ν το ς π ρ τ ς λπεις  θνεσιν ντα κα  τἐ ῆ ὲ ὸ ὸ ἐ ῖ ὑ ὲ ὰ Ἄ ἔ ὄ ὶ ῇ 
Βρεττανί  συνεχέστερον νδημο ντα. Δεδι ς δ  μή ποτε φεύγων καταληφθείη (περιφαν ς γ ρ νᾳ ἐ ῦ ὼ ὲ ὴ ὰ ἦ  
δη πολλο ς  κατέχων α τ ν ρως τ ς βασιλείας) το ς ν το ς σταθμο ς ππους, ο ς τ  δημόσιονἤ ῖ ὁ ὐ ὸ ἔ ῆ ὺ ἐ ῖ ῖ ἵ ὓ ὸ  
τρεφεν, μα τ  φθάσαι τ ν σταθμ ν κολούων κα  χρείους ν το ς ξ ς στ σιν χρ το· καἔ ἅ ῷ ὸ ὸ ὶ ἀ ἐῶ ῖ ἑ ῆ ἑ ῶ ἐ ῆ ὶ 
ξ ς το το ποι ν το ς μ ν διώκουσιν πέκλεισε τ ν π  τ  πρόσω πορείαν, α τ ς δ  προσήγγιζενἑ ῆ ῦ ῶ ῖ ὲ ἀ ὴ ἐ ὶ ὸ ὐ ὸ ὲ  
το ς θνεσιν ν ο ς ν  πατήρ. ῖ ἔ ἐ ἷ ἦ ὁ
40 Lenski (2006), p. 21 and M. Grant,  The Emperor Constantine, (London, 1993), p. 22 are both 
sceptical about the story. 
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His proclamation by the troops did, however, force Galerius’ hand which shows 
that although they were not, in theory, the authoritative source at that time they 
did retain their importance and power and were capable of asserting this when 
they  wanted  (Pan Lat 6(7).8.2).  The  balance  which  the  tetrarchy had  tried  to 
establish in their own favour had not been successful when tested by force of 
arms. Galerius did not, however, cede all his ground and offered the position of 
Caesar to Constantine rather than accept him as a fellow Augustus (Lactant. Mort.  
Pers. 25).  In  order  to  establish himself,  therefore,  Constantine  settled  for  this 
position.  He  had,  however,  gained  a  position  in  the  imperial  college  and, 
thereafter, his tactics were the same as those of Septimius over a century earlier, 
who picked off his opponents one at a time (Eutr. 10.4-6). Constantine mastered 
the art of the strategic alliance as those he made with Maximian and then Licinius 
showed (Zos. 2.10.5-6 and Eutr. 10.5).41 None of the others emperors, however, 
managed to form an alliance to take on Constantine because of the suspicion they 
felt  towards  each  other.  This  would  have  been  in  part  due  to  the  actions  of 
Constantine who was not interested in fostering an attitude of cooperation.
In Diocletian’s case, he used Numerianus’ death to his own advantage (Aur. Vict. 
Caes. 39).42 The exact manner of his death is unknown, but Diocletian chose to 
affix the blame on Aper. By killing Aper (HA Carus 13),43 Diocletian removed the 
41 Constantine and Licinius had had an alliance through Licinius' marriage to Constantine's sister, 
Constantia.
42 T.D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 4-5.
43 quem ad modum Numerianus esset occisus, educto gladio Aprum praefectum praetori ostentans 
percussit, addens verbis suis: 'hic est auctor necis Numeriani.'
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risk that he could be accused of being involved because he had now established 
that he was Numerianus’ avenger. This, consequently, gave Diocletian a link to the 
previous  regime  and  Aper’s  death  also  removed  a  man  who  could  threaten 
Diocletian’s  ambitions  (Eutr.  9.20).44 Diocletian’s  link  to  Numerianus  as  his 
avenger remained tenuous, however, whilst Carinus was present in the west since 
he was still alive and the legitimate emperor (Eutr. 9.19-20). It should have been 
Carinus who was his brother’s avenger or, if Diocletian was to do it, he should 
have done it in Carinus’ name. He was, however, helped in his ambitions by the 
usurpation  of  Sabinus  Julianus  against  Carinus  since  it  gave  Diocletian  the 
opportunity to wait for a victor (Aur. Vict.  Caes. 39). If that was Julianus, then 
Diocletian could set out to avenge the usurped legitimate emperor, just as he had 
avenged his brother.45 It was, however, Carinus who was successful so Diocletian 
had to oppose him by levelling the same charge of tyranny against him that those 
who tried to promote Julianus had done (Zos. 1.73.1) and claim that he wanted to 
rescue  the  people  from his  oppressive  regime.46 After  his  success,  Diocletian 
gained the support of the remnants of Carinus’ army when the troops swore an 
oath of allegiance to him.47 This enhanced his legitimacy because it tied the troops 
to him. Carinus’ defeat also meant that there were no longer any other candidates 
for the throne left standing.
44 S. Williams, Diocletian and the Roman Recovery. (London, 1985), pp. 35-37.
45 Southern (2001), p. 135.
46 Also see  HA Carus 18 – Carinus 'maiora vitia et  scelera edidit,  quasi  iam liber  ac frenis  
domesticae  pietatis  suorum mortibus  absolutus'.  Also  see  Eutr.  9.20,  who states  that  Carinus 
'omnium odio et detestatione viventem'.
47 Williams (1985), p. 38. 
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The support of an authoritative source was essential for establishing a regime and 
the  removal  of  this  support  could  result  in  the  regime's  delegitimation  and 
overthrow.  Therefore,  it  was  important  to  maintain  the  belief  in  the  regime's 
legitimacy.48 Carinus, for example, was de-legitimised. According to Victor (Caes 
39), he was able to defeat Julianus which showed that he had had the respect of 
his troops at that time. His behaviour, however, is portrayed as being that of a 
tyrant.  Whether  this  was  true  or  merely subsequent  propaganda by Diocletian 
through which he sought to justify his own actions in challenging the legitimate 
emperor is neither here nor there. That his troops saw fit to assassinate him (Aur. 
Vict.  Caes 39)49 shows that he had lost his standing amongst the troops and his 
position, which should have been secure, was successfully challenged.50 
Septimius was well aware that the path which he had taken to become emperor 
was one that any man could take provided he was ambitious and there was enough 
dissatisfaction  amongst  enough  of  the  army for  them to  be  receptive  to  any 
seditious talk.51 Having loyal men, therefore, was imperative for any emperor who 
desired to maintain their position.  Men of ambition had to be working for the 
regime rather than against it if the emperor was to maintain the undivided loyalty 
of the army. To this end, Septimius’ strategies proved effective. He knew that an 
48 Weber (1994a), p. 29.
49 At Carinus ubi Moesiam contigit, illico Marcum iuxta Diocletiano congressus, dum victos avide 
premeret, suorum ictu interiit.
50 Williams (1985), p. 38.
51 J.B. Campbell. The Emperor and the Roman Army 31 BC – AD 235. (Oxford, 1984), pp. 171 and 
also 51-52. Septimius paid larger than usual donatives and decided to forego imperial luxuries in 
order to share the hard life which his men had to endure. Also see Herodian 3.6.10.
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emperor could only successfully establish himself if he was the sole source of 
power  and  patronage,  so  he  had  to  prevent  anyone  from becoming  powerful 
enough to challenge him.52 Septimius could not, however, afford to stifle all hope 
of advancement but he was able to rein in the ambitions of others through the 
example  of  his  severity  to  opponents  and patronage  through  advancement  for 
supporters (Cass. Dio 77.16.1-2).53 Soldiers would fight for their commander and 
if his legitimacy was secure, this commander was the emperor. 
Septimius was well aware that the army was the source of his power so he ensured 
that  they  were  rewarded  either  financially  or  through  improved  status  by 
promotion (see Herodian 2.14.5 and 3.8.4-5). Having wealth or ready access to it, 
therefore, was imperative for a would-be emperor in order that supporters were 
rewarded for giving their support.54 For example, Aurelian was quickly recognised 
by the mint at  Siscia and coins were struck which he was able to give to the 
soldiers with his name on them to ensure their support for his elevation.55 In the 
case  of  Septimius,  he  rewarded  his  best  troops  by  appointing  them  to  the 
Praetorian Guard. These men replaced the previous guardsmen whom Septimius 
had  dismissed  for  their  appalling  conduct  towards  Pertinax  (Cass.  Dio 
52 Birley (1988), pp. 106-107 provides some examples.
53 See Birley (1971), p. 165 for examples of his treatment of the Praetorian Guard and the reason, 
envy by the legionaries, as to why the Italian monopoly on service in the Guard was broken. Also 
see p. 199.  Cass.  Dio 75.8.1-3 states that he took away the property of some of his opponents, 
whereas other people were rewarded. When it  was apparent  that  Plautianus,  for example,  was 
wielding too much power and threatening Caracalla's position, he was swiftly removed. See Birley 
(1988), p. 162.
54 F. Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World: 31 BC – AD 337 (London, 1977) p. 136.
55 A. Watson, Aurelian and the Third Century, (London, 1999), p. 133.
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75.1-2/Herodian  2.13.1-14.5).56 This  was  not  the  reward  they  had  envisioned 
when they had negotiated with him (Cass. Dio 74.17.3), but those men had proved 
themselves to be untrustworthy. This was not something which an emperor could 
afford and was in stark contrast to the loyalty of his own men. 
Septimius achieved the necessary recognition of his position from the Senate.57 He 
had  set  out  for  Rome  as  soon  as  he  was  proclaimed  emperor  by  his  troops, 
pausing only to ensure that he had enough support to protect his rear (HA Sev. 
5.3), in order to confront Julianus, who had the Senate declare Septimius a public 
enemy  (Cass.  Dio  74.16.1).  This  meant  that  his  position  was  not  receiving 
legitimation from the requisite sources at this time. As well as removing Julianus, 
Septimius as a prospective emperor, needed to advertise himself to the Roman 
populace in order to show his respect for the city and the people and gain any 
favours for himself which the city wished to bestow rather than lose out on these 
to a rival.58 Whether he really cared for the feelings of Rome’s populace or not he 
did give them handouts which won them over to his side (Herodian 2.14.5).59 
Emperors did need to be careful that they did not de-legitimate themselves in the 
eyes of the soldiers when trying to gain favour with the people with Probus failing 
56 bitτο ς  τε  στρατιώταις  πολλ  δωρησάμενος,  κα  ῖ ὰ ὶ το ς  κμαιοτάτους  πιλεξάμενος  ς  τὺ ἀ ἐ ἐ ὸ 
δορυφόρους ε ναι τ ς βασιλείας τόπ  τ ν πεζωσμένων, π  τ ν νατολ ν πείγετο· (Herodianἶ ῆ ῳ ῶ ἀ ἐ ὶ ὴ ἀ ὴ ἠ  
2.14.5)
57 Levick (2007), p. 38.
58 C.  Ando,  Imperial  Ideology and Provincial  Loyalty  in  the  Roman Empire (Berkeley,  2000) 
(2000), p. 137.
59 τ  δήμ  μεγαλοφρόνως ῷ ῳ
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on this score when, in an attempt to win the support of the war weary and over-
taxed citizens of the empire, he remarked that the empire would not need an army. 
He ended up being assassinated as a consequence (HA Prob. 20.1-6).60 Another 
emperor  who  cultivated  the  favour  of  the  Roman  people  was  Aurelian.  He 
distributed money to them (HA Aurel. 48.5), which showed the Senate he was a 
populist as well as a military man. This was something that they were wary of but 
he did receive his powers from them without opposition, although that he could 
have just taken them for himself had he chosen was beyond question as the Senate 
lacked the means to oppose him.61
The Senate contained the richest men in Rome and it was the body authorised to 
confer  the  emperor’s  imperium.62 Septimius  was  himself  a  Senator  and, 
consequently,  important  supporters  would be found within its  ranks  who were 
capable  of  looking  after  his  interests  and  keeping  him  informed  about 
developments.63 He  would  have  known  that  Julianus  was  discredited  and 
struggling to maintain his own legitimacy. Challenging him, therefore, would not 
necessarily meet with stringent opposition if the challenger played his cards right. 
60 cum per Illyricum iter faceret, a militibus suis per insidias interemptus est. causae occidendi eius 
haec fuerunt:  primum quod numquam militem o<t>iosum esse perpessus est,  si  quidem multa 
opera militari manu perfecit, dicens annonam gratuitam militem comedere non debere. his addidit 
dictum ei[u]s grave, si umquam eveniat, salutare rei p., brevi milites necessarios non futuros. quid 
ille conceperat animo qui hoc dicebat?
61 Parker (1935), p. 143 and p. 194.
62 R.J.A Talbert, The Senate of Imperial Rome (Princeton, 1984), p. 354. 
63 Birley (1988), p. 97.
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Septimius, when he took power, did make the right noises and won the Senate 
over by promising that he would rule like the good emperors of the past by not 
putting any Senators to death unless they were convicted by the Senate (Cass. Dio 
75.2.1). Other emperors chose other methods to win the approval of the Senate 
and to be proclaimed by them. Philip the Arab’s good relationship with the Senate 
was a result of his desire to foster traditional Roman virtues (Zos. 1.19.2-1.21.1). 
Making promises and delivering on them, however, were not one and the same 
thing.  Septimius,  once  he  had  gained  the  Senate’s  acknowledgement  of  his 
position, did not treat the Senate as it wanted since he made it clear that he would 
have  what  he  desired  regardless  of  whether  it  supported  him.64 This  did  not, 
however, result in his regime being de-legitimated. In fact, he has respect from 
Dio and the stability he eventually provided for the empire was welcomed by the 
Senate (Cass. Dio. 77.16.1-77.17.4). 
Elagabalus’ reputation, on the other hand, was dismal.65 There are a multitude of 
reasons for this and his disregard for the Senate is just one of them. Militarily 
Elagabalus was not seriously threatened by any external enemy which makes his 
demise all the more spectacular since this was the usual cause of an emperor's de-
legitimation.66 He was accused of removing opponents without even the pretence 
of  going through the right  channels  by having them murdered  without  saying 
anything to the Senate either before or after the event (Cass. Dio 80.4.6). In this 
64 Hammond (1956), p. 115.
65 J. Hoskinson, Experiencing Rome: Culture, Identity and Power in the Roman Empire, (London, 
2000), p. 156. His background and perceived domination by his female relatives was ill-regarded 
by conservative Roman writers such as Cassius Dio.
66 D. Shotter, Rome and her Empire, (London, 2003), p. 374.
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regard,  there  is  little  difference  to  what  Septimius  had  done.  The  significant 
difference  was,  however,  that  Septimius  was  dealing  with  those  who  had 
supported his opponents whereas Elagabalus was more indiscriminate.67 
Those emperors best regarded in the sources respected the Senate by allowing it to 
confer their powers upon them and seeking its advice on the governance of the 
empire, with Augustus providing the model which others were expected to follow 
(RG 34).68 Those ill-regarded on the other hand, like Commodus or Elagabalus, 
usually took imperial powers for themselves and/or relied on advice from people 
considered unworthy. For these actions, they were damned.69 Maximinus Thrax 
was invested with the appropriate decrees by the Senate. He had been appointed 
by the army, through whose ranks he had risen, which meant that his lowly origins 
caused the Senate to have misgivings about his appointment (Eutr. 9.1/Herodian 
7.1.2). The Senate usually ratified the appointment of the army, but only because 
it had no choice as was the case with Maximinus. The bias that was shown against 
men such as Maximinus was largely irrelevant unless the Senate had the force of 
arms  with which to  back  any challenge  they wanted  to  make.  At  the time of 
Maximinus’ accession they did not, but after the revolt in Africa that brought the 
67 See Cass. Dio 80.3.4-7.4 for examples of a list of some of those put to death on Elagabalus’ 
orders. Dio is horrified by the frivolous excuses which he cannot see any justification for. 
68 P.A. Brunt, 'The Role of the Senate in the Augustan Regime',  The Classical Quarterly, New 
Series, Vol. 34, No 2. (1984), pp. 423-424. The Senate appeared to be the great body it had been in 
the Republic and continuing to maintain this appearance contributed to an emperor's prestige when 
Senatorial authors came to pen their thoughts.
69 Southern (2001), pp. 248-249.
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Gordians to power briefly,  they did pull together an army, probably consisting 
predominantly of the urban Roman populace, to try to deal with him.70
The Senators believed that they were the best and most appropriate men for the 
emperor to consult about matters of law and public business  (Herodian 6.1.1-4 
and HA Alex. Sev. 15.6-16.3)71 and it was men of this ilk who wrote the works we 
have surviving today. Severus Alexander’s good reputation is mainly related to the 
belief  that  his  reign  was a  return  to  the  emperor  being  guided  by the  Senate 
(Herodian  6.1.2).72 Syme,  however,  believes  that,  rather  than  a  resurgence  in 
power, the Senate had advanced its own interests due initially to the weak rule of 
Alexander and then again during Maximinus’ reign due to his on-going absence 
from the city.73 This had then led to the Senate nominating Pupienus and Balbinus, 
two of the leading men from amongst their number, to become emperor after the 
death of the first two Gordians (Herodian 7.10.1-5). 
70 D.S. Potter,  The Roman Empire at Bay: AD 180-395, (London, 2004), p. 170.
71 κα  πρ τον  μ ν  τ ς  συγκλήτου  ὶ ῶ ὲ ῆ βουλ ς  το ς  δοκο ντας  κα  λικί  σεμνοτάτους  κα  βίῆ ὺ ῦ ὶ ἡ ᾳ ὶ ῳ 
σωφρονεστάτους κκαίδεκα πελέξαντο συνέδρους ε ναι κα  συμβούλους το  βασιλέως· ο δέ τιἑ ἐ ἶ ὶ ῦ ὐ  
λέγετο  πράττετο, ε  μ  κ κε νοι α τ  πικρίναντες σύμψηφοι γένοντο. ρεσκέ τε τ  δήμἐ ἢ ἐ ἰ ὴ ἀ ῖ ὐ ὸ ἐ ἐ ἤ ῷ ῳ 
κα  το ς στρατοπέδοις,  λλ  κα  τ  συγκλήτ  βουλ ,  τ  σχ μα τ ς  βασιλείας κ τυραννίδοςὶ ῖ ἀ ὰ ὶ ῇ ῳ ῇ ὸ ῆ ῆ ἐ  
φυβρίστου ς ριστοκρατίας τύπον μεταχθείσης (Herodian 6.1.1-4).ἐ ἐ ἀ
72 κα  πρ τον  μ ν  τ ς  συγκλήτου  ὶ ῶ ὲ ῆ βουλ ς  το ς  δοκο ντας  κα  λικί  σεμνοτάτους  κα  βίῆ ὺ ῦ ὶ ἡ ᾳ ὶ ῳ 
σωφρονεστάτους κκαίδεκα πελέξαντο συνέδρους ε ναι κα  συμβούλους το  βασιλέως· ο δέ τιἑ ἐ ἶ ὶ ῦ ὐ  
λέγετο  πράττετο, ε  μ  κ κε νοι α τ  πικρίναντες σύμψηφοι γένοντο. ρεσκέ τε τ  δήμἐ ἢ ἐ ἰ ὴ ἀ ῖ ὐ ὸ ἐ ἐ ἤ ῷ ῳ 
κα  το ς στρατοπέδοις,  λλ  κα  τ  συγκλήτ  βουλ ,  τ  σχ μα τ ς  βασιλείας κ τυραννίδοςὶ ῖ ἀ ὰ ὶ ῇ ῳ ῇ ὸ ῆ ῆ ἐ  
φυβρίστου ς ριστοκρατίας τύπον μεταχθείσης (Herodian 6.1.2).ἐ ἐ ἀ
73 R. Syme, Emperors and Biography (Oxford, 1971), pp. 175-178.
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Maximinus was still  alive but the Senate had never warmed to him due to his 
lowly origins, reputation for cruelty and his preference for staying with the army 
(see for example HA Max 8.1 and 8.6-9.2). They had also declared him a hostes, 
enemy of the state, which meant that there was no way back for their relationship 
with him (HA Max. 15.2).74 The people did not, however, see the Senate’s power 
as being all consuming anymore since the idea of dynastic succession was strong 
with them. They did not seek to help Maximinus remain in power. What they did 
do, however, was to demonstrate their belief in dynastic succession by agitating in 
favour of the young Gordian, who was the grandson of Gordian I and nephew of 
Gordian II (HA Gord 22.2).75 As a consequence, the Senate was forced to invest 
him as Caesar to Pupienus and Balbinus’ Augustus (Herodian 7.10.6-9).76 
That  the  soldiers  and  people  were  able  to  agitate  successfully  for  their  own 
nominee, who was a child, shows how limited the real power of the Senate had 
become.  Although  they wanted  to  maintain  their  importance  and  prominence, 
there was little they could do when there were dissenting views and their hand 
was forced.77 At the same time, having a child forced upon them would not have 
been a concern since they would have considered it a good opportunity to extend 
their influence. No child would be able to rule in his own right, so it is likely that 
74 senatus magis timens Maximinum aperte ac libere hostes appellat Maximinum et eius filium.
75 Potter (2004), p. 170.
76 θενὅ  δεδιότες πηρέσκοντοἀ  α τὐ ῷ βόωνἐ  τε καὶ πείλουνἠ  ποκτενε νἀ ῖ  α τούς·ὐ  ξίουνἠ  γ ρὰ  τοῦ 
Γορδιανοῦ γένους βασιλέα α ρεθ ναιἱ ῆ ,  τό τε τ ςῆ  α τοκρατορικ ςὐ ῆ  νομαὄ  ρχ ςἀ ῆ  κείνἐ ῳ τῷ ο κἴ ῳ 
(Herodian 7.10.6) ...  τ ςῆ  τε συγκλήτου Καίσαρα α τὐ ὸ ποδειξάσηςἀ ,  πειδἐ ὴ διὰ τ νὴ  λικίανἡ  ο χὐ  
ο όςἷ  τε νἦ  προΐστασθαι τ νῶ  πραγμάτων (Herodian 7.10.9).
77 Potter (2004), pp. 170-171.
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both  groups  saw the  advantages  of  being  able  to  exploit  his  youth  to  gain  a 
measure  of  control  for  themselves.78 When Gordian  became Augustus  he  was 
indeed  too  young  to  rule  independently  and  so  did  rely  upon  others,  most 
particularly Timesitheus, his Praetorian Prefect and father-in-law (Zos. 1.17.2).79
After  the  emperors  had  removed  themselves  from  Rome,  the  Senate  became 
completely uninvolved in the process of decision making so it is only natural that 
the emperors were considered to have become increasingly autocratic and that 
their decisions came to have the force of law.80 The pressure that the emperor was 
under to maintain the security of the empire meant that it was far more important 
for  him to be close to  the  frontiers  where  the  problems were  and it  was  this 
pressure  which  also  meant  that  decisions  needed  to  be  made  quickly  with  a 
minimum of  discussion  resulting  in  increased  autocracy.81 Quick  and decisive 
decisions needed to be made, therefore, in order that problems which arose could 
be dealt with and the troops kept happy.82
78 Potter (2004), p. 171.
79 Timesitheus was called Timesicles by Zosimus and Misitheus in the HA Gordians 13.6. See L.L. 
Howe, The Praetorian Prefect from Commodus to Diocletian (Chicago, 1942), pp. 78-79 for more 
information on Timesitheus’ career.
80 M. Chambers, ‘The Crisis of the Third Century’ in L. White, Jr., ed., The Transformation of the 
Roman World: Gibbon’s Problems after Two Centuries (Berkeley, 1966), p. 43. Also see  Digest 
1.4.1. Millar (1977), pp. 351-352 believes that the oath which was taken to observe the measures 
of past emperors and those which the current emperor would make shows that the Senate still had 
a role in the legitimation of imperial acts. This was the case in Dio’s day (Cass. Dio 57.8.4-5).
81 Southern (2001), p. 249.
82 M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, 2nd Edition, revised by 
P.M. Fraser, Vol. 1, (Oxford, 1957), pp. 506-507.
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Early in the third century, however, the emperors did try to ensure that they had 
support in the city of Rome and being there was the best way of doing this. Some 
emperors, such as Macrinus (Herodian 5.2.3), did not make it to Rome after they 
were proclaimed. This may have been because of how far away they were when 
they came to power, with Macrinus staying in the east to deal with affairs there, 
although Herodian believes he did have the opportunity and is critical of him for 
delaying his journey to Rome (Herodian 5.2.3).83 Macrinus’ absence from Rome 
was a  disadvantage for  securing  the loyalty of  the Senate  and people  but  the 
advantage he did have was that he was not Caracalla, who was not at all popular 
with the Senate (Herodian 5.2.1).84 In Dio’s mind, however, he would have been 
best served if, after Caracalla’s death, he had declared a Senator emperor instead 
of himself (Cass. Dio 79.42.2-3). 
Macrinus had also violated the correct process in regard to being invested with the 
imperial titles since he had not waited for the Senate to bestow titles upon him but 
acted on his own volition (Cass. Dio 79.16.2). The correct process, as described 
by Dio – who himself had a vested interest in the powers of the Senate – was to 
wait  until they were bestowed on him by the Senate (Cass. Dio 79.16.2). The 
short-term situation in  the east  and the tenuous loyalty of the army,  however, 
meant  that  he  perceived  that  there  were  more  pressing  matters  requiring  his 
attention than either getting himself to Rome or following the correct protocol.85 
83 G. Brauer, The Young Emperors: Rome AD 193-244, (New York, 1967), p. 105.
84 ς περήδοντό τε κα  πανδημε  ώρταζον π  τ  ντωνίνου παλλαγ .ὡ ὑ ὶ ὶ ἑ ἐ ὶ ῇ Ἀ ἀ ῇ
85 Brauer (1967), pp. 101-104.
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It was hard to expect those men who were promoted by the army to deal with the 
problems confronting the empire to set out for a city remote from the frontier 
areas  that  suffered  the  incursions.  Another  problem confronting  men  such  as 
Maximinus Thrax who had not been brought up as part of the aristocracy was that 
they would not have had strong connections within those circles to begin with nor 
the time to cultivate them once they had come to power.86 However, any man who 
had risen to high positions in the army would have had connections throughout 
the social, military and political spheres in the areas in which they had risen to 
prominence. These people are the ones upon whom the emperors came to rely.87 
The imperial  court  was not fixed in its location but was present wherever the 
emperor was and, as they ventured to Rome with less and less frequency, the need 
for deep roots with the aristocracy of the city became less and less necessary.
While  Maximinus  Thrax  had  decided  that  affairs  on  the  frontiers  were  more 
important  than  promoting  himself  to  the  Senate,  Trebonianus  Gallus  felt 
differently and negotiated peace with the Goths in order to allow himself to return 
to Rome to establish his power (Zos. 1.24.2-25.1).88 He was a Senator, so this may 
explain why his approach was different, although he might also have considered 
that  one  of  the  lessons  to  be  learned  from  the  short  rules  of  Macrinus  and 
Maximinus was that matters in Rome were of greater importance than securing 
support with the provincial armies by staying on the frontiers and fighting with 
86 Southern (2001), p. 247.
87 Parker (1935), p. 142. It would have been through such military connexions that Maximinus was 
able to quell the mutinous plots to replace him with Magnus – see Herodian 7.1.4.
88 Τα τα ο τως  Γάλλος δι κηκ ς ε ς τ ν ώμην φίκετο, μέγα φρον ν π  τ  τεθείσ  πρ ςῦ ὕ ὁ ῳ ὼ ἰ ὴ Ῥ ἀ ῶ ἐ ὶ ῇ ῃ ὸ  
το ς βαρβάρους ε ρήνὺ ἰ ῃ.
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them.89 Paying for peace, however, was never a particularly popular move with 
either the army or the Senate since the army wanted success in battle and the 
booty  that  went  with  it,  whereas  to  the  Senate  such  moves  smacked  of 
appeasement. 
The  Goths  remained  a  problem with  their  raiding  across  the  Danube and  the 
inability of Gallus to be everywhere meant that  those suffering invasions took 
matters  into  their  own  hands.  The  Danubian  troops,  for  example,  declared 
Aemilius  Aemilianus  emperor  (Zos.  1.28.2).90 Perhaps  then  the  lesson  Gallus 
thought he had learned was the wrong one.  However,  the problems for Gallus 
were not merely confined to the Goths. In the east, where the Persians were again 
threatening, Antoninus was declared emperor.91 When Aemilius Aemilianus was 
declared emperor he believed Senatorial approval was important for the stability 
of his position. To this end he suggested that they should exercise supreme power 
whilst he commanded the army in battle on the Danube and in the east.92 This 
would stabilise his position in those areas he did not control,  since the Senate 
would look after them, and also ensure that the Senate looked kindly upon his 
regime since his appeasement of them was designed to flatter them and ensure 
their support. In the areas which he did this he also had the advantage of having 
89 G.C.  Brauer,  The Age of  the Soldier  Emperors:  Imperial  Rome,  A.D. 244-284 (Park Ridge, 
1975), p. 58.
90 α ρε ται παρ  τ ν τ δε στρατιωτ ν α τοκράτωρ.ἱ ῖ ὰ ῶ ῇ ῶ ὐ
91 Southern (2001), p. 76 and pp. 308-309, note 96. The usurpers name according to the coinage is 
Lucius Julius Sulpicius Antoninus.
92 H. Mattingly, 'The Reign of Aemilian: A Chronological Note',  The Journal of Roman Studies, 
Vol. 25 (1935), p.57.
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had  his  command  ratified  by them (Zonar.  12.20).  As  an  idea  it  would  have 
enhanced his  legitimacy but  he was not secure enough with the troops whose 
importance remained paramount and they decided his fate by killing him.93
While the emperors still either based themselves in Rome or maintained close ties 
to  the  city,  the  Senate  maintained  its  importance  in  their  legitimation.  For 
example, when Valerian was acclaimed, he sought to have his powers confirmed 
as soon as his rivals had been eliminated. His son, Gallienus, was also declared 
Caesar by the Senate (Aur. Vict. Caes. 32).94 This shows that there were emperors 
who believed that there was still a place for the Senate in the high politics of the 
empire.  The  Senate  were  also  called  upon  to  ratify  the  choice  of  Claudius 
Gothicus as Gallienus’ successor and gave him the name Augustus (Eutr. 9.11). 
There is no reason to disbelieve that Claudius chose to go through these channels 
since there is no evidence that Claudius and the Senate had anything other than a 
good  relationship.95 The  appropriation  of  Claudius’  legacy  by  Constantine, 
however, does make it difficult to know exactly what was thought of Claudius at 
the time since later politics dictated that a favourable picture of him needed to 
emerge.96 
93 Brauer (1975), p. 67.
94 Gallienus is also named as being Caesar on milestones from Numidia. See H.G. Pflaum ‘P. 
Licinius Gallienus nobilissimus Caesar et Imp. M. Aurelius Numerianus,  à la lumière de deux 
nouveaux milliaires d’Oum-el-Bouaghi’, Bulletin d’Archéologie Algérienne 2 (1966), pp. 175-179. 
Both of these, however, contradict Zos. 1.30.1 which states that Valerian took Gallienus as his 
colleague.
95 Brauer (1975), p. 178 and p. 186.
96 Grant (1993), pp. 26-27.
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The final chance the Senate had to show its relevance as an institution involved in 
the  legitimation  of  imperial  regimes  came  when  the  troops  made  it  clear, 
following Aurelian’s murder, that they would not proclaim any of his generals as 
his  replacement  (HA Aurel. 40.2-3  and  Tac. 2.5).  Neither  an heir  nor  marked 
successor existed so the troops requested that the Senate choose an emperor (HA 
Tac. 2.5).97 The  Senate,  uncertain  how  to  take  this,  hesitated  and  gave  the 
responsibility back to the soldiery. No longer was the Senate acting as a confident 
source of authority for the state.98 Its members were not in a position to command 
the respect of the troops since most had no involvement with military life but they 
did still  fill  some administrative posts  in the less volatile parts  of the empire, 
being  chosen  as  correctors in  Italy,  for  example.  They  were  also  extremely 
wealthy and, as a consequence, maintained their social prestige.99 
Eventually  after  much  hesitation  the  Senate  chose  Tacitus  (Aur.  Vict.  Caes. 
35-36). There is no evidence to suggest Tacitus had a military background. He 
was probably an equestrian adlected into the Senate,  but he was the last  man 
promoted to the purple by the Senatorial elite.100 It is believed that there was a 
resurgence  of  Senatorial  influence  under  him  because  he  was  a  Senator,  but 
evidence is lacking so we cannot know for sure whether the Senate as a body saw 
any of its powers revived and is likely to be a claim for self-importance by the 
97 tunc odio pr<a>esentium exercitus, qui creare imperatorem raptim solebat, ad senatum litteras 
misit, de quibus priore libro iam dictum est, petens, ut ex ordine suo principem legerent.
98 Brauer (1975), pp. 239-240.
99 M.T.W. Arnheim, The Senatorial Aristocracy in the Later Roman Empire (Oxford, 1972), p. 54.
100 M. Christol,  L’Empire Romain du IIIe Siècle: histoire politique 192-325 aprés J.-C. (Paris, 
1997), p. 182.
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Senatorial authors rather than anything concrete.101 Even if they were, his reign 
was too short for any measures he might have taken to be of consequence and 
there were no Senatorial appointments of great note made.102 That there was no 
Senatorial revival could be assumed when his brother, Florian, tried to assume 
power after his death without waiting for Senatorial approval (Aur. Vict.  Caes. 
36/HA Tac. 14.1). A revived Senate should have been respected enough by the 
brother of the man responsible to desire their acceptance before taking on the role. 
The short duration of Tacitus’ reign and the likelihood that he was assassinated 
(Zos. 1.63.2) also suggests that he never acquired general support amongst the 
military. He punished Aurelian’s assassins (HA Tac. 13.1)103 which should have 
enhanced the reputation of his regime since he was avenging the death of a man 
who was a god. The military, however, had only allowed his appointment because 
of the disgust they felt at Aurelian’s murder (HA Tac 2.5-6). His lack of standing 
amongst the troops and his actions as emperor did not draw any loyalty to him and 
the experiment with the Senate having the final say over who would be emperor 
was quickly curtailed (HA Tac 13.5-14.2).104 The fact that no emperor after Tacitus 
rose from the Senate suggests that its powers had waned, as had its prestige and 
influence.  Its  failure to act  decisively when asked by the soldiers to nominate 
Aurelian’s  replacement  removed  any  aura  of  authority  that  it  had  had  as  an 
institution.  Any brief  resurgence that was perceived from Tacitus’ appointment 
101 Watson (1999), p. 112.
102 Southern (2001), p. 127.
103 Probus then mopped up those whom Tacitus missed. See HA Prob. 13.2 and Zos. 1.65.1-2.
104 Brauer (1975), p. 241. Florian and Probus were proclaimed by the troops under their command 
before any Senatorial involvement.
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had disappeared by Carus’ accession and it never reappeared.105 Carus took power 
without acknowledging the Senate in any way (Aur. Vict. Caes. 38).106
Carus,  like  Maximinus,  was  not  concerned that  the  Senate  may have  had the 
power  to  de-legitimate  him  as  demonstrated  when  he  chose  not  to  seek  the 
Senate's approval of his accession (Aur. Vict.  Caes. 38). These were men whose 
rise to prominence came through the military so it made no sense to them to leave 
the soldiers and take advice from Senators who were inexperienced in the theatre 
of war.107 This would quite probably have resulted in them being de-legitimated 
amongst the soldiers and this would have finished their reigns off even quicker. As 
it was, it was the failure to maintain his legitimacy with the soldiers which led to 
Maximinus’ assassination  (Herodian  8.5.8-9).  Carus,  however,  did  not  die  at 
another  man’s  hand  (Eutr.  9.18),  but  his  son,  Carinus,  suffered  the  same  de-
legitimation as Maximinus and died at the hands of his troops (Aur. Vict.  Caes. 
39). This does show the importance of maintaining the approval of the army with 
the Senate not being a decisive factor in either Maximinus' or Carinus' deaths. It 
was not, however, a failure to enrich the soldiers that caused legitimacy problems 
for either emperor but a failure to maintain strong leadership (Zos 1.14-15/Aur. 
Vict. Caes. 39). 
105 J. Drinkwater, 'Maximinus to Diocletian and the “Crisis”' in A. Bowman, P. Garnsey and A. 
Cameron (eds.),  The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd Edition, Vol. 12: The Crisis of Empire AD 
193-337. (Cambridge, 2005), p. 57. Carus did not even seek the approval of the Senate when he 
was elevated to be emperor by his troops.
106 Neither source makes any reference to the Senate at all when mentioning Carus’ rise.
107 T. de Quincey, The Caesars, (Charleston, 2007), p. 163-164.
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The Senate still functioned, however, and did involve itself in imperial politics on 
the rare occasions it was given the chance. Maxentius was able to be proclaimed 
as emperor with the support of the Roman Senators and Praetorians (Aur. Vict. 
Caes. 40) but he was never able to gain recognition from the other emperors and 
the majority of the army.108 This means that he was never able to legitimate his 
regime. Recognition by the army and other members of the imperial college had, 
at that time, become a more important factor for imperial legitimacy than being 
the son of a former emperor backed by the Senate as Constantine had already 
shown when he accepted the title of Caesar from Galerius after  the army had 
pushed for his promotion into the imperial college (Pan. Lat. 6(7).8.2).
The Senate no longer provided emperors and no longer filled positions close to 
the  emperor  but  there  is  no  indisputable  evidence  that  they  were  explicitly 
forbidden to hold posts in the government under Diocletian or any emperor prior 
to  him.109 Gallienus,  for  example,  is  accused  by  Aurelius  Victor  of  banning 
Senators from army commands (Aur. Vict. Caes. 33.31-34) but whether there was 
such  an  official  pronouncement  or  not  is  the  source  of  debate.110 What  was 
concrete, however, was that men of this status were no longer being appointed to 
these positions.  Gallienus’ relationship with the Senate does not  seem to have 
been excessively strained and they did vote him honours.111 The security of the 
108 R. Rees, Diocletian and the Tetrarchy, (Edinburgh, 2004), pp. 83-85.
109 A.  Cameron,  The  Later  Roman  Empire:  AD  284-430.  (London,  1993), p.  41.  Epigraphic 
evidence suggests that they were not excluded but the decentralisation of the time increased the 
importance of the military at the expense of the Senators.
110 See Cameron (1993), p. 7 for someone who claims that there was never a formal ban.
111 L. de Blois, The Policy of the Emperor Gallienus (Leiden, 1976), pp. 59.
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empire, upon which his own position was dependent, was under threat, however, 
so there was a need to be practical and use those who would do the best job. These 
were men who had experience of these or subordinate roles. Times of danger were 
not times to bow to tradition.
Diocletian was unable or unwilling to go to Rome to have his powers conferred 
upon him there.112 The tribes on the Danube provided threats that needed to be met 
and dealing with these seemed more important than a ceremonial investiture in 
Rome.113  At no point in any surviving panegyric does the consent of the Senate 
rate a mention.114 Diocletian is another emperor who is accused of having taken 
the governance of the empire entirely away from the Roman Senate115 and the 
circumstances of his rule do show that he spent very little time in Rome at any 
point during his reign.116 This is unlikely to have been a deliberate policy from the 
very outset of his reign and more a case of circumstances.117 The longer and more 
established his rule because the less likely he was to have believed that he needed 
to change what he was doing by consulting and including men as part of his set of 
112 See T.D. Barnes, The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine (Cambridge, Mass., 1982) pp. 
49-56.
113 Williams (1985), p. 41.
114 S. MacCormack, Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity, (Berkeley, 1981), p. 169.
115 Williams (1985), p. 41.
116 See Barnes (1982) pp. 49-56. Zonar. 12.31 alleges that Diocletian visited Rome in the summer 
of  285, whilst  the only other  time which he was known to be in the city was in 303 for his 
vicennalia during November and December.
117 See Eutr. 9.22, 'disorder thus prevailed throughout the world'. Also see Southern (2001) p. 331. 
See note 3. Southern believes that it was too early for Diocletian to have formulated a deliberate 
policy by this time. Williams (1985), p. 41, however, believes that he deliberately did not go to 
Rome and was seeking to take government away from Rome and exclude Senators from a share of 
power. 
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advisors  whom he  did  not  know  for  the  sake  of  mere  tradition.  These  men, 
afterall, did not comprise those who established his legitimacy, so his legitimacy 
did not suffer at all as a result of this.118
Diocletian rose through the ranks of the army to become emperor and it was to his 
military cohorts that he turned when seeking other men to promote to share power 
with him (Aur. Vict. Caes. 39). He did not consider turning to the Senate nor did 
he seek their advice on whom he should appoint, which is understandable since he 
would want men he knew and trusted to work with him and each other with the 
goal  of  achieving  the  same  purpose.119 When  Galerius  and  Constantius  were 
promoted, their two new Caesars were invested by their respective Augusti (Zos. 
2.8.1). This legitimised their new position in the Roman state. There is no mention 
of the Senate being involved in this process and neither is there any evidence that 
their investitures took place anywhere near Rome.120
During the tetrarchy, each emperor established himself in different cities and none 
of them spent much time in Rome at all.121 This further removed the Senate from 
the centre of power in the empire. Galerius, for example, carried out much of his 
administrative  function  at  Thessalonika  and  it  was  there  that  he  erected  a 
triumphal  arch  to  record  his  exploits.122 He  did  not  see  fit  to  publicise  his 
118 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
119 Southern (2001), p. 147.
120 Williams (1985), p. 64. Also see Barnes (1982), pp. 60-62.
121 See Barnes (1982), pp. 49-63 for details of the movements of the four emperors and the cities in 
which they based themselves. 
122 Rees (2004), p. 14.
67
successes in such a way at Rome,123 whereas in days gone by this was the most 
likely place for an emperor to erect monuments to his success: the edifices of 
Septimius  Severus  and  Marcus  Aurelius  were  both  standing  in  Rome  during 
Galerius’ day.124 Constantine later also built a triumphal arch but, unlike Galerius, 
he did choose to erect  it  in Rome.  Constantine,  however,  was different  to the 
emperors who preceded him. He had redefined what it meant to be a Senator by 
expanding the Senate and not making them live in Rome or attend the Senate’s 
meetings (Euseb.  Vit. Const. 4.1). He also created a new Senate for his city at 
Constantinople,125 and  so  formalised  the  break  from Rome which  had  been  a 
reality for half a century or more.
Conclusions
The authoritative source which legitimised emperors, therefore, was the army. The 
Senate did have a role to play but its will was subordinate to that of the army 
throughout  the third century.126 The enrichment  of the soldiers was one of the 
ways in which an emperor could secure the approval of the soldiers, with Didius 
Julianus the most notorious example. This was not the only means of gaining the 
army's support, however, as they also promoted men such as Maximinus Thrax 
123 N.H.  Ramage  and  A.  Ramage,  Roman  Art:  Romulus  to  Constantine (London,  1995),  pp. 
274-275.
124 See R. Leader-Newby, Silver and Society in Late Antiquity: Functions and Meanings of Silver  
Plate in the Fourth to Seventh Centuries,  (Aldershot,  2004), pp. 30-31 for some discussion of 
monuments and triumphal arches.
125 C. Kelly, 'Bureaucracy and Government' in N. Lenski (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the 
Age of Constantine. Cambridge, 2006. p. 197.
126 Hammond (1956), p. 63.
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and Diocletion who were career soldiers who were well known to the army and 
Constantine whose standing as Constantius' son drew support towards him.
As time passed the problems which confronted the empire on the frontiers pulled 
the emperors away from Rome and they rarely returned.  For  example,  during 
Septimius' long rule he spent a great deal of time in Rome dealing with affairs of 
state there, whereas Diocletian rarely set foot in the city in spite of ruling for even 
longer.  He  was  not,  however,  the  first  to  base  himself  elsewhere.  Neither 
Macrinus  nor  Maximinus  had entered  Rome during  their  reign.  While  neither 
were successful in maintaining their  position, they did survive for a couple of 
years which showed that an emperor could rule away from Rome provided they 
ruled  well.  Unfortunately,  neither  of  these  men  did  so,  with  the  severity  of 
Maximinus'  administration causing an uprising in Africa (Herodian 7.4.2). The 
most  significant  blow  for  Rome's  status  as  the  centre  of  the  empire  was 
Diocletian's tetrarchy.127 The four emperors all chose to establish themselves in 
cities closer to the frontiers and so the process which had seen a succession of 
emperors  spend  less  and  less  time  in  Rome  came  to  its  conclusion.128 Once 
Constantine  established  a  new court  and  Senate  at  Constantinople,  Rome was 
merely a  symbolic  heart  for  the  empire  and not  administratively or  militarily 
important.129
127 Cameron (1993), pp. 42-43.
128 Barnes (1982), p. 47
129 R. Van Dam, The Roman Revolution of Constantine, (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 57-58.
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The consequence of the departure of the emperors was that the Senate became 
removed  from  the  decision  making  process  and  this  included  imperial 
legitimation. The Senate was still filled with wealthy men with social prestige and 
its august standing as a traditionally powerful body did mean that it continued to 
make an impression when it could. After Tacitus, however, this was limited to 
Maxentius who was desperately searching for any allies he could find. In spite of 
the Senate’s support, he never received formal recognition as a legitimate emperor 
because the Senate did not have any sway in this regard any longer. The army 
continued to make and break emperors, who eventually did not even bother to 
seek recognition of their status from the Senate before settling into their role.
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Chapter 3: Traditional Legitimacy
The position of emperor had been established for over two centuries by the time 
Septimius made his bid for power. The emperor was expected to come from a 
Senatorial  background but  having this  background was not  necessarily always 
enough in itself to ensure on-going legitimacy as the short reigns of Balbinus and 
Maximus Pupienus, amongst others, showed (Zos 1.14.2).1 This was because of 
the  common  belief  in  the  tradition  that  the  emperor  would  come  from  the 
Senatorial class.2 Coming from the traditionally accepted background might help 
gain  a  level  of  support  in  the  short  term  but  in  the  longer-term  it  was  the 
emperor’s  performance  in  his  role  that  mattered  and  those  that  were  quickly 
overthrown,  as  Balbinus  and  Pupienus  Maximus  were,  show  this  (Herodian 
7.10.3-8.8.8). This is because obedience is only given to the emperor when he is 
bound  by  traditions  which  the  role  demands.3 Therefore,  failure  to  fulfill  the 
traditional expectations led to a dissipation in belief about the individual's ability 
to lead and a withdrawal of support.4 The imperial institution, however, remained 
strong  and  the  next  emperor  was  expected  to  act  within  the  same  traditional 
expectations.5
1 M. Weber. Sociological Writings. (New York, 1994a), p. 31.
2 Weber (1994a), p. 31. The common belief in the tradition is what makes this customary in Rome 
and, therefore, is an aspect of legitimacy in the traditional sense.
3 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
4 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
5 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
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During the course of  the century there was a  shift  away from those from the 
Senate and towards those who had risen through the army.6 This was initially met 
with derision by the Senatorial sources, but the protests dissipate as the century 
progresses. This is most likely due to the paucity of source material rather than a 
growing acceptance that the military nature of the position called for someone 
who had been shown to be capable in this area.7 This had, after all, always been a 
necessary role for a successful emperor but it was especially the case as the third 
century progressed and the pressure on Rome's borders increased.8 The increasing 
amounts of time which the emperors spent  dealing with trouble-spots was the 
reason that the army had overtly taken over as the most important agent when 
proclaiming an emperor as legitimate.9
Traditions had been established by the third century which meant that the emperor 
was  expected  to  perform  certain  roles  in  the  military,  political,  judicial  and 
religious spheres.10 He was expected to show due deference to the gods and the 
laws but maintaining the security of the empire and the safety of its people was 
his  primary function  and it  was  this  which  usually determined the  success  or 
6 M. Burger, The Shaping of Western Civilization: From Antiquity to the Enlightenment, (Toronto, 
2008), p. 131.
7 A. Dihle. Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire: from Augustus to Justinian, trans. M. 
Malzahn, (London, 1994), p. 361.
8 Dihle (1994), pp. 360-361.
9 C.S. Mackay, Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History, (Cambridge, 2004), p.280.
10 A. Wallace-Hadrill,  'The Emperor and His Virtues',  Historia: Zeitschrift  für Alte Geschichte. 
1981. Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 300. The virtues of the emperor are virtus, clementia, iustitia and pietas. 
Virtus can be displayed through the success of his armies in keeping the empire safe.  Clementia 
was a political and judicial virtue as was iustitia. An emperor's pietas displayed his suitability for 
the imperial role in the religious sphere.
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failure of a regime. Septimius (Aur. Vict,  Caes, 20) provides an example of one 
who did  maintain  the  empire's  security.  This  was  the  overriding  aim of  most 
emperors  and  the  success  they  enjoyed  enhanced  the  status  of  their  regime. 
Failure  often  resulted  in  a  crisis  of  legitimacy  which  could  then  lead  to  the 
overthrow of the regime. The short reign of Gallus shows the effects of failure 
(Zos  1.26.1-1.28.3).11  Regimes  during  this  time  were  generally  focused  on 
fighting internal and external enemies. Emperors still did try to ensure the health 
of the Roman economy, however, but the main way they did so was to take the 
short-term measure of debasing the coinage which only resulted in increases in 
inflation.12 By doing this,  they were trying to show that they were capable of 
maintaining the security of the empire and, consequently, they could maintain the 
legitimacy of their regime.13 
11 ν τούτοις δ  τ ν πραγμάτων ντων, κα  τ ν κρατούντων ο δαμ ς ο ων τε ντων μ ναι τἘ ὲ ῶ ὄ ὶ ῶ ὐ ῶ ἵ ὄ ἀ ῦ ῷ 
πολιτεύματι,  πάντα  δ  τ  τ ς  ώμης  ξω  περιορώντων,  α θις  Γότθοι  κα  Βορανο  καὲ ὰ ῆ Ῥ ἔ ὖ ὶ ὶ ὶ 
Ο ρουγο νδοι  κα  Κάρποι  τ ς  κατ  τ ν Ε ρώπην λ ζοντο πόλεις,  ε  τι  περιλελειμμένον νὐ ῦ ὶ ὰ ὰ ὴ ὐ ἐ ῄ ἴ ἦ  
ο κειούμενοι. Πέρσαι δ  τ ν σίαν π εσαν, τήν τε μέσην καταστρεφόμενοι τ ν ποταμ ν κα  πἰ ὲ ὴ Ἀ ἐ ῄ ῶ ῶ ὶ ἐ ὶ 
Συρίαν προϊόντες χρι κα  ντιοχείας α τ ς, ως ε λον κα  ταύτην τ ς ας πάσης μητρόπολινἄ ὶ Ἀ ὐ ῆ ἕ ἷ ὶ ῆ ἑῴ  
ο σαν, κα  το ς μ ν κατασφάξαντες τ ν ο κητόρων το ς δ  α χμαλώτους παγαγόντες μα λείαςὖ ὶ ὺ ὲ ῶ ἰ ὺ ὲ ἰ ἀ ἅ  
ναριθμήτ  πλήθει  ο καδε  π εσαν,  π ν  τιο ν  διον   δημόσιον  τ ς  πόλεως  ο κοδόμημαἀ ῳ ἴ ἀ ῄ ᾶ ὁ ῦ ἴ ἢ ῆ ἰ  
διαφθείραντες, ο δεν ς παντάπασιν ντιστάντος· Πέρσαις μ ν ο ν ξεγένετο δίως τ ν σίανὐ ὸ ἀ ὲ ὖ ἐ ῥᾳ ὴ Ἀ  
κατακτήσασθαι π σαν, ε  μ  τ  τ ν λαφύρων περβολ  περιχαρε ς γεγονότες σμένως τα ταᾶ ἰ ὴ ῇ ῶ ὑ ῇ ῖ ἀ ῦ  
περισ σαι κα  παγαγε ν ο κοι δεινοήθησαν. ... πολλ  τ ν Γάλλον λαττούμενον τα ς δυνάμεσινῶ ὶ ἀ ῖ ἴ ῷ ὸ ἐ ῖ  
ρ ντες  ο  σ ν  α τ ,  κα  μα  πρ ς  τ  κμελ ς  κα  νειμένον  το  νδρ ς  ποβλέποντες,ὁ ῶ ἱ ὺ ὐ ῷ ὶ ἅ ὸ ὸ ἐ ὲ ὶ ἀ ῦ ἀ ὸ ἀ  
ναιρο σιν α τ ν μετ  το  παιδός,ἀ ῦ ὐ ὸ ὰ ῦ
12 G. Hodgett, A Social and Economic History of Medieval Europe, (Abingdon, 2006), p. 37.
13 Weber  (1994a),  p.  31.  Maintaining  the  empire's  security  was  a  common  belief  about  the 
emperor's role amongst the emperor's subjects.
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All of these roles the emperor was expected to play had roots deeper than the 
imperial  period,  with  the  emperor  expected  to  fulfil  roles  that  consuls  and 
pontifices would  have  performed  in  Republican  times.14 These  positions  still 
existed and were often taken on by the emperors but the consulship, when held by 
non-emperors, no longer had the same expectations of leading the Roman state 
and  armies  that  it  once  had  because  this  role  had  been  subsumed  by  the 
emperors.15 
In the first half of the third century, the emperors followed tradition and tried to 
win favour in the city of Rome. Even emperors who were unable to be present in 
the city at the time of their accession, such as Elagabalus (Herodian 5.5.6)16 and 
Maximinus Thrax (HA Max. 12.10),17 promoted themselves by sending pictures to 
the Senate. In the case of Elagabalus, who took many months to get there, this 
also served the purpose of preparing those in the city for his coming (Herodian 
5.5.6-7). The portraits showed him in his priestly attire, which was not what a 
traditional Roman priest would wear, and it allowed them to become accustomed 
to what they were going to see (Herodian 5.5.6-7). Maximinus was another who 
sent pictures and reports to the Senate in order to promote his success in battle 
14 C. King, 'Roman Portraiture: Images of Power?' in G.M. Paul and M. Ierardi (eds.),  Roman 
Coins and Public Life under the Empire: E. Togo Salmon Papers II. (Ann Arbor, 2002), p. 127.
15 G. Mousourakis, A Legal History of Rome, (Abingdon, 2007), p. 88.
16 βουλόμενος  ν  θει  γενέσθαι  τ ς  το  σχήματος  ψεως  τήν  τε  σύγκλητον  κα  τ ν  δ μονἐ ἔ ῆ ῦ ὄ ὶ ὸ ῆ  
ωμαίων,  πόντος  τε  α το  πε ραν  δοθ ναι  π ς  φέρουσι  τ ν  ψιν  το  σχήματος,  ε κόναῬ ἀ ὑ ῦ ῖ ῆ ῶ ὴ ὄ ῦ ἰ  
μεγίστην γράψας παντ ς αυτο , ο ος προϊών τε κα  ερουργ ν φαίνετο, παραστήσας τε ν τὸ ἑ ῦ ἷ ὶ ἱ ῶ ἐ ἐ ῇ 
γραφ  τ ν τύπον το  πιχωρίου θεο ,  δ  καλλιερ ν γέγραπτοῇ ὸ ῦ ἐ ῦ ᾧ ὴ ῶ ἐ
17 iussit praeterea tabulas pingi ita, ut erat bellum ipsum gestum, et ante curiam proponi, ut facta 
eius pictura loqueretur.
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(Herodian 7.2.8) although he was less inclined to  head for the city in  person, 
doing so only when the Senate  had turned away from him and appointed the 
Gordians  as  emperors  (Herodian  7.7.2).18 In  sending  the  pictures  he  was  also 
following  what  Septimius  had  done  when  he  had  commissioned  paintings  to 
celebrate his success in Parthia (Herodian 3.9.12)19 and publicise his achievements 
even though he had not yet been able to return from the east.20 
Later, however, emperors came to realise that presenting themselves in the city 
and before the Senate was irrelevant for their status. Carus, for example, made no 
effort to go to Rome and Diocletian spent little time there during his twenty year 
reign, going only to celebrate his vicennalia before leaving quickly after receiving 
an underwhelming reception (Lactant.  De Mort. Pers. 17).21 Events had shown 
that acceptance by Rome did not make or break an emperor so this was a tradition 
that could afford to be broken given the lack of military muscle which the Senate 
could  flex.  The  performance  of  the  imperial  duties,  regardless  of  where  the 
emperor physically was, however, remained a high priority.22
18 Herodian states that  τ ς δ  το  Μαξιμίνου τιὰ ὲ ῦ μ ς νατρέπουσι  ὰ ἀ as well as giving the title of 
Σεβαστο ς (ὺ Augusti) to the Gordians. 
19 τούτων δ  α τ  δεξι ς κα  π ρ π σαν ε χ ν προχωρησάντων πέστειλε τ  τε συγκλήτ  καὲ ὐ ῷ ῶ ὶ ὑ ὲ ᾶ ὐ ὴ ἐ ῇ ῳ ὶ 
τ  δήμ , τάς τε πράξεις μεγαληγορ ν, τ ς μάχας τε κα  τ ς νίκας δημοσίαις νέθηκε γραφα ς.ῷ ῳ ῶ ὰ ὶ ὰ ἀ ῖ
20 C. Ando,  Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (Berkeley, 2000), p. 
137.  Paintings  traditionally  had  formed  part  of  a  triumph.  Although  little  is  known  about 
Maximinus’ background and early years, he was a career soldier is likely to have been in the army 
throughout Septimius’ reign. He, therefore, may have known that Septimius had had his success 
celebrated in this way.
21 D.L. Vagi, Coinage and History of the Roman Empire, (Chicago, 2000), pp. 419-420.
22 O. Heckster with N. Zair, N. Rome and its Empire: AD 193-284. (Edinburgh, 2008), pp. 61-64.
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The most important functions of the emperor were to ensure the safety of the 
people of the empire and bring glory to Rome. Both of these called for military 
success.  Although  not  necessarily  expected  to  lead  the  troops  in  person,  the 
emperor was responsible for taking decisive action to deal with any threats that 
presented themselves.23 He also had to ensure that the troops were paid and fed. 
Diocletian's  edict  stipulating  maximum  prices  for  goods,  for  example,  was 
concerned  with  ensuring  the  army  was  adequately  supplied  and  that,  by  not 
paying excessive amounts for supplies, there was still money left with which to 
pay the troops.24 Troops developed loyalty to those who fulfilled these functions 
and failing to keep their loyalty would end badly for the de-legitimated emperor, 
with Macrinus' attempt to pay new recruits less than Caracalla had done causing 
disaffection which contributed to his de-legitimation (Cass. Dio 79.28.2).25 It was 
not  only  those  whom the  sources  treat  badly,  such  as  Maximinus  Thrax  and 
Caracalla, who suffered because of troop dissatisfaction, but also emperors who 
were well regarded, such as Severus Alexander (Aur. Vict. Caes. 24) and Probus 
(Aur. Vict. Caes. 37). Signs of weakness, such as Alexander’s failure to live up to 
the expectations of the military, undermined his authority (Herodian 6.9.5).26 
De-legitimated emperors found that the legions would desert them in favour of 
generals who the troops believed were credible leaders,27 such as had occurred to 
23 J.B. Campbell, War and Society in Imperial Rome 31 BC – AD 284. (London, 2002), pp. 41-42.
24 T.D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, (Cambridge, Mass. 1981), p. 11.
25 S. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate, (Berkeley, 2002), p. 140.
26 F. Meijer, Emperors Don’t Die in Bed, (London, 2004), p. 81.
27 P. Southern,  The Roman Empire From Severus to Constantine (London, 2001), p. 269. It  did 
help their credibility if they could pass a lot of cash around but success on the battlefield was also 
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Severus Alexander. This also occurred about fifteen years later when Trebonianus 
Gallus’ army killed him, whom they regarded as lax and cowardly, rather than 
face Aemilianus’ superior forces (Zos. 1.28.3).28 Probus, on the other hand, de-
legitimated himself in the eyes of his soldiers by declaring there would be no need 
for an army (Eutr. 9.17.3).29 The army saw it differently. With that attitude, they 
saw  no  need  for  Probus.  At  times,  emperors  could  foresee  the  problems 
confronting them and chose not to test the loyalty of their own troops.30 Galerius, 
for example, did not take on Maxentius because he was unsure that the troops 
under  his  command  would  be  loyal  to  him (Zos.  2.10.3).31 These  troops  had 
previously  served  under  Maximian,  Maxentius’  father,  and  their  loyalty  to 
Maximian was partly responsible for the defeat of Severus in Italy.32 Faced with 
the same situation,  Galerius  saw no benefit  in  risking his  own legitimacy and 
chose  to  withdraw  from  Italy,  so  ignoring  Maxentius’  presence  rather  than 
confronting it (Zos. 2.10.3).
extremely important. 
28 πολλ  τ ν  ῷ ὸ Γάλλον  λαττούμενον  τα ς  δυνάμεσιν  ρ ντες  ο  σ ν  α τ ,  κα  μα πρ ς  τἐ ῖ ὁ ῶ ἱ ὺ ὐ ῷ ὶ ἅ ὸ ὸ 
κμελ ς κα  νειμένον το  νδρ ς ποβλέποντες, ναιρο σιν α τ ν μετ  το  παιδόςἐ ὲ ὶ ἀ ῦ ἀ ὸ ἀ ἀ ῦ ὐ ὸ ὰ ῦ .
29 Hic cum bella innumera gessisset, pace parata dixit brevi milites necessarios non futuros. Vir 
acer, strenuus, iustus et qui Aurelianum aequaret gloria militari, morum autem civilitate superaret. 
Interfectus tamen est Sirmii tumultu militari in turri ferrata. 
30 R.M. Novak, Christianity and the Roman Empire: Background Texts, (Harrisburg, 2001), p. 143.
31 γενόμενος δὲ κατὰ τ νὴ  ταλίανἸ  καὶ το ςὺ  στρατιώτας οὐ πιστ ςῶ  περὶ α τ νὑ ὸ  χεινἔ  α σθόμενοςἰ  πἐ ὶ 
τ νὴ  ανἑῴ  νέζευξενἀ , μάχης ο δεμι ςὐ ᾶ  γενομένης.
32 F. Paschoud, ed. and trans., Zosime: Histoire Nouvelle Tome 1 (Livres I et II) (Paris, 1971), p. 
195 note 15. Zosimus claims that they were bribed (Zos. 2.10.1) and this also no doubt helped. The 
troops, however, would have trusted Maxentius because their experience and their faith in him as 
an emperor and commander meant that they could trust him to come up with the money promised.
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Those emperors who maintained their legitimacy throughout their reigns, such as 
Septimius  and Diocletian,  enjoyed early military successes  over  foreign  tribes 
which allowed them to claim they were protecting the Roman state.33 Septimius, 
for example,  was successful against the Arabians, Adiabeni and Osrhoeni after 
defeating  Niger  (Cass.  Dio 75.1.1-3.3).  This  was  in  response to  Nisibis  being 
beseiged  (Cass.  Dio  75.1.2)  and  showed that  he  was  not  prepared  to  tolerate 
incursions against Roman forces. It also sent a message to his own people that he 
would  be  a  strong leader,  prepared  to  defend Roman interests.  Septimius  had 
showed  that  he  could  and  would  defend  the  empire.  Both  of  these  emperors 
enjoyed periods of relative quiet which allowed them to promote their success and 
the peace which it brought. Septimius, for example, between the success against 
Parthia, from which he had returned to Rome via Africa, and his final campaigns 
in  Britain,  was  unchallenged  militarily.34 Septimius  was  able  to  extend  the 
boundaries of the empire in every direction35 and so not only ensured the security 
of the empire but also added to his own glory. During this time he did face a threat 
to his authority but this was not a military threat: it appeared in the form of his 
friend and Praetorian Prefect, Plautianus. This threat, however, was quelled with 
Plautianus’ execution.36 Dio (76.14.1-76.16.5) and Herodian (3.11.2-3) both dwell 
on the vast power that Plautianus acquired but that this did not actually threaten 
33 See A.H.M. Jones,  The Later Roman Empire 284-602: A Social  and Administrative Survey, 
(Oxford, 1973), pp. 38-39 lists the early successes of Diocletian and Maximian while pp. 15-16 
discusses the rise of Septimius.
34 K. Gilliver, A.K. Goldsworthy and M. Whitby, Rome at War: Caesar's Legacy, (Oxford, 2005), 
p. 12.
35 A. Birley, Septimius Severus: The African Emperor (London, 1971), p. 285.
36 M. Grant, The Severans: The Changed Roman Empire (London, 1996), pp. 15-16.
78
Septimius’ own legitimacy is shown by the ease with which he was removed and 
the  lack  of  disquiet  that  his  removal  caused.37 Septimius  remained  firmly  in 
control  and  his  position  was  not  in  dispute  at  any  time  during  Plautianus’ 
ascendency.38 Septimius, therefore, still had the support of the people, the Senate 
and the army.39 
Diocletian and Maximian, like all emperors, faced problems on the frontiers (see 
Pan Lat 10(2).5.1-4 and 11(3).4.2 for examples). They were successful but did 
lose  control  of  Britain  to  the  usurper,  Carausius  (Aur.  Vict.  Caes. 39).40 The 
victories over the tribes along the Rhine and Danube, however, meant that there 
were successes to promote the stability they were able to bring to the empire. 
They also met in Milan in 291, possibly to show the solidarity of their regime, 
advertise their unity and promote their achievements (Pan. Lat. 11(3).11.1-4).41 
This would have been meant to have a reassuring effect on the people to show 
that, although there were two legitimate emperors, they were not competing with 
one  another  but  rather  complementing  each  other  to  ensure  that  security  was 
maintained. Traditionally Rome was where this meeting should have occurred, but 
37 B. Levick,. Julia Domna: Syrian Princess. (London, 2007), pp. 80-81.
38 D.S. Potter,  The Roman Empire at Bay: AD 180-395, (London, 2004), pp. 118-119. Even though 
Plautianus was extremely powerful, Septimius was still firmly enough in control to be able to have 
some  of  his  statues  melted  down  when  he  thought  that  Plautianus  was  being  a  little  too 
ostentatious with his displays of his power (Cass. Dio 75.16.2).
39 Birley (1971), pp. 162-163.
40 Quo bello Carausius, ... Hoc elatior, cum barbarum multos opprimeret neque praedae omnia in 
aerarium referret, Herculii metu, a quo se caedi iussum compererat, Britanniam hausto imperio 
capessivit.
41 R. Rees, Layers of Loyalty in the Latin Panegyric AD 289-307. (Oxford, 2002), p.69.
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it no longer mattered where they met to do this.42 Rome was a long way from the 
edges of the empire where the emperors were needed to deal with any outbreaks 
of trouble.43 
Diocletian moved about throughout his reign, as did the other tetrarchs, and the 
advantage of this can be seen when there were military problems to deal with. 
Victor states that the Caesars, Constantius and Galerius, were appointed in order 
to deal with the disturbances that were occurring both inside and outside of the 
empire  (Aur.  Vict.  Caes. 39).  When  they  were  needed  there  was  always  an 
emperor available to confront the problems and the speed with which this could 
be done could prevent any incursions doing too much damage before they were 
challenged.  Galerius,  for  example,  was  charged with dealing with any Persian 
incursions (Aur. Vict. Caes. 39). Ultimately, in spite of some initial problems, he 
was successful and the treaty which his victory resulted in led to almost forty 
years  of  peace.44 The  military  success  of  the  tetrarchs,  both  in  terms  of  the 
organisation  of  the  army  and  the  successes  on  the  battlefield,  stabilised  the 
frontiers of the empire and enhanced the ability of the empire to deal with its 
enemies.45
42 F.  Millar,  H.M. Cotton and G. Rogers,  Rome, the Greek World,  and the East: Government,  
Society and Culture in the Roman Empire, (Chapel Hill, 2004), p. 375.
43 P.J.  Heather,  The  Fall  of  the  Roman  Empire:  a  new history  of  Rome  and the  Barbarians, 
(Oxford, 2006) p. 25.
44 M. Whitby,  Rome at War: AD 293-696, (Oxford, 2002), pp. 34-36. After Galerius' success in 
298,  it  was not  until  near  the end of  Constantine's  reign that  Persia  and Rome again became 
engaged in serious conflict.
45 S. Williams, Diocletian and the Roman Recovery. (London, 1985), p. 87.
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The  emperor  who  had  the  most  trouble  keeping  the  empire  together  was 
Gallienus. For the duration of his reign he had to deal with external threats to the 
empire  and  it  was  these  which  led  to  internal  strife  which  resulted  in  the 
fragmentation  of  the  empire.  Zosimus  (1.36.1-38.2)  catalogues  invasions  of 
Illyricum by Scythians,  Germanic  wars  and a  devastating plague  as  well  as  a 
series  of  usurpations  occurring  in  the  aftermath  of  Valerian's  capture  by  the 
Persians  (also  see  Aur.  Vict.  Caes. 33).  Consequently,  unlike  Septimius  and 
Diocletian, he was never in a position to take the attack to the enemy and he 
certainly  never  enjoyed  relative  peace  during  which  he  could  consolidate  his 
status.46 When he did take some time away from the battlefront he was accused of 
neglecting his duties (Aur. Vict. Caes. 33).47 His entire reign was one of defending 
his lot as best he could and this was itself difficult because he was prevented from 
accessing the resources of the whole of the empire because of the fragmentation 
which  had  occurred.48 Postumus'  presence  in  Gaul,  for  example,  meant  that 
Gallienus was locked out of that region from about 260 (Aur. Vict. Caes. 33).
Gallienus’ response to this was to try to maintain the loyalty of the troops still 
under his command and face each threat as best he could.49 To this end, he opened 
up the possibility of a career in the army that could lead to promotion through to 
46 Meijer (2004), pp. 96-97.
47 See HA,  Gall., 11.2-9 and 16.1 as well as Aur. Vict. Caes. 33 for examples of the distaste that 
these  sources  felt  towards  Gallienus.  Aur.  Vict.  Caes.  33  states  that  inter  haec  ipse  popinas 
ganeasque obiens lenonum ac vinariorum amicitiis haerebat, expositus Saloninae coniugi atque  
amori flagitioso filiae Attali Germanorum regis, Pipae nomine.
48 Meijer (2004), p. 98.
49 L. de Blois, The Policy of the Emperor Gallienus (Leiden, 1976), p. 117.
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positions that gave equestrian and Senatorial status.50 Although disaffection with 
Gallienus  resulted  in  his  removal,  Claudius  did  not  immediately  set  about 
changing his military,  social or financial policies. This does suggest Gallienus’ 
reign was not as bad as sources, such as Eutropius (9.8 and 9.11) and Aurelius 
Victor (Caes. 33) make out.51 He was also successful in maintaining the loyalty of 
the  troops,  as  was  shown  when  he  was  killed  and  they  provided  the  only 
resistance to  Claudius  Gothicus’ accession.  They were distressed at  Gallienus’ 
death because he was the man who bankrolled them (HA. Gall. 15.1). As was 
usually  the  case,  however,  money  soothed  their  angst,  as  Claudius  stepped 
forward  to  be  their  new  benefactor  (HA  Gall. 15.2).52 The  broadening  of 
possibilities for soldiers can be seen by the men who became emperor in the fifty 
years before and after Gallienus. Whereas the non-Senatorial emperors, such as 
Macrinus and Maximinus, were the exception before, this was not so afterwards 
with only Tacitus not rising from the ranks of the army before the Constantinian 
dynasty.53 This, therefore, suggests that the pathway to the imperial purple was no 
longer occurring in this traditional way and emperors from outside the Senatorial 
aristocracy were reliant on different degrees of backing to secure their rule. The 
Senate, for example, was not as important to these men as to those who were from 
50 See de Blois (1976), p. 43, 52-57, 63-64 and 86-87.
51 Aurelius Victor (Caes. 33.29) describes Gallienus as  cum neque Gallieni flagitia, … occultari  
queant, et, quisque pessimus erit, par similisque semper ipsi habebitur. He cannot understand why 
Claudius would have forced the Senate to have deified such a man. Eutropius (9.8) decries his 
descent  in omnem lasciviam and his  ignavia  as well as (in 9.11) accusing him of  rem publicam 
deserente.
52 quare consilium principum fuit, ut milites eius quo solent placari genere sedarentur. promissis 
itaque per Marcianum aureis vicenis et acceptis.
53 G. Alföldy, The Social History of Rome, (Beckenham, 1985), p. 166.
82
that strata of society. As army commanders, they did not by this time have this 
traditional  Senatorial  background  on  their  side  but  they  were  still  using  the 
traditional  powers  of  a  Roman  leader.  This  shows  that  within  any  form  of 
legitimate authority there were different components which it could comprise and 
changes could occur over time.54
Success over a foreign enemy was expected from an emperor and added to his 
prestige. Septimius’ response to defeating Niger was to change the focus from 
civil  to  foreign  war  by  taking  on  the  Parthians.55 Although  the  Romans  had 
justifiable reasons for going to war in the east because the Osroeni and Adiabeni 
had  been  besieging  Nisibis  (Cass.  Dio  75.1.2),  the  war  with  Parthia  was  not 
Septimius’ primary reason for having headed east. It did provide a good excuse, 
however, once he had defeated Niger since it was far more honorable to fight an 
external  foe than  to  fight  other  Romans for  imperial  power  and so served its 
purpose as a public relations exercise since he was able to claim he expanded the 
empire (Cass. Dio 75.3.2). Fighting a foreign enemy was also a traditional means 
which Roman commanders had used to boost their standing and, consequently, 
success against the Parthians was a means of securing his legitimacy.56 He again 
undertook  this  role  when  he  took  on  the  Parthians  after  Albinus  had  been 
54 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
55 P. Edwell and P.M. Edwell, Between Rome and Persia: the Middle Euphrates, Mesopotamia and 
Palmyra under Roman Control, (Abingdon, 2008), p. 26.
56 For  example,  Augustus  had  sought  a  foreign  enemy after  the  civil  wars  and  this  is  what 
Septimius was also seeking to do. D.E.E. Kleiner, Cleopatra and Rome, (Cambridge, Mass, 2005), 
p. 42.
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removed,57 although he again could justify going to war with Parthia because they 
had occupied Mesopotamia and besieged Nisibis (Cass. Dio 76.9.1). This again 
changed the focus to an external foe, away from the defeat of a fellow Roman and 
the  punishment  meted  out  on  his  supporters.  The  punishments  were  again  a 
traditional response by a victorious general with Sulla and Augustus, during the 
second  triumvirate,  providing  the  historical  examples  which  Septimius  used 
(Cass. Dio 76.8.1). 
Other emperors who had come to power as a result of successfully challenging the 
incumbent emperor included Maximinus (Zos. 1.13.1)58 and Diocletian (Aur. Vict. 
Caes. 39).59 These  men  were  all  in  some  way  able  to  fulfill  the  emperor’s 
traditional role, at least in the short term. One of Diocletian’s first tasks had been 
to restore internal law and order in the provinces that had suffered the frequent 
invasions (Aur. Vict. Caes. 39). A number of rescripts survive from throughout his 
reign which provide evidence of Diocletian’s interest in legal proceedings.60 The 
legislative functions that an emperor was expected to carry out were important, 
especially for the judgement of the Senators such as Dio (see Cass. Dio 77.17.2 
for example) who wrote the histories.61 
57 Birley (1971), p. 200. 
58 τραπέντα δ  ε ς νεωτερισμ ν γει Μαξιμ νον ε ς βασιλείαν.ὲ ἰ ὸ ἄ ῖ ἰ
59 At Carinus ubi Moesiam contigit, illico Marcum iuxta Diocletiano congressus, dum victos avide 
premeret,  suorum  ictu  interiit,  quod  libidine  impatiens  militarium  multas  affectabat,  quarum 
infestiores viri iram tamen doloremque in eventum belli distulerant.
60 S.  Corcoran,  The  Empire  of  the  Tetrarchs:  Imperial  Pronouncements  and  Government  AD 
284-324 (Oxford, 1996), p. 1.
61 Dihle (1994), pp. 348-349.
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Septimius  diligently  fulfilled  the  legislative  role  expected  of  an  emperor  and, 
consequently, Dio is full of praise for his interest in the law and his willingness to 
listen to  those speaking in  court  and his  advisers (Cass.  Dio 77.17.2) – all  of 
whom were men from the right social background of course. The pronouncements 
of  Septimius and Diocletian form the basis  of the laws that  were codified by 
Diocletian and the later emperors, Theodosius and Justinian.62 Both Septimius and 
Diocletian,  therefore,  enjoyed  long  reigns  with  periods  of  relative  stability 
compared with those ruling between them. This is what gave them an opportunity 
to  step away from matters  of  the military and the  security of  the empire  and 
enhance their own positions through their diligent attention to their administrative 
and judicial roles 
The  abundance  of  emperors  to  deal  with  the  external  threats  meant  that  the 
political climate during Diocletian’s tetrarchy was stable enough to tackle some of 
the problems which he perceived were afflicting the empire such as the size of the 
provinces (Lactant.  De Mort. Pers. 7.4). In order to make it easier to administer 
and defend, he reorganised the military departments of the empire63 and began the 
separation of military and civil posts, which became clearly identifiable during the 
fourth century, in recognition of the trend for men to specialise in one of these 
branches.64 Even though some of his measures proved unsuccessful – the price 
edict, for example, seems to have been unworkable in practice (Lactant. De Mort.  
Pers. 7.5-7) – he was trying to make things work better. The attention Diocletian 
62 Corcoran (1996), pp. 1-4.
63 P. Erdkamp, A Companion to the Roman Army, (Malden, 2007), pp. 268.
64 R. Rees, Diocletian and the Tetrarchy, (Edinburgh, 2004), pp. 26-27.
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paid to the reorganisation of administration of the empire, therefore, highlights 
that emperors paid attention to matters that benefited more than just the army. 
Even if the good of the army may have been behind such changes, there was still a 
reorganisation of the civil administration in order to try to make it more effective 
which would have benefited the people as a whole. In this regard he was fulfilling 
the traditional role expected of the emperor who was expected to be a diligent 
administrator. Since this was one of the customary expectations of an emperor, it 
was, consequently, an aspect of his legitimacy.65 
Most of the other emperors, to varying extents, tried to govern the empire with the 
diligence that was expected and ensure that there were sufficient supplies for their 
armies.  This  was  even the  case  of  those  quickly deposed  and condemned for 
trying to ensure adequate money for the army to be supplied, such as Maximinus 
(Herodian 7.3.1-6). Success in battle was a primary concern of all and those who 
did  succeed  managed  to  maintain  their  position.  The  legal  and  administrative 
functions  were  not  forgotten  either,  although  inflation  became  increasingly 
uncontrollable by the end of the century and no emperor could think of adequate 
measures to rein it back in.66 Such issues, however, did not adversely affect their 
legitimation as fiscal mechanisms were not something which were understood in 
the ancient world and were, consequently, accepted as something which very little 
could be done about. 
65 Weber (1994a), p. 31
66 A. Watson, Aurelian and the Third Cenrury, (London, 1999), p. 126.
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It  was  often  the  case,  however,  that  emperors  had  to  put  administrators  and 
administrative procedures into place whilst they were under pressure to confront 
the external threats to the empire.  Decius, for example,  had very little time to 
settle into his role before having to fight the Carpi in Dacia (Aur. Vict. Caes. 29).67 
He used the men he knew in the Senate to look after the civil administration in 
Rome whilst he was away with the army. His younger son, Hostilianus, was left in 
Rome with Valerian as the regime’s representative (Zonar. 12.20). The turmoil on 
the outer edges of the empire, however, was replicated in Rome where the mob 
tried to make Licinianus emperor (Cyprian Ep. 55). Without an army to support 
him he was not legitimated but the attempt showed that Decius’ own legitimacy 
was not firmly secure either in spite of his attempts to ensure that he confronted 
the  external  threat  to  the  empire  and,  at  the  same  time,  looked  after  the 
administration. 
Decius’ death in battle occurred before his regime had a chance to establish itself 
firmly and the legions quickly proclaimed Trebonianus Gallus emperor, ignoring 
any claims that Hostilianus may have had to the succession (Zos. 1.24.1-1.25.1). 
Gallus’ own  legitimacy  was  threatened  by  the  pressure  of  external  invasions 
which led to the troops on the Danube declaring an emperor of their own (Zos. 
1.28.2).68 Gallus sent for Valerian to help to deal with Aemilianus’ usurpation, but 
67 Decius’ son, Etruscus, was sent to fight as soon as he had been appointed Caesar, whilst Decius 
followed him after he had finished dedicating the public works he had had built. He only ruled for 
two years  and  was  away fighting the  Carpi  well  before  he  was  killed,  so any administrative 
changes he had made would have had little time to consolidate before the end of his reign.
68 Κα  το ς πολλο ς νελών, δη δ  κα  π  τ ν κείνων γ ν το ς στρατιώτας διαβιβάσας καὶ ὺ ὺ ἀ ἤ ὲ ὶ ἐ ὶ ὴ ἐ ῆ ὺ ὶ 
παραδόξως  π ν  τ  προσπεσ ν  διαφθείρας,  παρ  π σάν  τε  λπίδα  τ  ωμαίοις  πήκοα  τ ςᾶ ὸ ὸ ὰ ᾶ ἐ ὰ Ῥ ὑ ῆ  
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this did not prove any use since his own troops realised the weakness of their 
position  because  of  the  strength  of  Aemilianus’  numbers  and  consequently 
murdered both Gallus and his son, Volusianus (Zos. 1.28.3). In this regard his 
situation matched that of Philip the Arab somewhat when the troops were defeated 
by Decius and went over to his side (Zos 1.22.2). Gallus, therefore, in the eyes of 
the troops, had been thoroughly discredited.
Earlier, Macrinus, although in the east campaigning, had tried to ensure the good 
governance of the empire by installing men he knew and trusted, such as Marcius 
Agrippa and Decius Triccianus, as governors (Cass. Dio 79.13.2-4). Macrinus was 
an experienced administrator, whom Dio would no doubt have known, who knew 
how the empire functioned and was not prepared to neglect this function in spite 
of the problems that  the Parthians were presenting him.69 There is  insufficient 
evidence from many of the reigns during this period to generalise that all of the 
emperors took an active interest on maintaining the legal form expected of them 
but it can be suspected that this disinclination to give adverse comment by the 
sources  means  that  this  task  was  performed  as  expected.70 The  reason  for 
suspecting this was that Senatorial authors were quick to condemn an emperor 
when they did breach the correct legal protocols. When Elagabalus, for example, 
sanctioned the deaths of Senators, he was condemned by Dio (80.4.6), who no 
doubt reflected the attitude of the majority of his class.71
κείνων μανίας λευθερώσας, α ρε ται παρ  τ ν τ δε στρατιωτ ν α τοκράτωρἐ ἐ ἱ ῖ ὰ ῶ ῇ ῶ ὐ
69 F. Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford, 1964), p. 161. 
70 Corcoran (1996),  p. 3.  In the period between the death of Ulpian in 223 up to the time of 
Diocletian, private rescripts were the main legal means used by emperors.
71 Zos. 1.11.1, Eutr. 8.22 and Aur. Vict.  Caes. 23 all mention Elagabalus briefly and decry his 
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It was sometimes necessary for an emperor to deal with problems for which they 
did not have the resources. Parthia was such a problem for Macrinus (Herodian 
4.15.7-8). Caracalla’s dithering had led to dissatisfaction with him, but there was 
little money in the treasury due to Caracalla’s extravagance and Artabanus took 
advantage  by  attacking  during  the  instability  which  was  a  consequence  of 
Caracalla’s demise (Herodian 4.14.6-15.1). In order to extract himself from it with 
as much credit as possible Macrinus had not ended the war as soon as he had 
become emperor, but the reverses that he suffered meant that he was left with little 
option. A negotiated settlement from a position of weakness led to some territory 
being lost and an indemnity being paid to the Persian king (Cass. Dio 79.27.1-3). 
This was another problem that Macrinus had which meant that his regime was not 
on solid ground.72 He was awarded the title,  Parthicus Maximus, on the basis of 
the reports he sent back to the Senate, but refused it because, according to Dio he 
was ashamed to take a victory title when there had not been a victory (Cass. Dio 
79.27.3). 
Maximinus,  on  the  other  hand,  prosecuted  the  war  against  the  Germans  with 
vigour, according to Herodian (7.2.1-9) and so showed that he was the man of 
action that Severus Alexander had not been, which had resulted in the rebellion 
against him.73 This was to his credit but the resources he needed to prosecute the 
war had to come from somewhere. Consequently, he had to exact money from the 
depravity.
72 G. Rawlinson, Parthia, (New York, 2007), p. 357.
73 T.E. Gregory, A History of Byzantium, (Malden, 2010), p. 25.
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people  of  the  empire  and  this  led  to  dissatisfaction.74 The  frontiers  had  been 
secured  but  his  fiscal  policy caused unrest  to  build  up against  him (Herodian 
7.3.5).75 This lack of concern for anything other than the stability of the frontiers 
and the favour of the army, however, did not contribute to his regime being able to 
maintain sufficient support to retain its legitimacy.76 The army’s need for money 
resulted  in  charges  of  greed,  corruption  and  cruelty  being  levelled  at  him by 
Herodian (Herodian 7.3.5 and 7.4.1-3) and the Historia Augusta (HA Max. 8.5 and 
13.5) since those outside the army saw or felt  the financial  burden which his 
policies  inflicted.77 Traditionally,  the  emperor  was  expected  to  provide  sound 
administration for the empire and there was an expectation that his appointees 
would help to strengthen not hinder his regime in the way Maximinus' procurator 
did in the district of Carthage (Herodian 7.4.2).78 Failure to provide the requisite 
administrative  leadership,  therefore,  contributed  to  Maximinus'  de-legitimation 
(Herodian 7.3.1-6). Despising all others and concentrating on pleasing the troops 
was not a successful route to a long rule.
Maximinus also faced the problem of not having risen to his station from the right 
background.  He  was  not  the  first  to  have  done  so  and,  although  Dio  praises 
Macrinus for his actions as emperor, he does state that he should have handed 
74 J. Burckhardt, The Age of Constantine the Great, (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 26-27.
75 R.  Syme,  Emperors  and  Biography (Oxford,  1971),  p.  190.  Herodian  states  that  even 
distinguished families were reduced to poverty, πε  δ   Μαξιμ νος το ς πλείστους τ ν νδόξωνἐ ὶ ὲ ὁ ῖ ὺ ῶ ἐ  
ο κων ς πενίαν περιστήσας.ἴ ἐ
76 Burckhardt (1983), pp. 27-28.
77 Burckhardt (1983), pp. 27-28.
78 πετρόπευέ τις  τ ς  Καρχηδονίας χ ρας τραχύτατα, κα  μετ  πάσης μότητος καταδίκας τεἐ ῆ ῶ ὶ ὰ ὠ  
ποιε το κα  χρημάτων ε σπράξειςἐ ῖ ὶ ἰ
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power to someone of suitable standing. Dio states that this failure was his main 
failing (Cass. Dio 79.14.2). Tradition decreed that Rome’s leaders came from the 
Senatorial  class  and  Macrinus  was  the  first  emperor  who  was  not  from  the 
Senatorial  aristocracy.79 Macrinus  struggled  to  maintain  his  legitimacy in  part 
because his rival had the better bloodline on which to draw. He did try to establish 
links  to the previous regime and gave the name Severus  and titles  Pius Felix 
Augustus to himself (Cass. Dio 79.16.2). Elagabalus followed Macrinus’ example 
and made himself Imperator Caesar, son of Antoninus, grandson of Severus, and 
Pius Felix Augustus (Cass. Dio 80.2.2). These titles linked both men to Septimius 
and, therefore, Caracalla and so linked them into a Senatorial bloodline (Cass. Dio 
80.2.2).  Elagabalus  was  at  least  related  to  these  Severan  emperors  (Herodian 
5.3.2). He was also linked to the Antonines in accordance with the fiction begun 
by Septimius. Elagabalus went one step further, however, by also claiming Nerva 
as  an ancestor.80 This  claim does  not  seem to  have  been  at  all  detrimental  to 
Elagabalus just as Septimius’ use of the Antonines had not affected him (Cass. 
Dio 76.7.4).81 Macrinus’ claims, however, do not seem to have been any use to 
him when confronted by someone with a more firm link to past emperors.82 Actual 
bloodlines created a more solid claim based on tradition than invented ones.
79 Grant (1996), p. 23.
80 CIL VIII.10347
81 Although styling himself in this way caused the Senators dismay, it did not make any difference 
to the legitimacy of his regime and he continued as emperor for more than a decade without being 
threatened by usurpers who may have been offended by his claim.
82 Levick (2007), pp. 145-146. 
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Aurelian is another example of a man who rose from an obscuriore familia (HA 
Aurel. 3.1). He rose through the ranks of the army to the point where, by the time 
Claudius  died,  he  had  risen  to  be  one  of  the  most  important  men  in  his 
entourage.83 By this time, however, the failure to have come from a Senatorial 
background was not so loudly decried. The lack of an outcry can be, in part, due 
to paucity of a contemporary sources but it  could also be because there was a 
growing acceptance that  it  was the army which groomed future emperors.84 It 
could be a combination of both. Over the course of the third century the Senate 
had not proven itself adept at appointing emperors and after Gallienus’ reign had 
seen the empire disintegrate into three different segments, a strong leader with a 
strong military understanding was essential.85 Subsequently, the debacle over the 
appointment of Tacitus, when the Senate was presented with the opportunity to 
take  a  direct  hand  in  affairs,  further  diminished  the  Senate’s  authority  in  the 
soldiers’  eyes.  His  brief  reign  did  nothing  to  renew  this  authority  and  this 
traditional element to imperial legitimacy was no longer held in the same light 
that it had once been.86 It seems that these barriers were being broken through and 
the Senators could do nothing, even when presented with the opportunity. The 
lack of any narrative sources for the period too can be partly explained by the 
removal of the Senators from positions close to the emperors. No longer did they 
record events surrounding the emperor in the same detail  as they had done in 
earlier generations.
83 Watson (1999), p. 47.
84 Watson (1999), p. 10.
85 Watson (1999), pp. 98-99.
86 N.H. Baynes, ‘Three Notes on the Reforms of Diocletian and Constantine”. Journal of Roman 
Studies, 1925, Volume 15, pp. 198-199.
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Establishing legitimacy in the traditional political sense meant being able to show 
authority and this was what Aurelian had been able to do and the Senate had not.87 
Showing authority meant that opponents had to be dealt with, supporters rewarded 
and the emperor had to ensure that no weaknesses were revealed for an opponent 
to exploit.88 It was not always easy to do this, especially as it meant keeping the 
troops in line. Elagabalus, for example, had to offer 2000 sesterces per soldier in 
order to prevent them from sacking Antioch (Cass. Dio 80.1.1) which shows the 
hold the troops could have and the measures emperors had to take to rein them in. 
Constantine provides a similar example (Pan Lat 12(9).7.5-7). When he marched 
on Rome, he had to ensure that his troops maintained their discipline and were 
prevented from rampaging through the towns on the way.89 His propaganda had 
stated that he was seeking to relieve Rome from Maxentius’ tyranny (Pan Lat 
12(9).3.5-7 and 12(9).4.3-4) so it was essential that he ensured that there could be 
no similar accusation made against him (Pan Lat 12(9).7.3). 
Then,  once  Constantine  had  fought  and  defeated  Maxentius,  the  portrait  of 
Maxentius as a tyrant was able to be reinforced because he was unable to stand up 
for his own reputation (Pan Lat 12(9).4.4).90 Those who had supported him in 
Rome could claim their complicity was merely necessitated by the circumstances 
87 Weber (1994a), p. 31. There was no longer a common belief that the Senate could be relied on to 
make decisions concerning imperial appointments.
88 M. Goodman and J. Sherwood, The Roman World, 44BC-AD180, (London, 1997), pp. 127-128.
89 J. Morgan, Constantine: Ruler of Christian Rome, (New York, 2003), p. 29.
90 Barnes (1981), p. 37.
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and they could welcome Constantine as their liberator.91 There was no profit for 
them to stand up for Maxentius’ reputation so Constantine’s representation of him 
is the one handed down through history. These examples show that the army could 
strongly influence the emperors and that it was often difficult for them to keep the 
troops  in  check.92 It  was  money  which  helped  them  to  keep  them  in  line. 
Providing the political and financial circumstances which allowed this to occur 
was  a  traditional  role  of  the  emperor  since  by  the  time  of  the  Severans  and 
beyond,  the  emperors  had  established  themselves  as  the  paymasters  of  the 
troops.93
The emperor also had to reward his supporters in order to ensure the maintenance 
of  this  support.  Treating  opponents  harshly  was  meant  to  show an  emperor's 
authority and disuade others from trying to undermine his position.  The severity 
which  Septimius  displayed  when  he  dealt  harshly  with  some  of  Albinus’ 
supporters (Cass. Dio 76.8.3-4) showed that it was unwise to take on Septimius 
since he was firmly in charge, while the prominent supporters, such as Plautianus 
and  Anicius  Faustus,  achieved  showed  that  ambitions  could  be  fulfilled  by 
working  within  his  regime.94 Dealing  with  his  opponents  in  such  a  way was 
essential for an emperor’s security and referring to precedent for the action taken 
could help justifying his actions. Septimius is said to have praised Augustus for 
his severity (Cass. Dio 76.8.1). This reminded everyone that even the most highly 
91 Barnes (1981), pp. 45-46.
92 J.B. Campbell, The Roman Army: A Sourcebook, (London, 1994), pp. 230-233.
93 Campbell (1994), p. 68.
94 Birley (1971), p. 210, pp. 294-296 and p. 337. Dio does state that some of Albinus’ supporters 
were let off while about the same number were condemned.
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regarded  emperors  had  to  establish  their  position  by  removing  the  threat  of 
opposition.  The money that was exacted from the defeated opponent and their 
supporters  could then be used to further ensure the support  of those who had 
provided the backing for the successful emperor.95 Septimius did prove successful 
and he made use of the money he acquired to reward his supporters (Cass. Dio 
77.16.1-2). His authority, once established, remained undiminished until his death, 
with the empire enjoying a time of relative peace.
It was not unusual for an emperor to remove those closest to his predecessor when 
that  emperor  had  no  tie  to  the  regime  he  was  replacing.  Maximinus  Thrax 
removed the supporters of Severus Alexander from their positions. He distrusted 
everyone in general and Senators in particular because of the lack of enthusiasm 
for his appointment and the failed plots to depose him (Herodian 7.1.4). Members 
of Alexander’s immediate entourage were executed upon his accession (Herodian 
7.1.2-3).  This  contributed  to  Herodian’s  accusation  of  cruelty  against  him 
(Herodian  7.1.2  and  6.9.7),  but  there  were  no  others  who  were  killed  with 
Herodian  saying  those  accompanying  Alexander  were  either  sent  to  Rome  or 
removed from the administration (Herodian 7.1.3).96 This mixture of severity and 
leniency was  consistent  with  Septimius'  behaviour  half  a  century  earlier.  The 
executions removed those closest to the previous regime who might have had the 
ability to lay claim to the name and get their hands on the money needed to buy 
the loyalty of the troops or promote someone else well connected and acceptable 
95 J.S. Wacher, The Roman World: Volume 2, (London, 2002), p. 566.
96 ε θέως  ο ν  τούς  τε  φίλους  πάντας,  ο  συν σαν  τ  λεξάνδρ  σύνεδροί  [τε]  π  τ ςὐ ὖ ἳ ῆ ῷ Ἀ ῳ ὑ ὸ ῆ  
συγκλήτου βουλ ς πιλεχθέντες, πεσκευάσατο, κα  ο ς μ ν ς τ ν ώμην πέπεμψε.ῆ ἐ ἀ ὶ ὓ ὲ ἐ ὴ Ῥ ἀ
95
to the troops.97 Maximinus’ decisive action took away any chance they could have 
of taking advantage of the turmoil that followed Severus Alexander’s death for 
their own ends (Herodian 7.1.3). 
Maximinus (Herodian 6.9.7) and Septimius (Herodian 3.8.1-2) both did the same 
thing  and  the  actions  of  neither  were  approved  by  Herodian.  Yet  because 
Septimius fulfilled a range of the roles traditionally expected of the emperor well 
and  Maximinus  did  not,  Septimius’ legitimacy  was  able  to  be  solidified  and 
secured and his regime endured whereas Maximinus was overthrown swiftly and 
never  able  to  turn  opinion  away  from  his  severity  through  his  other  deeds 
(Herodian  8.5.9).  Likewise,  Licinius’ and  Constantine’s  removal  of  opponents 
does not seem to have affected the legitimacy of either. Again it was other things 
that  destabilised  Licinius’ position.  Licinius  removed  as  many  of  Maximinus 
Daia’s family and supporters as could be found after defeating him in 313 and he 
then  also  went  on  to  remove  survivors  of  Diocletian’s  and Galerius’ families 
(Lactant.  De Mort.  Pers. 50.1-51.2).  This shows that  Licinius  wanted to clear 
away any threats to his own power since they had the potential to destabilise his 
legitimacy.98 Licinius, himself, after he was defeated and removed by Constantine, 
was promised that his life would be spared and Constantine was good to his word 
for some months before it was expedient to have him killed as was also the case 
with Martianus (Zos. 2.28.2).99 The clearing of potential threats by all of these 
97 Dihle (1994), pp. 310-311.
98 Burckhardt (1983), p. 277.
99 θάρρει γ ρ ς βιώσεται, τ ς α το  γαμετ ς ρκους π  τούτ  παρ  Κωνσταντίνου λαβούσης·Ἐ ὰ ὡ ῆ ὐ ῦ ῆ ὅ ἐ ὶ ῳ ὰ  
 δ  Κωνσταντ νος Μαρτινιαν ν μ ν παρεδίδου το ς δορυφόροις π  θανάτ , Λικίννιον δ  ε ς τ νὁ ὲ ῖ ὸ ὲ ῖ ἐ ὶ ῳ ὲ ἰ ὴ  
Θεσσαλονίκην  κπέμψας  ς  βιωσόμενον  α τόθι  σ ν  σφαλεί ,  μετ'  ο  πολ  το ς  ρκουςἐ ὡ ὐ ὺ ἀ ᾳ ὐ ὺ ὺ ὅ  
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men helped  to  consolidate  their  position.  This  was  a  traditional  measure  with 
Augustus having undertaken proscriptions with his fellow triumvirs after Caesar's 
assassination. Sulla also had provided the emperors with a historical example for 
ruthlessly disposing of enemies who could prove a threat (Plut.  Sull. 31).  The 
example of Caesar also showed the risk of showing clemency to these men (Plut, 
Caes. 46 and 66).100 Purging opponents, therefore, had a history in Rome long 
before the third and fourth century emperors followed the example.101
It was wise of Septimius to treat his opponents harshly only once his position was 
secure, otherwise it might only serve to drive people to support a rival’s claim.102 
Traditionally, Roman political office during the Republic had been a contest and 
the  man  best  served  by  a  network  of  support  was  usually  able  to  prevail. 
Consequently,  Septimius  did  not  deal  harshly  with  Niger’s  supporters  with 
Albinus still a threat to his position, choosing to send them into exile and take 
their property rather than kill them at this time (Cass. Dio 75.8.3-4). This meant 
that there was no fear of Septimius driving people to Albinus' side and also that 
those of Niger's supporters who had been spared either owed a debt to Septimius 
or were too weak from the confiscations to threaten immediately. Once Albinus 
had  been  removed,  however,  Septimius'  clementia disappeared  and  he  sought 
retribution (Herodian 3.8.1-2). He was able to do this because he had proved his 
πατήσας ( ν γ ρ το το α τ  σύνηθες) γχόν  το  ζ ν α τ ν φαιρε ται. ἦ ὰ ῦ ὐ ῷ ἀ ῃ ῦ ῆ ὐ ὸ ἀ ῖ
100 M. Toher, 'The Earliest Depiction of Caesar and the Later Tradition' in M. Wyke (ed.), Julius 
Caesar in Western Culture, (Malden, 2006), pp. 35-36.
101 R. Bauman, Human Rights in Ancient Rome, (London, 2000), p. 114.
102 G. Bonamente and F. Paschoud, Historiae Augustae Colloquium Genevense, (Macerata, 1994), 
pp. 28-29.
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supremacy over his rivals and had secured the backing of all of the remaining 
legions.103 
Maximian’s blend of harshness and leniency are dealt with in the panegyric of 289 
which describes how he dealt with those of the poor forced to turn to brigandage 
to try to survive with clementia (Pan Lat 12(9).4.3) while it is juxtaposed to his 
destruction of external enemies such as the Chaibones and Eruli (Pan Lat 12(9).
5.2).  Clementia was  a  virtue with which  emperors  wanted  to  be associated.104 
Maximian displayed it towards an internal group who were not well resourced 
and, therefore, not a threat to the security of the empire which meant that he was 
not risking his standing by doing so.
The  need  to  punish  opponents  needed  to  be  counterbalanced  by  rewarding 
supporters. This would help to secure an emperor’s legitimacy since people would 
support the regime in the expectation of favours to come.105 The favour Septimius 
showed men like Plautianus has already been mentioned. Diocletian recognised 
the need to reward those who worked in his interests and rewarded Aristobulus, 
who had forsaken Carinus and come over to Diocletian’s side, by confirming him 
as  Praetorian  Prefect  and  consul  (Aur.  Vict.  Caes. 39).  Diocletian  obviously 
welcomed the support but also did not want to risk upsetting the body of troops 
whose loyalty had been stronger to their prefect than the man who was then their 
103 Bauman (2000), p. 114.
104 Wallace-Hadrill (1981), p. 300.
105 Southern (2001), p. 38.
98
emperor.106 The foundation of his own regime was not yet solid and he did not 
command the loyalty of these troops any more than Carinus had been able to. 
Therefore, ensuring Aristobulus' support and allowing him to maintain his status 
was a way to try to ensure that these troops were not going to be used against him 
by Aristobulus or – in the event of Aristobulus' removal – one of the other leaders 
of those troops who might have had ambitions of high office and been able to use 
any disaffection Aristobulus' demise created.
The ability to consult with a predecessor was very rare for an emperor. Sometimes 
a son would be joint emperor with his father, such as Septimius with Caracalla 
and  Geta,  but  the  senior  man  remained  in  control  until  his  death  (Herodian 
3.9.1).107 It was only then that the younger generation took the lead. In this regard, 
the  position  that  Diocletian’s  successors  found  themselves  in  was  unique.  He 
seems to have abdicated his position voluntarily,108 although Lactantius does claim 
that  it  came  about  due  to  pressure  from  Galerius  (Lactant.  De  Mort.  Pers. 
18.1-7),109 and his retirement, along with Maximian’s, meant that they were both 
still  alive  for  the  incoming  emperors  to  benefit  from  their  experience  and 
authority in person if they so desired. They had retired to Salona and Lucania 
106 T. Mommsen, A History of Rome under the Emperors, edited by B. Demandt and A. Demandt, 
(London, 1999), p. 349.
107 T.E. Wiedemann, Adults and Children in the Roman Empire, (London, 1999), p. 126.
108 C.E.V Nixon and B.S Rodgers, In Praise of the Later Roman Emperors (Berkeley, 1994), pp. 
188-189.
109 Lactantius,  however,  contradicts  himself  somewhat  at  20.4  when  he  claims  Galerius  too 
planned to abdicate after his vicennalia suggesting that doing so was part of the tetrarchic system 
which seems to give credence to the voluntary nature of Diocletian’s departure. See Nixon and 
Rodgers (1994), p. 188.
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(Eutropius 9.28),110 which, while in theory quiet backwaters away from political 
life in different parts of the empire, enabled them to be close enough to be able to 
communicate effectively.111 When problems were encountered and the benefits of 
Diocletian's  wisdom  was  deemed  necessary,  he  could  be  called  upon. 
Consequently, Diocletian was asked to reconcile the members of the tetrarchy and 
encourage them to pursue united ambitions at the council of Carnuntum in 308.112 
Unity in any imperial college was essential for maintaining the legitimacy of a 
collegial regime.113
Diocletian  managed  to  consolidate  his  reign  by  sharing  imperial  power  with 
Maximian and their unity remained undiminished throughout. Having a colleague 
share his power was not an original idea, having had its roots in the Republican 
consulship.114 The idea of the imperial position as a collegial one was not original 
to the third century either. Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus were invested with 
equal imperial powers in the middle of the second century (HA Marc. 7.6) and in 
166 Marcus’ two sons were designated as Caesars (HA Comm. 1.10).  Marcus’ 
sons, however, were not at this time of an age where they would have been able to 
lead troops, so his ambition was primarily dynastic.115 Most of the other emperors 
who promoted others to imperial positions prior to Diocletian also had this as their 
110 Vagi (2000), p. 420.
111 Southern (2001), p. 152. 
112 S. Mitchell, A History of the Later Roman Empire: AD 284-641, (Malden, 2007), p. 60.
113 Rees (2004), p. 72.
114 T. Cornell,  The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars  
(c1000-264BC), (London, 1995), p. 226.
115 A. Birley, Marcus Aurelius: A Biography, (New York, 2000), p. 239. Also Vagi (2000), p. 251.
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motive since they had also promoted from within their families, with even those 
adopting heirs usually taking their nearest relative. When their junior emperors 
were capable, they were often used to confront problems within different areas of 
the empire with no fixed delineation of spheres of responsibility.116 In this regard, 
Diocletian  was  no  different.  By  promoting  men  unrelated  to  him,  however, 
dynastic succession was not his motivation on the surface.117 The other time which 
there had been an attempt to  create  a shared imperial  presence was when the 
Senate elected Pupienus Maximus and Balbinus to be emperors. Unfortunately, in-
fighting and jealousy undermined their regime as each struggled to assert himself 
over the other (Herodian 8.8.4-5).118
 
Gallienus and Valerian were the most prominent predecessors to try the collegiate 
approach before Diocletian since both were adults and were able to look after 
different spheres of the empire (Zos. 1.30.1-2).119 Gallienus remained in the west 
while Valerian went east to try and sort out the persistent Persian menace (Zos. 
1.30.1-2). This should have aided the legitimacy of Valerian’s regime since there 
were two men working in concord to deal with the threats to the empire. The joint 
116 Southern (2001), p. 136.
117 C.M. Odahl, Constantine and the Christian Empire, (New York, 2004), pp. 40-41. Although not 
related by blood, marriages were arranged so that there was a familial relationship between the 
Augusti and their Caesares.
118 συνέβαινε δ  κ κείνους μ  ὲ ἀ ὴ πάνυ τι λλήλοις μονοε ν, λλ' ο α περ μοναρχίας ἀ ὁ ῖ ἀ ἷ πιθυμία κα  τἐ ὶ ὸ 
κοινώνητον ν τα ς ξουσίαις <ε ωθε ποιε ν,> καστος πρ ς α τ ν τ ν δύναμιν νθε λκεν.ἀ ἐ ῖ ἐ ἴ ῖ ἕ ὸ ὑ ὸ ὴ ἀ ῖ
119 Odahl (2004), p. 19. Zosimus stated: 
Συνιδ ν δ   Ο αλεριαν ς τ ν πανταὼ ὲ ὁ ὐ ὸ ὸ χόθεν πικείμενον τ  ωμαίων ρχ  κίνδυνον, α ρε ταιἐ ῇ Ῥ ἀ ῇ ἱ ῖ  
Γαλλιην ν τ ν πα δα τ ς ρχ ς κοινωνόν· νοχλουμένων δ  τ ν πραγμάτων πανταχόθεν,ὸ ὸ ῖ ῆ ἀ ῆ ἐ ὲ ῶ ἁ  
α τ ς μὐ ὸ ὲν π  τ ν αν λαυνεν Πέρσαις ντιστησόμενος, τ  δ  παιδ  τ  ν τ  Ε ρώπἐ ὶ ὴ ἑῴ ἤ ἀ ῷ ὲ ὶ ὰ ἐ ῇ ὐ ῃ 
στρατόπεδα  παρεδίδου,  το ς  πανταχόθεν  πιο σι  βαρβάροις  μετ  τ ν  κε σε  δυνάμεωνῖ ἐ ῦ ὰ ῶ ἐ ῖ  
ντιστ ναι παρεγγυήσας. ἀ ῆ
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rule of Valerian and Gallienus, in spite of the problems in dealing with the array of 
foreign invasions, did last longer than any other since the demise of the Severan 
dynasty. The dual emperors, therefore, were proving quite successful until all the 
good work was undone by Valerian’s capture. 
Carinus and Numerianus had been joint emperors with Carus whilst he was alive 
and remained emperors together after he died (Eutr. 9.18-20). Again, as earlier 
when Valerian and Gallienus reigned, there was no formal division of the empire’s 
territories between them,120 although they were operating in different areas of the 
empire. Their joint rule was never given the opportunity to develop, however, due 
to Numerianus’ untimely, mysterious death as he was returning from Persia (Aur. 
Vict. Caes. 38).
Emperors  were  expected  to  show  due  reverence  to  the  gods  and  this  was 
necessary for an emperor to be legitimised in the traditional sense. However, the 
appropriation of the gods in the way that the tetrarchs did constitutes a component 
of  charismatic  legitimacy and  will  be  explored  further  in  that  chapter.121 The 
pietas which an emperor was expected to show suggests that they honoured the 
gods and performed the rituals associated with them. This does not mean that all 
of  the  gods  were  honoured  equally  by  each  emperor  since  they  had  their 
favourites  with  whom  they  closely  identified  themselves.122 There  was  the 
120 Southern (2001), p. 133.
121 Weber (1994a), p. 32. This is one of the ways an emperor could promote his heroism, which 
was an aspect of an emperor's charisma.
122 Vagi (2000), p. 56.
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perception, however, that the ills which were grieving the empire were the result 
of the lack of attention being paid to the gods. The form of respect shown to the 
gods  differed  from  emperor  to  emperor.  Decius,  for  example,  had  become 
concerned  at  the  lack  of  respect  that  was  being  shown  and  so  ordered  that 
sacrifices  be  made in  accordance  with  traditional  Roman practices.123 He also 
began  restoring  Roman  temples  and  claimed  that  he  was  restitutor  sacrorum 
according to an inscription from Cosa.124 Valerian (Lactant.  De Mort. Pers. 5.1) 
and  the  tetrarchs  (Lactant.  De  Mort.  Pers. 10.4-5)  were  the  others  who  are 
damned by Christian writers as persecutors because they too expected sacrifices to 
be made in accordance with traditional Roman practice.125 By 311, however, the 
Christians were granted toleration by the state (Lactant. De Mort. Pers. 34.1-5).126 
This was celebrated by the emperors themselves as examples of their  clementia 
and  indulgentia,  traditional  virtues  which  an  emperor  was  expected  to  show 
(Lactant. De Mort. Pers. 34.4).127 
123 See X. Loriot and D. Nony, La Crise de ‘Empire Romain 235-285 (Paris, 1997), pp. 54-55 no. 
23 about the order to sacrifice to the gods and the certificates which were given out as proof that 
the sacrifices had been made..  The text  of the decree does not  survive (H. Temporini  and W. 
Haase, Aufsteig und Niedergang der Römischen Welt. Vol. 16, Part 3, (Berlin, 1986), p. 1832). The 
surviving  libelli do  make it  clear,  however,  that  all  subjects  of  the  empire  were  expected  to 
sacrifice.  Also  see  J.R.  Knipfing,  'The  Libelli  of  the  Decian  Persecution',  The  Harvard  
Theological Review, 16(1923), pp. 345-390.
124 AE 235
125 Rees (2004), p. 60.
126 F.  Millar,  The Emperor in the Roman World: 31 BC – AD 337. (London, 1977),  pp. 578-579. 
See Lactant. Mort. Pers. 34.1-35.1.
127 Temporini and Haase (1986), p. 3719. Hadrian had extolled these virtues on his coinage almost 
two centuries earlier.
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Other  emperors  showed  that  they  took  their  responsibilities  seriously  without 
feeling the need to issue demands that the gods be honoured by everyone. For 
them,  it  was  enough  that  they  fulfilled  this  duty  themselves.  Septimius,  for 
example, went to the temple of Jupiter and offered a sacrifice (Herodian 2.14.2). 
He then did this at other temples in accordance with imperial custom (Herodian 
2.14.2).128 That these were among his very first acts upon entering Rome shows 
how seriously he took religious practice. This reflected well on him and can be 
compared to Elagabalus who can be seen to take his own religion very seriously 
but not that of the Romans (Herodian 5.5.7-5.6.10). He built a large temple when 
he  arrived  in  Rome (Herodian  5.5.8)  but  took a  Vestal  Virgin  to  be  his  wife 
(Herodian  5.6.2),  effectively  mocking  the  strict  expectations  placed  on  these 
women to  remain chaste  and in  Vesta’s  service for  the  duration of  their  lives 
(Plut. Num. 10.1-4).129 
Most emperors tried to fulfil the duties that tradition decreed the role demanded. 
Elagabalus is noteworthy for his difference and his removal came about when his 
behaviour  became  threatening  towards  Severus  Alexander  (Cass.  Dio 
80.19.1-20.2), who had won over the Praetorians with his conduct. The sources 
are unfavourable towards Elagabalus (see Aur. Vict. Caes. 23 and Zos. 1.11.1 for 
example),130 but even allowing for their bias against him, his religious practices, 
128 νελθ ν ς τ  το  Δι ς τέμενος κα  θύσας, ν τε το ς λοιπο ς ερο ς νόμ  βασιλικἀ ὼ ἐ ὸ ῦ ὸ ὶ ἔ ῖ ῖ ἱ ῖ ῳ ῷ 
καλλιερήσας.
129 Vagi (2000), p. 300.
130 Aurelius Victor's (Caes. 23) description of Elagabalus focuses on his behaviour. Hoc impurius  
ne improbae quidem aut petulantes mulieres fuere: quippe orbe toto obscoenissimos perquirebat  
visendis tractandisve artibus †libidinum ferendarum. Zosimus' (1.11.1) description also focuses on 
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overt homosexuality and the influence which he allowed his lovers to gain were 
all things which went against accepted traditional imperial practice.131 
Different  gods  were  favoured  at  different  times  and,  by  the  end  of  the  third 
century,  emperors  tended  to  favour  one  particular  god  over  the  others  with 
Aurelian,  for  example,  favouring  Sol  (HA,  Aurel. 39.6).132 There  was  no  one 
particular favourite, however, with the complete dominance of Christianity still 
some way in  the future.  The occasional  persecution of the Christians was not 
because of any obviously perceived threat towards the established Roman gods, 
but rather because the emperors were seeking to appease these established gods by 
having everyone in the empire show them the respect that they thought was their 
due.133 Firm  Christians  could  not  accept  this  and  suffered  as  a  result.  Some 
emperors, Decius for example, believed that respecting the traditional gods would 
make them relieve the empire from the suffering that it was going through.134 The 
good  of  the  empire,  consequently,  was  at  the  heart  of  attempts  for  religious 
renewal  and  the  conviction  that  some  emperors  showed.  Ultimately,  most 
his behaviour. 
Το  δ  ντωνίνου κρατήσαντος κα  το ς τ  Μακρίνου φρονήσασιν ς  δυσμενέσινῦ ὲ Ἀ ὶ ῖ ὰ ὡ  
πεξελθόντος,  τά  τε  λλα  α σχρ ς  κα  πονειδίστως  βεβιωκότος,  μάγοις  τε  κα  γύρταιςἐ ἄ ἰ ῶ ὶ ἐ ὶ ἀ  
σχολακότος  κα  περ  τ  θε α  σεβηκότος,  ο κ  νεγκόντες  ο  ωμα οι  τ ν  τ ς  σελγείαςἐ ὶ ὶ ὰ ῖ ἠ ὐ ἐ ἱ Ῥ ῖ ὴ ῆ ἀ  
περβολήν, κατασφάξαντες κα  τ  σ μα διασπάσαντες.ὑ ὶ ὸ ῶ
131 W. Ball, Rome in the East: the Transformation of an Empire, (London, 2000), pp. 413-414.
132 L. Dirven, The Palmyrenes of Dura-Europos: A Study of Religious Interaction in Roman Syria, 
(Leiden, 1999), p. 174.
133 G. Clark, Christianity and Roman Society, (Cambridge, 2004), p. 48.
134  Mackay (2004), p. 270. The text of the decree does not survive (H. Temporini and W. Haase, 
Aufsteig  und  Niedergang der  Römischen  Welt.  Vol.  16,  Part  3,  (Berlin,  1986),  p.  1832).  The 
surviving  libelli do  make it  clear,  however,  that  all  subjects  of  the  empire  were  expected  to 
sacrifice.  Also  see  J.R.  Knipfing,  'The  Libelli  of  the  Decian  Persecution',  The  Harvard  
Theological Review, 16(1923), pp. 345-390.
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emperors, successful or otherwise, were attempting to make the empire safer and 
better. Unfortunately, in this epoch, many were unsuccessful.
Conclusions
Therefore, in the context of the Roman empire, there were traditional attributes 
which an emperor expected to have. Having any of these attributes enhanced his 
legitimacy, while having them all would mean that he was secure in his position. 
Septimius and Diocletian both enhanced their standing by enjoying victory over 
external  foes  and,  consequently,  keeping  the  empire  safe.  The  emperor  was 
expected to be a man who came from the Senatorial class which corresponds with 
Weber's assertion that tradition was an acceptance of the ways which had existed 
in  the  society  through  the  generations.135 The  vast  majority  of  emperors  did 
continue to come from this class of men and the earliest of those who did not, 
Macrinus (Cass. Dio. 79.41.2) and Maximinus Thrax (Zos. 1.13.3),136 struggled to 
maintain their position. The emperor's military role was also something that was 
of  long  standing.  The  imperium which  they  held  was  the  same  power  which 
consuls used when they led armies during the Republic and, consequently, this 
leadership also corresponds with Weber's traditional category.137 The majority of 
the emperors during the third century were with their armies and their success or 
failure in this role came to define the ongoing legitimacy of their regime. It was 
135 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
136 Τ ς δ  βασιλείας δη βεβαίως παρ  Μαξιμίνου κατεχομένης, ν μεταμελεί  πάντες σαν ςῆ ὲ ἤ ὰ ἐ ᾳ ἦ ὡ  
τυραννίδα πικρ ν μετρίας λλαξάμενοι βασιλείας· γένους γ ρ ν φανο ς,ὰ ἀ ὰ ὢ ἀ ῦ
137 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
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when they were successful that  they were obeyed and their  right to command 
accepted.138
Traditionally  the  expectation  was  that  this  success  would  involve  taking  the 
territory of the enemy rather than merely repelling them from the empire. In this 
regard,  there  was  little  success  throughout  this  period  since  the  extent  of  the 
empire remained much as it had throughout the second century. The emperor was 
expected to make laws and make judgments on the basis of these laws, for which 
Septimius receives praise. After two centuries of imperial rule, it was expected 
that the emperor would be responsible for all forms of leadership in the state. As 
well as the political sphere, this also extended to leadership in the religious sphere 
where respect for the gods and their role in Roman society was important. The 
enrichment of the soldiers, therefore was not all that the emperor needed to do to 
ensure they maintained the legitimacy of their regime.
The idea of collegial government was also a traditional one dating back into the 
Republic.  Marcus Aurelius (HA, Marc. 7.6 and  Comm. 1.10) also provided an 
example and it was not unusual for emperors to give their sons a share in the 
governance of the empire and give them commands once they were old enough. 
Septimius (Herodian 3.9.1), Valerian (Zos 1.30.1) and Carus (Aur. Vict. Caes. 38) 
had  all  provided  examples  of  this,  but  Diocletian  was  the  most  exceptional 
example in that the men he promoted were not blood relations (Aur. Vict. Caes. 
138 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by G. Roth and C. 
Wittich (New York, 1968), pp. 215-216.
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39). As unusual as this was there was some resonance with the past since consuls, 
the traditional leaders of the state during the Republic when they were the most 
important men in the Roman state, were unrelated but needed to have a working 
relationship that benefited the state.
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Chapter 4: Charismatic Legitimacy
The charismatic nature of imperial legitimacy is a more nebulous concept than 
either the proclaimed legality or traditional types of legitimacy because it is based 
on the willingness of an individual to believe in the leader's charisma rather than 
having the concrete nature of a proclamation or the weight of tradition behind it.1 
It is by its nature a way for emperors to draw attention to their person through 
their  relationship  to  the  divine  or  their  exemplary  personal  characteristics.2 
Emperors whose traditional or proclaimed legitimacy had not been established or 
had been eroded tried to bolster their standing by other means which focused on 
their  person in  order  that  their  charismatic  authority  was  recognised  by those 
subject to his rule.3 These methods were designed to enhance their standing and to 
try and draw support to themselves and included making the ceremonies which 
surrounded them or the titles which they claimed for their victories more elaborate 
or exulted. Not all of their attempts were successful, however, and these military 
failures which revealed a breakdown in the emperor's relationship with the divine 
or a diminution of the personal characteristics which had attracted support, led to 
charismatic authority being lost.4
1 M. Weber. Sociological Writings. (New York, 1994a), p. 32.
2 Weber (1994a), p. 33.
3 Weber (1994a), p. 33.
4 Weber (1994a), pp. 33-34.
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Ultimately,  when  charismatic  authority  is  consolidated,  it  will  evolve  into  a 
traditional  or  legal  form of  authority.5 For  example,  when Septimius  received 
acclamations as imperator by his troops,6 this was acknowledgement of his heroic 
qualities and the success of this campaign allowed for the routinisation of this 
charismatic  boost  to  his  legitimacy  into  a  traditional  virtue  of  defending  the 
empire from foreign enemies. This, therefore, enhanced this form of legitimacy 
because  of  his  ongoing  success.7 Receiving  acclamations  enhanced  the 
charismatic legitimacy of an emperor and their receipt by generals had a long-
standing in the Roman world.8 
Not all of the methods for enhancing an emperor’s charismatic legitimacy had 
such long roots. Some of the methods used were those that had not been attempted 
by emperors  in  stable  times.  Gallienus,  for  example,  attempted  to  bolster  his 
standing by sprinkling his hair with gold dust and by wearing a radiate crown in 
public.  He also wore a  purple  cloak with jewels and golden clasps (HA Gall. 
16.4).9 He seems to have regarded it as a way to promote his position and stand 
out  from  those  aspiring  to  and  fighting  to  become  emperor.  The  exemplary 
characteristics  he  was  promoting  was  his  status  above  ordinary  men  and, 
consequently, illustrating an assocation with the divine.10
5 Weber (1994a), p. 37.
6 ILS 417.
7 Weber (1994a), p. 38.
8 L.J.F. Keppie, Understanding Roman Inscriptions, (Baltimore, 1991), p. 42.
9 cum chlamyde purpurea gemmatisque fibulis et aureis Romae visus est.
10 Weber (1994a), p. 33.
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Similarly,  the  emperors  linked  themselves  to  gods.11 This  was  more  than 
performing the duties of a priest or showing the veneration due to a god which 
was the traditional role. For example, some emperors – Diocletian and Maximian 
are a case in point – claimed relationships to the gods they linked themselves to, 
in this case through their use of the names Herculius and Jovius (Aur. Vict. Caes. 
39).12 It was not just links to gods, but victories over Rome's enemies which were 
advertised through the use of victory titles. When Septimius, for example, decided 
to  celebrate  the  Secular  Games  it  would  have  given  him  the  opportunity  to 
advertise his ancestry and titulature in front of the Roman people as well as the 
relationship he had with gods such as Hercules (Herodian 3.8.10).13 His ancestry 
allowed him to show that there was an established family on the imperial throne 
with the promise of more to come in the form of his sons since he had made sure 
his whole family took an active part in the celebrations.14 His titulature, Arabicus, 
Adiabenicus,  Parthicus Maximus  catalogued  Rome’s  enemies  whom  he  had 
defeated,15 which promoted not only his own martial prowess but also in the case 
of  Parthicus Maximus linked his regime to the success which Marcus Aurelius 
and Lucius Verus had against the same enemy.16 Septimius followed Augustus’ 
example by publicising the celebration of the games on coins.17 He also celebrated 
11 R. Rees, Diocletian and the Tetrarchy, (Edinburgh, 2004), p. 50.
12 Maximianum ... Huic postea cultu numinis Herculio cognomentum accessit, uti Valerio Iovium.
13 R. Brilliant, 'The Arch of Septimius Severus in the Roman Forum',  Memoirs of the American 
Academy in Rome, Volume 29, (1967), p. 104.
14 A. Birley, Septimius Severus: The African Emperor (London, 1971), p. 227 and p. 230.
15 C. Ando,  Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (Berkeley, 2000), p. 
106.
16 Y. Le Bohec, The Roman Imperial Army, (New York, 1994), p. 202.
17 BMC V (Septimius and Caracalla) 843, 845 and 846 are examples for Septimius’ reign.
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his military successes on them and even included Caracalla on them at the time, 
claiming on one coin to be  Victoria Parthica Maxima and  IMPP INVICTI PII  
AUGG.18 
We do not know exactly how much influence the emperor exerted over the mints, 
but there is evidence in Herodian (2.15.5) as well as earlier sources that at times 
the emperors did take a personal interest in the coins which were struck.19 The 
coin legends contributed to an emperors charisma by providing a forum for them 
to publicise the exemplary characteristics they wanted people to associate them 
with, such as their religious virtues or military prowess.20 The depictions which 
went with the legend would reinforce religious or military symbolism and provide 
meaning for those who could not derive meaning from the words. Septimius also 
gained yet another title, propagator imperii, for successes in North Africa which 
had extended the boundaries of the empire.21 
Philip the Arab was another who celebrated the Secular Games, which coincided 
with the celebration for the thousandth year of the city of Rome. Games were put 
on and he also issued coins which commemorated  Roma Aeterna.22 Like those 
18 BMC V (Septimius and Caracalla) 265.
19 M. Peachin, Roman Imperial Titulature and Chronology AD 235-284 (Amsterdam, 1990), p. 10. 
See Suet.,  Aug. 94.12 and  Ner. 25.2 as these are examples of emperors from earlier eras having 
coins struck to mark events that they wanted noted.
20 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by G. Roth and C. 
Wittich (New York, 1968), pp. 215-216.
21 Birley (1971), p. 133. Ephem. Epig v 898 and 902.
22 RIC IV.3 Philip 44, 85, 140 and 243 have the legend ROMAE AETERNAE. He also celebrated 
the games on coins with the legend SAECVLVM NOVVM (RIC IV.3 Philip 25, 86 and 244 are 
examples).
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emperors before and after him, Philip wanted to make sure that his benefaction 
was broadcast and that the people and soldiers were aware who was providing it 
in  order  that  he  received  the  flattery  and  adulation  associated  with  the 
perpetuation of the city.23 Other imperial virtues were also proclaimed on coins in 
order to ensure that the people knew the qualities which the particular emperor 
wanted to be associated with. Probus, for example, used his coins to proclaim his 
virtus and  invincibility.24 These  are  exemplary  qualities  which  emperors  were 
associated  with  in  order  to  try  to  highlight  the  impressive  character  of  the 
particular emperor.25
For Aurelian, his military success which he had within the fragmented empire was 
extremely  important.26 When  he finally  restored  the  east  to  the  empire,  he 
proclaimed  himself  on  his  coins  as  Restitutor  Orientis,27 which  later  became 
Restitutor Orbis after he restored the Gallic provinces to the empire and again 
ruled a united, although insecure, Roman world.28 These titles, however, had also 
been  awarded to  Valerian,  whose  capture  by the Persians  meant  that  Aurelian 
would not want to carry only those titles such an ultimately unsuccessful emperor 
had.29 Aurelian’s titulature, therefore, became even more extravagant in order to 
stand  out  when  compared  to  these  other  emperors  whom he  would  not  have 
23 S.K. Drummond and L.H. Nelson, The Western Frontiers of Imperial Rome, (New York, 1994), 
p. 201.
24 RIC V.2 Probus 451-456 have virtus and invictus as their legends.
25 Weber (1994a), pp. 32-33.
26 T.E. Gregory, A History of Byzantium, (Malden, 2010), p. 30.
27 RIC V.1 Aurelian 140-141, 233-234 and 350-351 all have Restitutor Orientis as their legend.
28 RIC V.1 Aurelian 287-306 are examples of Aurelian claiming to be Restitutor Orbis.
29 A. Watson, Aurelian and the Third Century, (London, 1999), p. 174
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considered  to  have  achieved  as  much.  In  inscriptions,  he  is  described  as 
victoriosissimus and  gloriosissimus and  he  conquered  the  Carpi,  Germans, 
Arabians, Persians and Palmyrenes.30 Gloriosissimus and  restitutor patriae  were 
titles  unclaimed  before  during  this  troubled  period  since  the  demise  of  the 
Severans,  whereas  Valerian  had  also  laid  claim  on  Restitutor  Orientis and 
Restitutor Orbis on his coins. Gallienus claimed he too was  Restitutor Orbis on 
his coins and was victoriosissimus in inscriptions.31 They were, however, none of 
these and Aurelian felt the need to show that he was better.
Coins and inscriptions were two of the ways that the emperors could publicise the 
success they enjoyed or the causes with which they wanted to be linked.32 The 
victory titles which they took, such as  Parthicus,  Sarmaticus, Germanicus  and 
Britannicus, showed the foreign enemies who had been defeated and promoted 
the emperor’s military might.33 These appeared on their coins and on inscriptions 
and were appended to their names in order that everyone was reminded of their 
success whenever the emperor was formally announced or issued an edict and, 
30 For  gloriosissimus see  CIL VIII.22361 and VIII.22449,  victoriosissimus CIL VIII.10205 and 
VIII.20537. Titles for success over the Carpi, Germans, Goths and Parthians are all claimed on 
CIL VI.1112.  CIL II.4506  list  the  Arabians,  Goths  and  Carpi.  CIL V.4319  has  Palmyra,  the 
Germans and the Goths.
31 Peachin  (1990),  pp.  511-515.  See  CIL III.7586  for  restitutor  patriae.  Valerian’s  claim  as 
restitutor orientis RIC V.1 Valerian 286. For restitutor orbis see for example RIC V.1 Valerian 118. 
Gallienus  also  made  the  claim  RIC  V.1  Gallienus  165.  See  CIL VI  1108  and  XI  3090a  for 
Gallienus’ claim to be victoriosissimus.
32 W. Sayles,  Ancient Coin Collecting III: The Roman World – Politics and Propaganda, (Iola, 
2007), p. 45.
33 S. Mattern,  Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate, (Berkeley, 2002), pp. 
197-198.
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therefore, enhanced their charismatic legitimacy by reminding the audience that 
these were the heroic qualities through their martial success and successes with 
which  he  wanted  to  be  associated.34 Diocletian's  edict  on  maximum  prices 
provides an example of emperors advertising their heroic qualities by stating the 
victories enjoyed over tribes such as the Germans, Sarmatians and Britains.35 The 
cognomina devictarum gentium also continued to multiply and Aurelian held nine 
such titles. During the tetrarchy the emperors shared their titulature regardless of 
which specific emperor had been successful.36 The multiplication of the number of 
titles held showed the need that emperors felt to extol their military virtues and 
showed they were successful. It was an attempt to ensure those subject to him 
maintained their faith in his ability and his heroism, as the martial leader of the 
empire who was charged with its defence and expansion.37 The sharing of titles 
expressed the unity of the imperial college and was meant to ensure that no one 
emperor was perceived to be more heroic than another and avoid people having 
more willingness to believe in one emperor at the expense of another.38
Septimius (Zos. 1.8.2), Aurelian (Zos. 1.48.2) and the tetrarchy (Aur. Vict. Caes. 
39)  all  enjoyed  military  successes  which  enhanced  their  reputation  with  the 
troops.  This  gave  them the  right  to  claim the  titles  which  they  took  and  the 
34 See RIC VI 5a and 19a for an example of the tetrarchs issuing a coing to celebrate victory over 
the Sarmatians.
35 W.M. Leake (ed),  An Edict of Diocletian, fixing a Maximum of Prices throughout the Roman 
Empire, (London, 1826), p. 8
36 M. McCormick Eternal Victory: Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity,  Byzantium, and the 
Early Medieval West (Cambridge, 1986), p.22. 
37 Weber (1994a), pp. 32-33
38 Weber (1994a), p. 32.
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number of epithets which they incorporated should be seen to have enhanced their 
heroic  qualities.  This  was  certainly  the  effect  which  they  were  seeking.  The 
successes they enjoyed means that there would not have been any dilution of their 
charismatic authority and there is nothing in the extant sources to suggest that 
their use of these titles did have an adverse effect on their standing. Septimius' 
first campaign against the Parthians served its purpose since it provided him with 
honours  and  titles  which  allowed  him  to  add  the  names  Parthicus Arabicus, 
Parthicus Adiabenus and Parthicus Maximus to his own,39 while after his second 
campaign he conferred the title Parthicus Maximus upon himself.40 Septimius also 
publicised his achievements against the Parthians on a series of paintings which 
provided  a  visual  reminder  of  the  success  he  had  had  (Herodian  3.9.12).41 
Septimius’ titles, therefore, allowed him to exploit his successes and enhance his 
military reputation and so contributed to his legitimation. For a new emperor who 
had emerged through civil war, the foreign success was a chance to show that the 
empire was in strong hands and,  in Septimius'  case,  a chance to unite Niger's 
legions, which he had been fighting against, with his own and fight a common 
enemy.42 This  was  important  when  there  had  been  fragmentation  caused  by 
different areas being subjected to  different aspirants  in the civil  war since the 
presence  of  a  strong emperor  would  be  a  disincentive  for  other  pretenders  to 
39 RIC 4.1 55cf lists Septimius as PART ARAB PART ADIAB while RIC 4.1 167a refers to PART 
MAX. Also see P. Kneissl, Die Siegestitulator der Römischen Kaiser, (Göttingen, 1969), p. 211.
40 RIC IV.1 Septimius Severus 122-173 are examples of coins upon which this title appears.
41 ο τω μ ν δ  Σεβ ρος, τύχ  μ λλον  γνώμ , τ  κατ  Παρθυαίων νίκ  κεκόσμητο· τούτων δὕ ὲ ὴ ῆ ῃ ᾶ ἢ ῃ ῇ ὰ ῃ ὲ 
α τ  δεξι ς κα  π ρ π σαν ε χ ν προχωρησάντων πέστειλε τ  τε συγκλήτ  κα  τ  δήμ , τάςὐ ῷ ῶ ὶ ὑ ὲ ᾶ ὐ ὴ ἐ ῇ ῳ ὶ ῷ ῳ  
τε πράξεις μεγαληγορ ν, τ ς μάχας τε κα  τ ς νίκας δημοσίαις νέθηκε γραφα ς.ῶ ὰ ὶ ὰ ἀ ῖ
42 C.M. Wells, The Roman Empire, (Cambridge, MA, 1995) p. 283.
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emerge. Septimius' success would have showed the army, Senate and people that 
they had an emperor who was interested in the glory of the empire and displaying 
and publicising this success was the most certain method in Rome of drawing 
support  and  enhancing  his  authority.43 The victory titles  provided  an on-going 
reminder of the success he had enjoyed. No emperor was going to let a victory go 
uncelebrated because of the public relations mileage that was able to be made 
from their successes.
Macrinus awarded the title of Parthicus Maximus to himself when he reported to 
the Senate  that  the Parthian campaign had been finalised (Cass.  Dio 79.27.3). 
Severus Alexander took the title Persicus Maximus when he triumphed in Rome 
for the Persian campaigns which resulted in hostilities largely ceasing between the 
two powers for the remainder of the 230s.44 He also celebrated a triumph (HA 
Alex. Sev. 56.1)45 even though the war was wound up so he could return to address 
problems  on  his  northern  frontier  rather  than  it  being  fought  to  a  successful 
conclusion (Herodian 6.7.1-5). In this case, failure to defeat the Persians alone 
does not seem to have caused any problems with Severus Alexander’s standing 
because a number of the troops were from these northern areas and wanted to get 
back  there  to  deal  with  threats  to  their  homes  and  families.46 According  to 
Herodian, they were already angry at him for neglecting affairs there (Herodian 
43 J.B. Campbell, War and Society in Imperial Rome 31 BC – AD 284. (London, 2002), p. 144.
44 D.L. Vagi, Coinage and History of the Roman Empire, (Chicago, 2000), p. 307.
45 Post hoc Romam venit triumphoque pulcherrimo acto.
46 P. Edwell and P.M. Edwell, Between Rome and Persia: the Middle Euphrates, Mesopotamia and 
Palmyra under Roman Control, (Abingdon, 2008), p. 166.
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6.7.3),47 so leaving the east to tackle the Germanic tribes should have appeased 
them. However, when he negotiated with the Germans rather than attack them, he 
was no longer seen by the troops as a worthy emperor and the soldiers removed 
him (Herodian 6.7.9-10). The heroic, charismatic qualities which he was trying to 
celebrate by claiming the title of  Parthicus Maximus were not apparent in this 
failure to attack the Germanic tribes and he needed to do so for the sake of his 
charismatic  standing.  Charismatic  authority  could  be  delegitimated  when  the 
heroic qualities which were designed to draw personal support were no longer 
apparent.48 
Victory titles for claimed success against the Persians continued throughout the 
middle of the third century. Philip the Arab took the title Parthicus Maximus for 
settling affairs in the east even though this settlement was negotiated and cost the 
Romans money and territory.49 Gallienus took the title Parthicus Maximus on the 
basis of the success enjoyed by Odaenathus, whom he rewarded with the title dux 
totius orientis  (Zonar 24).50 That Gallienus awarded these titles to him suggests 
they were working in concord, although over time Odaenathus’ ambitions may 
have been rising.51 They also suggest that charges against Gallienus for ignoring 
the east were based on anti-Gallienan sentiment and not the situation that actually 
47 γανάκτουν ο ν, κα  τ ν λέξανδρον ε χον ν α τί  ς τ  π  τα ς νατολα ς δι' μέλειαν ἠ ὖ ὶ ὸ Ἀ ἶ ἐ ἰ ᾳ ὡ ὰ ὑ ὸ ῖ ἀ ῖ ἀ ἢ 
δειλίαν προδεδωκότα, πρός τε τ  ρκτ α μέλλοντα κα  κνο ντα.ὰ ἀ ῷ ὶ ὀ ῦ
48 Weber (1994a), pp. 33-34.
49 CIL III.4634 (Partico Maximo) and III.10619 (Parthico Maximo).
50 L. de Blois, The Policy of the Emperor Gallienus (Leiden, 1976), pp. 34-35.
51 E.  Cizak,  L’Empereur Aurélien et  son Temps (Paris,  1994),  p.  78 believes that  Odaenathus’ 
ambition had risen so far that he may have turned against Gallienus by the time he died.
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existed at the time. Carus was another who received the title  Parthicus for his 
success  over  the  Persians.52 The  prevalence  of  titles  taken  for  success  against 
Parthia/Persia shows the ongoing struggle for supremacy in the east between the 
two empires  which had a  long history dating  back  to  the  time of  the Roman 
Republic.
These were all designed by the individual emperors to draw support by showing 
that they had the heroic qualities required by a Roman leader.53 Philip the Arab, 
like Severus Alexander, did not have enough substance behind his claimed title 
and, consequently, did not have sufficient charismatic authority to claim sufficient 
loyalty to his person. Gallienus too, although able to claim credit for Odaenathus' 
success, was not able to use it to draw support. This was a failure of the tactic and 
shows that a negotiated or appropriated peace was not a substitute for an enforced 
one in regard to the enhancement of an emperor's legitimacy. 
Carus died soon after his victory over the Persians (Aur. Vict.  Caes. 38), but his 
son, Numerianus, was with this army and the legitimacy his father derived from 
his  success  meant  that  Numerianus  was  acclaimed  unchallenged  as  successor 
(Zonar.  30).  This dynastic connection and proximity to the troops was distinct 
from Gallienus' attempt to claim credit for a success which occurred in an area he 
was perceived as having little authority. Charismatic authority could be claimed 
52 RIC V.2 Carus 30 and 108-113. For the claim of Carus to Persicus see RIC V.2 Carus 48 & 50. 
These were all issued posthumously.
53 Keppie (1991), p. 44-45.
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through a familial relationship.54 This authority can only be maintained, however, 
through the selection of the correct heir.55 
Although eastern campaigns remained the pinnacle of success that  an emperor 
could enjoy, there was also a great need to deal with tribes along the Rhine and 
Danube  frontiers.  This  then  afforded  further  opportunities  for  glory  and  self-
promotion.  Maximinus  Thrax  was  raised  as  Severus  Alexander’s  replacement 
because Alexander  was  perceived  as  being  weak towards  the  Germanic  tribes 
(Herodian 6.7.10) so it was important that he be seen as active and successful in 
this region. Consequently, this was the action he undertook and he was successful 
after a bloody exchange (Herodian 7.1.5 and 7.2.7). He was able to take the titles 
Germanicus Maximus, Sarmaticus and Dacius which, even allowing for some self 
aggrandisement, shows that he did achieve what was expected of him.56 Philip the 
Arab also took the titles Germanicus and Carpicus Maximus,57 although pay-offs 
were made to these peoples to make sure they remained quiet.58 Other emperors 
also laid claim to the same titles. Claudius became Germanicus Maximus for his 
success over the Alamanni,59 while Aurelian claimed the title Carpicus Maximus 
when his commander, Marcellinus, defeated the Carpi.60 Tacitus earned the title 
54 Weber (1994a), p. 39.
55 Weber (1994a), p. 39.
56 CILXIII.8861 and XVII.312 amongst others for all three titles. 
57 See IGR IV 635 for the title of Germanicus and P. Lond. 3 p. 221, papyrus no. 951 for both titles.
58 H.  Temporini and W. Haase,  Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt: Geschichte und  
Kultur Roms im Spiegel der Neueren Forschung.  (Berlin,  1986), p. 3006. These subsidies were 
subsequently stopped in about 249 which led to further problems from these tribes.
59 CIL XII.2228 and  III.3521 provide examples.
60 CIL VI.1112. IMP CAES L DOMITIO AVRELIANO … GOTHICO … GERMANICO … 
CARPICO.
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Gothicus  Maximus,  although  the  victory  for  which  it  was  earned  was  barely 
recorded  by  the  literary  sources.61 This  shows  the  difficulty  the  Romans  had 
subduing tribes  from these  areas  but  those  emperors  who did  fight  the  tribes 
successfully enhanced their personal standing and, consequently, their charismatic 
legitimacy. 
Germanic tribes had a long history of causing panic in the minds of the Romans 
with the  Teutones and  Cimbri having massacred Roman legions in  the second 
century BC (Florus 1.38) so commanders enjoying real success enhanced their 
heroic status. During the third century it was not often the case that the emperor 
was  able  to  go  and  take  the  initiative  against  these  enemies  since  they  so 
frequently had to deal with incursions into Roman territory. That they needed the 
attention of the emperors over many generations shows the threat they posed and 
the inadequacies of the ability of the Roman defences to contain them.62 Failure to 
deal with these threats would then endanger the emperor’s legitimacy because it 
would undermine the support he received from the army as was the case with 
Severus Alexander and Philip the Arab.63 This highlights the need for the emperor 
to maintain his  control over the army which was something he could only do 
when his legitimacy was secure.
Some  emperors  faced  problems  in  the  same  area  repeatedly.  Diocletian  and 
Maximian  took  the  title  Sarmaticus  Maximus four  times  and  Germanicus  
61 CIL XII.5563. IMP CAES MARCVS CLAVDIVS TACITVS … GOTHYCVS MAXIMUS.
62 P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, Europe: A Cultural History, (New York, 1998), pp. 52-55.
63 F. Meijer, Emperors Don’t Die in Bed, (London, 2004), p. 81 and p. 90.
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Maximus six  times  over  about  fifteen  years  which  suggests  that  these  areas 
presented on-going problems for them that was difficult to settle.64 There is no 
evidence in the sources to suggest that the repeated need to fight the same enemy 
or in the same region had any effect on the legitimacy of the tetrarchy. This was in 
part because the extra emperors meant that there was always an emperor available 
to deal with the threat which in turn meant that the emperor never needed to move 
far from the affected area. It also helped that this emperor kept being successful. 
Other emperors,  such as Gallienus (see Aur. Vict.  Caes.  33)65 or even Severus 
Alexander (Herodian 6.5.7 and 6.7.3-6),66 needed to move around more to deal 
with threats and their inability to defeat all of these opponents in combat and the 
need to pay off opponents destabilised their standing. Failure, therefore, eroded 
the willingness of those subject to a regime to maintain their belief in it.67 With the 
tetrarchy, however, failure by one emperor could be offset against the success of 
another so the college of emperors as a whole did not suffer an erosion of belief in 
its legitimacy.68 This highlights the advantage of having an imperial college so as 
to reduce the need to for an individual emperor to be moving continuously over 
64 T.D. Barnes, The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine (Cambridge, Mass.,1982), p. 255, 
table 5. The Edict of Diocletian on Prices in 301 mentions Sarmaticus Maximus and Germanicus 
Maximus. These titles were also taken by the Caesars. See Leake (ed.) (1826), p. 8. Also see P.R. 
Coleman-Norton, A.C. Johnson, F.C. Bourne and C. Pharr, Ancient Roman Statues: A Translation 
with Introduction, Commentary, Glossary and Index, (Clark, NJ, 2003), p. 235.
65 Gallienus  had  to  deal  with  Germans  in  Gaul  and  the  hurry  off  to  Illyricum to  deal  with 
usurpation attempts. He then had to try to prevent incursions through Thrace and the Alamanni 
into Italy. This is just to list briefly some of the movements Gallienus had to make to keep the 
empire together.
66 These passages in Herodian show the problems Alexander had in the east and then in the west.
67 Weber (1994a), p. 33.
68 Weber (1994a), pp. 33-34.
122
vast distances to ensure he was seen by the soldiers to be in charge of threats as 
they arose.
In the third century there were a number of men who claimed to be restitutor or 
conservator.  For  example,  Philip  the  Arab,  Maximinus,  Valerian,  Probus  and 
Aurelian all claimed to be the restitutor of something. Probus, Tacitus, Maximinus 
and Valerian, amongst others made a claim to be a conservator whether it was as 
the preserver of the world, the army or just dignity and freedom. Consequently, if 
the boast was worthy of broadcast, there was an element of necessity behind it 
which made it worthwhile for the emperors to take credit for it.69 Gallienus used 
titles such as invictus to try to show that he was a strong leader and the saviour of 
the state.70 He also used the title magnus.71 
Gallienus  tried to  draw a link between himself  and Trajan by using the same 
epithet,  optimus  princeps.72 Titles  were  taken,  therefore,  that  could  link  an 
emperor  not  only  to  their  own  success  but  to  the  success  of  those  who  had 
preceded  them.  There  is  no  evidence  to  say  whether  or  not  this  attempted 
association benefited Gallienus but being linked to an emperor with the regard in 
which Trajan was held meant that there were expectations of success that were 
necessary before the link could enhance Gallienus' charismatic standing. In this 
regard,  Gallienus  tried  to  enhance  his  standing  through  Odaenathus'  success 
69 See Peachin (1990), pp. 511-515 for these examples of the many emperors who claimed these 
types of  titles. 
70 IRT 458 provides an example of its use in an inscription.
71 CIL XIV.4058. MAGNO ET INVICTO IMP GALLIENO.
72 de Blois (1976), p. 131.
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against the Persians, through his use of the totle Parthicus Maximus,73 a part of the 
world in which Trajan had also been victorious.74 Therefore, it can be assumed 
that the link to Trajan did not boost Gallienus' standing and the association with a 
past hero can only have been detrimental.
Titles, once gained by an emperor, were not always kept.75 Diocletian may have 
taken the title Britannicus Maximus on the strength of Carausius’ success against 
the pirates,76 although it could have been due to success enjoyed by Carinus which 
Diocletian either appropriated as his own or completed if the campaigning was 
on-going.77 That he dropped the title would suggest that it was after Carausius’ 
victory that it was taken and then, after Carausius rebelled and set himself up as 
an emperor within Britain, it was no longer politic of Diocletian to keep a title 
achieved through the efforts of a man he would now have to oppose.78 Keeping 
the title would only have served to enhance Carausius’ legitimacy and support his 
claim to  have  been  an  equal  within  the  imperial  college  with  Diocletian  and 
Maximian as he had claimed on his coinage.79 Removing the title from his own 
73 IRT 956.
74 K. Farrokh, Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War, (Oxford, 2007), p. 61.
75 C.E.V Nixon and B.S Rodgers,  In Praise of the Later Roman Emperors (Berkeley, 1994), p. 
107.
76 Nixon and Rodgers (1994), p. 107. ILS 615.
77 A. Birley, The Roman Government of Britain, (Oxford, 2005), p. 368.
78 A.  Bowman,  P.  Garnsey and  A.  Cameron,  The  Cambridge  Ancient  History:  The  Crisis  of  
Empire, AD 193-337, (Cambridge, 2005), p. 71 believe that it might have been taken then dropped 
because it was Carausius' success. 
79 P.  Salway,  Roman  Britain (Oxford,  1981),  p.  299.  See  RIC  V.2  Carausius,  Diocletian  and 
Maximian 1 for the coin on which Carausius claims to be the joint emperor with the Dyarchs, On 
the obverse he put the legend CARAVSIVS ET FRATRES SVI and on the reverse PAX AUGGG.
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titulature, therefore, took away any acknowledgement that he had been involved 
with the usurper. It also warned Carausius that he was not recognised nor accepted 
as  an  imperial  colleague.  Since  recognition  from  the  ruled  is  essential  for 
charismatic authority to exist,  Carausius, like any usurper was unable to attain 
belief in his status with the wider empire and certainly meant that he could expect 
to be challenged in his position by those emperors who did enjoy wide ranging 
acceptance of their position.80
The collegial idea that Diocletian promoted with the tetrarchy meant that success 
was shared. All of the tetrarchs shared all of the victory titles with one another, 
regardless of which tetrarch was responsible for the success.81 The Caesars in the 
tetrarchy, however, did not receive all of the titles which the  Augusti had since 
they were not acknowledged as  Imperatores.82 Sharing the military titles in this 
way removed competition for success because it meant that any success enjoyed 
by one of the tetrarchs contributed to the legitimation of the regime as a whole.83 
It  also  meant  that  each  emperor  enjoyed  the  same  official  standing  and, 
consequently, the legitimacy that one emperor enjoyed was enjoyed collegially. 
The  legitimacy of  Maximian  was,  therefore,  linked with Diocletian.  This  was 
shown after  their  retirement  when Maximian tried to  make a  comeback (Zos. 
2.10.4-7/Aur. Vict. Caes. 40). Without Diocletion, Maximian was unable to assert 
his  own status  against  the new set  of emperors.  Diocletian,  however,  was not 
80 Weber (1994a), pp. 32-33.
81 McCormick (1986), p. 112.
82 Barnes (1982), pp. 25-26. See the text of the price edict, Leake (ed.), p. 8.
83 Rees (2004), p. 73.
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responsible for every title which the original tetrarhy enjoyed amongst themselves 
so they all contributed to their legitimacy. The sharing of victory titles, however, 
does mean that the successes of an individual emperor, such as Constantius, are 
not well documented.84 Although, for example, we do know that he was successful 
because of the victory titles that were taken by the tetrarchs for his successes over 
the  Germans  and  Sarmatians,  we  are  lacking  much  of  the  detail  about  the 
campaigns and at whose instigation they were undertaken. The promotion of the 
success, however, was sufficient to enhance the legitimacy of the regime because 
it helped promote the heroic qualities of the emperor.85
As well as victories being a way of boosting a regime by promoting its ongoing 
success,  they  also  brought  financial  reward.86 The  aurum  coronarium was 
expected to be given to an emperor to celebrate the victories which he won and 
the series of coins which Gallienus issued to celebrate victores suggests that he 
exploited  this  particular  source  of  revenue.87 Even  though  he  claimed  these 
victories and the money associated with their celebration, he did not deliver what 
was expected of an emperor since the empire remained fragmented. This failure to 
unite the empire meant that when he did take time away from the battlefield, he 
left  himself  open to  accusations  of  laziness  and negligence  which  the  ancient 
sources are quick to tarnish him with (Eutr. 9.8).88 Archaeological and epigraphic 
84 Rees (2004), p. 73.
85 Weber (1994a), p.32.
86 Bowman, Garnsey and Cameron (2005), p. 383.
87 J. Bray, Gallienus: A Study in Reformist and Sexual Politics (Kent Town, 1997) p. 202.
88 Gallienus  … mox in  omnem lasciviam dissolutus,  tendendae  rei  publicae  habenas  probosa 
ignavia et desperatione laxavit.
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evidence,  together  with  descriptions  of  what  Gallienus  was doing,  rather  than 
assessments of his character, do show the vast range that he covered trying to 
maintain the stability of the empire that remained.89 Such efforts were an attempt 
by Gallienus to maintain the willingness of the people to believe in his charisma 
but unfortunately being unsuccessful meant that his legitimacy was eroded and 
this ultimately led to his assassination.90
Aurelian's eternal victory is celebrated in inscriptions as is his association with 
Hercules.91 He is also  Imperator deus et dominus.92 The idea of the emperor as 
princeps senatus was long dead, but the notion of the emperor as an actual deus 
was new.  The imperial  position  was  now so firmly established  there  were no 
significant  dissensions  recorded  to  his  elevated  status.  His  achievements  had 
secured his legitimacy and he was even able to go further and claim divinity from 
birth – deus et dominus natus – which made all of his actions throughout his life 
divine.93 Proclaiming such things and not having them affect his status shows the 
development  of  the  nature  of  charismatic  legitimacy  over  the  course  of  the 
empire.94 To have claimed god-like status would have risked de-legitimating a 
89 Gregory (2010), p. 29.
90 Weber (1994a), p.32.
91 CIL XI.6308 and CIL XI.6309.
92 A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire 324-1453: Volume 1, (Madison, 1952), p. 61.
93 RIC V.1 Aurelian 305-306. Coin 305 has the legend IMP DEO ET DOMINO AURELIANO 
AVG while Coin 306 has DEO ET DOMINO NATO AURELIANO AVG.
94 A. Besançon,  The Forbidden Image: an Intellectual History of Iconoclasm, translated by J.M. 
Todd, (Chicago, 2000), p. 59.
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regime in the early empire with Gaius and Domitian both promoting themselves 
as divine and not enjoying enduring regimes or reputations.95
There had been little profit for Caligula, Domitian and Commodus trying to be 
gods since their memories were damned after their deaths.96 The attempts by these 
men  to  present  themselves  as  god-like  figures  were  not  accepted  by  their 
contemporaries (Cass. Dio 73.15.1-16.1).97 Commodus’ eventual deification only 
came  about  because  the  Severan  regime  wanted  to  have  divine  ancestry  and 
Septimius  was  claiming to  be  the  son of  Marcus  Aurelius  and the  brother  of 
Commodus  (Cass.  Dio  76.7.4).98 Those  emperors,  like  Commodus  (Cass.  Dio 
73.16.1), who had aspired to such a status were not discredited by their desire to 
be a god alone, however, but also because of their erratic behaviour, the favour 
they showed to  men who were from lowly backgrounds,  such as freedmen or 
others considered unworthy sources of advice, and also their mismanagement of 
the administration of the empire (Dio 73.16.1-21.3).99 These were not exemplary 
95 Besançon (2000), p. 59.
96 R. Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy, (Cambridge, 1990), p. 168.
97 Cass. Dio 73.15.1-16.1 shows the distaste Dio had for Commodus' desire to style himself as a 
god. Suet, Gaius, 22 mentions Gaius' desire to be treated as a god. Also see Aur. Vict. Caes. 11 for 
Domitian's  desire  to  be  addressed  as  lord  and  god.  See B.W.  Jones,  The Emperor  Domitian, 
(London, 1992), p. 108 who assesses the evidence for Domitian and concludes that he was willing 
to be flattered by the use of the label by those who want to use it but did not insist on it. A.A.  
Barrett, Caligula: Corruption of Power, (London, 1989), p. 140 looks at Caligula's claim for god-
like status. Also see Duncan-Jones, p. 168.
98 I. Gradel, Emperor Worship and Roman Religion, (Oxford, 2004), p. 350.
99 See Dio 73.16.1-21.3 for examples of his behaviour which was looked down upon by Dio. A. 
Bowman, P. Garnsey and D. Rathbone,  The Cambridge Ancient History: The High Empire, AD 
70-192. (Cambridge, 2000), p. 209.
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personal characteristics and did not, therefore, promote a belief in the charismatic 
authority of these emperors.100
Brauer  does  not  believe  that  Aurelian  would  have  claimed divine  status  from 
birth,  however,  and  the  evidence  of  one  coin  is  insufficient  to  draw  such  a 
conclusion.101 He also dismisses the idea that Aurelian was building a temple to 
the  Sun  in  order  to  identify  himself  with  his  god.102 However,  building  and 
restoring temples was a feature of emperors’ attempts to honour the gods and 
restore religious practice to a central place in people’s lives. Aurelian identified 
with Sol and it is entirely reasonable to have expected him to have built temples to 
show this identification (Aur. Vict. Caes. 35). Although Elagabalus had attempted 
and failed to introduce the Emesan Sun-god as the principal god in Rome, there is 
no reason to think that over fifty years later another attempt would similarly fail. 
Elagabalus’ failure was due to his excessive practices, not only as a chief priest of 
his god but also in his lifestyle in general, such as the debauched association Dio 
accuses him of forming with the chariot-driver Hierocles (Cass. Dio 80.15.1).103 
Had the practices associated with the sun-god been more in keeping with those 
which were familiar to the Romans, there is no reason that its introduction should 
not have been successful.104 
100 Weber (1994a), p. 32.
101 G.C.  Brauer,  The Age of the Soldier Emperors: Imperial Rome, A.D. 244-284. (Park Ridge, 
1975), p. 230.
102 Brauer (1975), p. 230.
103 C. White, The Emergence of Christianity, (Westport, 2007), p. 119.
104 M. Beard, J.A. North and S.R.F. Price,  Religions of Rome: A History, (Cambridge, 1998), p. 
259.
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Far from being too sensible to repeat Elagabalus’ mistakes, as Brauer asserts,105 
Aurelian  may  have  learnt  the  lesson  about  how  best  to  approach  such  an 
undertaking. The relationship between the emperors and the gods was, after all, 
being redefined by the emperors during this period. Aurelian’s  antoniniani,  for 
example, depict him and Jupiter.106 Traditionally the god would be expected to 
have been taller than Aurelian or some kind of signifier of deference would have 
been shown to the god. However,  on this  antoninianus  they are both standing 
upright and the same height.107 This imagery suggests to those who looked at it 
that Aurelian was of god-like stature and, therefore, above the stature of normal 
men. Aurelian’s legitimacy, however, remained secure in spite of this association 
and,  therefore,  the  link  to  the  god,  if  it  did  not  de-legitimate  him,  can  be 
considered to have enhanced his status. 
Links between emperors and the gods had always been an important part of their 
quest for legitimacy.108 All emperors attempted to show their piety but the way 
they were linked changed over time and between emperors. By doing such things 
as parading images of the gods at ceremonies, emperors were showing the people 
the gods to whom they wished to be linked.109 Gallienus associated himself with 
Jupiter  and  Hercules,  which  were  the  gods  the  tetrarchs  would  later  identify 
105 Brauer (1975), p. 230.
106 RIC V.1 Aurelian 48 and also others such as 260, 334 and 394.
107 Brauer (1975), pp. 230-1. RIC V.1 Aurelian 48.
108 Weber (1994a), p. 33.
109 McCormick (1986), p. 21.
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themselves  with.110 He is  depicted on a gold aureus  near  the end of his  reign 
wearing a lion skin which identifies him with Hercules.111 In this regard he was 
following the lead of Commodus who had identified himself with Hercules (HA, 
Comm. 8.5-9).112 Gallienus also associated himself with Apollo, Diana and Sol.113 
The association with Sol was also one that  other  emperors followed: both his 
immediate successors also revered this god. Claudius Gothicus’ coinage referred 
to Sol.114 Aurelian also identified strongly with Sol, and placed his portrait on the 
reverse of his coins. These also included the legends Sol Invictus, Sol conservator, 
Sol Dominus Imperii Romani.115 These are all epithets that an emperor wished to 
be associated with. Sol was also considered to be a unifying force which is what 
Aurelian had sought to achieve militarily throughout the empire. He also wanted 
to  restore  traditional  values,  even  if  doing  so  by  promoting  himself  as  the 
intermediary on earth to the god was in a slightly new guise.116 This was meant to 
create devotion to the sanctity of the emperor through his relationship with the 
gods.117
110 See RIC V.1 Gallienus 595 for Hercules and RIC V.1 Gallienus 143 for Jupiter.
111 RIC V.1 Gallienus 595.
112 For examples of Commodus’ coins depicting Hercules see RIC III Commodus 162, 254a, 254b, 
399a, 399b, 409 and 424.
113 See de Blois (1976), pp. 149-50 about Gallienus’ identification with Hercules, pp. 163-164 for 
the identification with Apollo and Diana and pp. 165-169 for Sol Invictus.
114 RIC V.1 Claudius 221 has the legend IMP C CLAVDIVS AVG on the obverse and SOL AVG on 
the reverse. RIC 153 and 155 also depict Sol.
115 RIC V.1 Aurelian 390 has the legend SOL INVICTO on the reverse. RIC V.1 Aurelian 319 and 
322 have AVRELIANVS AVG CONS on the reverse. Coin 319 has SOL DOMINUS IMPERI 
ROMANI on the obverse and 322 has SOL DOM IMP ROM.
116 G. Halsberghe, The Cult of Sol Invictus, (Leiden, 1972), p. 137. Also see Watson (1999), p. 190.
117 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
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Diocletian identified himself with gods in a similar way and for a similar purpose 
to Aurelian but chose to revert to Jupiter and Hercules rather than  Sol Invictus 
(Aur.  Vict.  Caes.  39).118 They were both traditional Roman gods,  whereas  Sol  
Invictus had only recently gained a position of prominance as the leading god.119 
The relationship between Diocletian and Maximian was expressed in religious 
terms and they hoped that the association with these gods would help to unify 
people  behind  their  regime  and  recall  times  that  were  perceived  as  more 
peaceful.120 They promoted their association as soon as Maximian was elevated to 
the imperial fold and their partnership was linked with the partnership between 
the two gods, with Jupiter’s role as the head god and Hercules’ as his assistant 
mirroring  the  relationship  between  the  emperors.121 These  names  were  also 
applied to military units and later to their Caesars, Galerius122 and Constantius,123 
upon the creation of the tetrarchy when they forged the same link to the gods as 
their Augustus.124 Diocletian had chosen to create the explicit links to Jupiter and 
Hercules rather than link the tetrarchs with any of their imperial predecessors. In 
this regard he was following Aurelian’s lead. The success of Diocletian’s tetrarchy 
118 S. Williams, Diocletian and the Roman Recovery. (London, 1985), pp. 58-59.
119 C.R. Long,  The Twelve Gods of  Greece and Rome,  (Leiden,  1987),  pp.  321-322.  Also see 
Bowman, Garnsey and Cameron (2005), p. 171.
120 C.M. Odahl, Constantine and the Christian Empire, (New York, 2004), p. 41.
121 Odahl (2004), p. 41 and Rees (2004), p. 55. See RIC 5.2 288 no. 583 in which Maximian is 
shown receiving a globe from Diocletian. On RIC 5.2 295 no. 626 Diocletian has received a globe 
from Jupiter. These together help to show the order of precedence. This is also the case on the 
Edict of Maximum Prices where Diocletian is the first mentioned emperor ahead of Maximian 
(Leake (ed.), p. 8).
122 RIC V.2 719 and RIC VI.436.
123 RIC V.2 669 and 670 for example.
124 A. Cameron, The Later Roman Empire: AD 284-430, (London, 1993), pp. 31-32.
132
meant that those divine associations were initially continued by their successors 
and  showed  the  routinisation  which  this  aspect  of  charismatic  authority  had 
achieved at that time.125
Constantine, however,  spurned the tetrarchic gods in favour of Apollo and Sol 
Invictus126 and so evoked memories of Claudius Gothicus and Aurelian.127 The 
link to Claudius was a deliberate ploy which tied in neatly with his claim to be 
descended  from  him  and,  consequently,  rejected  the  tetrarchic  ideal  of  how 
emperors  should  be  appointed  in  favour  of  the  dynastic  one.128 Disassociating 
himself from the tetrarchy's ideals made explicit his desire to rule himself and not 
as part of an imperial college.129 Constantine worked with a similar philosophy to 
Aurelian which promoted the idea of the emperor as between the people and the 
god with one state, one god as the theme.130 Coins were issued which depicted 
Constantine with Sol and advertised Sol’s invictus status which was an epithet he 
could equally apply to himself and would be eager to be associated with.131 He is 
also styled  Maximus Augustus.132 This was a title  he was voted by the Senate 
125 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
126 R. MacMullen, Constantine (London, 1969), p. 61.
127 RIC V.1 216 for an example of Claudius Gothicus' association with Apollo and RIC V.2 154 for 
Aurelian and Sol.
128 Odahl (2004), p. 81.
129 Odahl (2004), p. 81.
130 P. Southern, The Roman Empire From Severus to Constantine (London, 2001), p. 124.
131 RIC VII Constantine (London) 53-59, 68-79 and 88-95 are all examples of coins with SOL 
INVICTO COMITI as the legend.
132 This title is on an inscription on the Arch of Constantine – see  CIL VI.1139 IMP CAES FL 
CONSTANTINO MAXIMO PF AVGVSTO.  This  is  also  on  coins.  See  RIC  VII  154  –  IMP 
CONSTANTINVS MAX AVG.
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which shows his belief in his seniority as emperor above Licinius, whom he was 
then  still  acknowledging  as  his  colleague.133 The  act  of  Constantine  linking 
himself to Claudius and Sol was one which Licinius could not ignore.134 In order 
to  claim a significant antecedent of his own, he claimed lineage from Philip the 
Arab (HA Gord. 34.5).135 Thus, through this association, he was seeking to claim 
deeper imperial roots than Claudius Gothicus provided Constantine. Both men, 
however, were trying to claim a routinisation of charismatic authority which was 
transmitted through their family's bloodline, with he who could claim the longer 
bloodline able to claim the he had the greater hereditary charisma.136
For some emperors, divine association was better than an earthly one because the 
failings of the men who had preceded them meant that there was little to be gained 
by claiming a dynastic link to them. Others made light of the failings of some of 
their predecessors and had them deified anyway. Septimius deified Commodus 
which according to the  Historia Augusta was due to Septimius’ hatred for the 
Senate (HA Comm. 17.11). This could have been one motive. Another could have 
been  that  he  did  so  for  the  sake  of  his  standing  with  the  army  by  whom 
Commodus was well regarded.137 This also allowed him to tie his regime to that of 
the Antonines and most importantly Marcus Aurelius, who enjoyed an outstanding 
133 H.A. Pohlsander, The Emperor Constantine. (London, 1996), pp. 38-39.
134 I.  Shahîd,  Rome and the Arabs: A Prolegomenon to the Study of Byzantium and the Arabs, 
(Washington, 1984), p. 84.
135 Licinius dicitur ..., cum se vellet videri a Philippis originem trahere.
136 Weber (1994a), p. 39.
137 J.B. Campbell. The Emperor and the Roman Army 31 BC – AD 235. (Oxford, 1984), pp. 50-51.
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reputation which had not been sullied by the excesses of his son.138 This highlights 
the desire emperors had to associate themselves with those who preceeded them 
in  order  to  claim their  own imperial  roots  were longer  than they really were. 
Ensuring the deification of predecessors also helped to enhance the status of these 
imperial roots by also giving the reigning emperor an association with the divine. 
This again was an example of an emperor seeking charismatic legitimacy from a 
charismatic association, with a divine bloodline carrying more authority than a 
mortal one.139
Macrinus did not initially act to deify or damn Caracalla because he had been well 
regarded by the troops and to have upset them would have risked destabilising his 
own position (Cass. Dio 79.17.2-3). Dio states that he thinks Macrinus wanted the 
Senate  to  condemn  him so  that  his  standing  with  the  soldiers  would  not  be 
undermined (Cass. Dio 79.17.3). Dio's portrait of him suggests that the Senate did 
want him condemned because of the hatred felt towards him (Cass. Dio 79.9.1). 
Therefore, avoiding the issue seems to have been the sensible option and the one 
Macrinus chose to take while he was establishing himself and could not afford to 
lose the support he had from either party. 
The later Severans do not seem to have been men with whom it was profitable to 
have an association.  Philip  the Arab,  for example,  did not  link himself  to  the 
Severan  dynasty and stepped away from the  tradition  of  deifying  an  imperial 
138 J.J. Spielvogel, Western Civilization: to 1500 Volume 1, (Belmont, 2008), pp. 168-169.
139 Weber (1994a), p. 39.
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predecessor  by  deifying  his  father,  Marinus.140 This  was  unprecedented  since 
Marinus had not been an emperor, but there were few emperors of the immediate 
past  whose  reputation  warranted  being  associated  with.  Gordian  III  had  been 
significantly younger than Philip and so he could not be claimed as a forebear and 
Philip’s  Arabian  roots  also  meant  that  any  link  would  easily  be  decried  as 
fabrication  since  no  previous  emperor  had  come  from  there.141 Emperors, 
therefore, seem to have associated themselves with gods when they could in order 
to  increase  their  charismatic  legitimacy.142 They  understood  the  value  of  the 
association for their standing with the people.
Septimius,  as  well  as  claiming  an  Antonine  heritage  (Cass.  Dio  76.7.4),  also 
honoured Trajan by making the successful attack on Ctespihon during his Parthian 
expedition  on the centenary of  Trajan’s  dies  imperii.143 A further  link  was his 
Parthicus title since it  was one that Trajan had also been awarded (Cass.  Dio 
68.23.2 and 68.28.2).144 This was a demonstration that Septimius’ regime was one 
which would honour the past and wanted to link itself to the best of emperors.145 
Decius  also  awarded  himself  the  honorary  name  Trajan.146 There  were  no 
worthwhile imperial bloodlines to tie himself to in the more immediate past and 
this  would also have evoked Septimius’ honour of Trajan.  Septimius’ personal 
140 BMC 2. Vagi (2000), p. 330.
141 J. Taylor, Petra and the Lost Kingdom of the Nabataeans, (London, 2002), p. 126.
142 Weber (1994a), p. 32.
143 Birley (1971), p. 202. Although this claim is disputed. For the counter-argument, see Z. Rubin, 
'Dio, Herodian and Severus' Second Parthian War' Chiron 5 (1975), pp. 431-437.
144 RIC II 289 no 642. Bowman, Garnsey and Rathbone (2000), p. 124.
145 Sayles (2007), p. 122.
146 RIC 4.3 4 for example – IMP TRAIANVS DECIVS AVG. Brauer (1975), p. 19.
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reputation would have been relatively undimmed but it  can be concluded from 
Decius' choosing not to take his name directly that he did not think it was wise 
because those within his dynasty who followed him had tarnished the Severan 
name. Any desire any emperor would have had to link themselves to Septimius 
diminished  significantly  after  Elagabalus’ reign  because  to  include  the  name 
Severus or Antoninus in the imperial titulature no longer evoked Septimius alone 
but  his  successors  whose  reputation  was  not  so  distinguished.  Even  Severus 
Alexander, who does not have the same ill-repute in the sources as Elagabalus and 
Caracalla, was seen as weak, indecisive and too much under the influence of his 
mother (Herodian 6.8.3).147 He, consequently, was not worth having as an imperial 
prototype. Therefore, when the potential link to the past was too weak to enhance 
legitimacy, it was better not to make the link.148 Elagabalus, meanwhile, did not 
have the personal characteristics which would mean that Roman people would 
believe in his charisma149 so his was not a hereditary link worth having for the 
enhancement of an emperor's legitimacy.
That Elagabalus can be seen as the reason that later emperors chose not to link the 
Severan emperors to themselves can be shown by Macrinus, who was happy to 
take  the  Severan  name  (Cass.  Dio  79.16.2).  Only  Caracalla  and  Septimius, 
however, had preceded him so the soldiers must have still thought highly enough 
147 θεν ο  νεανίαι, ν ο ς ν τ  πολ  πλ θος Παιόνων μάλιστα, τ  μ ν νδρεί  το  Μαξιμίνουὅ ἱ ἐ ἷ ἦ ὸ ὺ ῆ ῇ ὲ ἀ ᾳ ῦ  
χαιρον, τ ν δ  λέξανδρον πέσκωπτον ς π  τ ς [τε] μητρ ς ρχόμενον, κα  διοικουμένωνἔ ὸ ὲ Ἀ ἐ ὡ ὑ ὸ ῆ ὸ ἀ ὶ  
τ ν πραγμάτων π' ξουσίας τε κα  γνώμης γυναικός, θύμως τε κα  νάνδρως το ς πολεμικο ςῶ ὑ ἐ ὶ ῥᾳ ὶ ἀ ῖ ῖ  
προσφερομένου κείνου.ἐ
148 Weber (1994a), p. 39.
149 Weber (1994a), pp. 32-33.
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of them both to make the link worth having.  He, therefore, took the name Severus 
to link himself  to their  dynasty (Cass.  Dio 79.16.2).  Severus Alexander’s own 
claim  to  dynastic  continuity  harked  back  prior  to  Elagabalus  to  his  link  to 
Septimius, since he was related to him (see Herodian 5.3.2 and 5.7.1), as well as 
Marcus Aurelius because of Septimius’ appropriation of the Antonine name. Even 
during Elagabalus’ reign, because of Elagabalus’ failings, Alexander was being 
pushed  forward.  Elagabalus  adopted  him and  granted  him the  title  of  Caesar 
(Herodian 5.7.1-4), with the regret he quickly felt (Herodian 5.7.5) indicating how 
little control he had by the end of his reign. It also means that Alexander was not 
tarred by Elagabalus’ acts because he was kept away from him and shown to the 
soldiers  and  people  as  a  virtuous  alternative  emperor  (Herodian  5.8.1-8).  The 
association with Septimius rather than Elagabalus was what was aiding Severus 
Alexander's charismatic legitimacy through the hereditary link.
The titles that emperors received and publicised on coins and inscription were 
small reminders of their achievements. They did not have to be on such a small 
scale. The arch Septimius had built in the forum to celebrate his Decennalia was a 
visible reminder of his power for Senators whenever they emerged from the curia 
(Herodian 2.9.5-6). The meaning that any individual derived from this would be 
specific to that person,150 but the intention of the emperor was to remind them of 
his  power and success.  The sculptures on the arch celebrated his  success over 
Parthia and the inscription on the arch celebrates his rebuilding of the Republic, 
which  although patently untrue,  did draw parallels  to  the claim that  Augustus 
150 A. Laird, ‘Ut Figura Poesis: Writing Art and the Art of Writing,’ in J. Elsner, ed., Art and Text  
in Roman Culture (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 98-99.
138
about giving the republic back to the people.151 Constantine also built an arch for 
his Decennalia, with the text listing his achievements including the claim that he 
saved Rome from tyranny.152 These arches displayed the grandeur of the regime 
and reflected the glory of the emperor responsible for building it.  The military 
glory  it  represented  showed  the  heroism of  the  emperor  and  this  encouraged 
ongoing obedience to his rule because of his charismatic authority.153
The emperor’s position as leader of the state was important and he needed to show 
his power as leader and protector of the state by being all things to all people.154 
Over time this came to require his standing to be above that of an ordinary mortal 
and he had to show his magnificence, invincibility and immortality.155 Triumphs 
were  the  traditional  way that  Roman  generals  had  displayed  their  power  and 
invincibility and this ritual had promoted them as men who stood out from their 
peers. It testified to the power of Rome and celebrated the success of its mission 
of conquest and domination as well as the courage of its soldiers.156 Above these 
151 See R. Brilliant,  The Arch of Septimius Severus in the Roman Forum (Rome, 1967), p. 91 for 
the  inscription  which  Septimius  had  put  onto  the  arch.  He  claimed  OB  REM  PVBLICAM 
RESTITVTAM. In the  Res Gestae, Augustus claimed  rem publicam ... in senatus populique ...  
transtuli (RG 34.1).
152 See N. Hannestad, Roman Art and Imperial Policy (Moesgard, 1986), p. 321. He claimed CUM 
EXERCITV SVO TAM DE TYRANNO QVAM DE OMNI EIVS FACTIONE VNO TEMPORE 
IVSTIS  REMPVBLICAM  VLTVS  EST  ARMIS.  Note  the  parallel  which  can  be  drawn  to 
Augustus who claimed per quem rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem 
uindicaui (RG 1.1).
153 Weber (1994a), p. 32.
154 A. Wallace-Hadrill, 'The Emperor and His Virtues',  Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte. 
1981. Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 300.
155 Cameron (1993), p. 42.
156 C. Nicolet,  The World of the Citizen of Rome, translated by P.S. Fulla (Berkeley, 1980), pp. 
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considerations, however, was the focus on the general and the favour he had been 
granted  by  the  gods  who  ensured  the  ongoing  prosperity  of  the  empire.157 
McCormick believes that despite all of the changes that did occur to the nature of 
the imperial position, there was little change in the celebration of victories from 
the principate to the later empire.158 It was in the triumphal ceremony that god and 
man had traditionally come as close as possible to one another.159 The combination 
of the divine and the martial glory of the emperor, therefore, enhanced the belief 
in the charismatic authority of the emperor concerned.160
The late empire was, therefore, no different in this regard. Aurelian wanted to take 
Zenobia alive so she could be marched through Rome in his triumph, which is 
what happened (HA Aurel. 30.1-2, 33.2 and 34.3).161 This alone was not enough to 
display his power, however, and he also took to wearing a diadem and his subjects 
were  expected  to  perform  obeisance.162 Gallienus  had  worn  the  diadem  and 
Aurelian may have seen that he needed to project an image that was greater than 
his predecessors since they had not, after all, achieved nearly as much as he had 
352-356.
157 H.S. Versnel, Triumphus: An Inquiry into the Origin, Development and Meaning of the Roman 
Triumph (Leiden, 1970), p. 1.
158 McCormick (1986), p. 11.
159 Versnel (1970), p. 1.
160 Weber (1994a), pp. 31-32.
161 This contradicts Zosimus 1.59 who says she died on the way to Rome. See R. Ridley (trans and 
commentary), Zosimus: A New History (Canberra, 1982), p. 146, note 106 who believes that this 
may be to draw a parallel between Zenobia and Cleopatra.
162 M.T.W. Arnheim,  The Senatorial Aristocracy in the Later Roman Empire. (Oxford, 1972), p. 
29.
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(Eutr.  9.13).163 Aurelian  had  had  his  problems  and  the  tribes  invading  into 
Northern  Italy  had  the  potential  to  undermine  his  regime  so  when  he  was 
successful it was important to make sure everyone knew it (Eutr. 9.13).164 Whether 
this success was temporary or not – and the number of emperors who had to keep 
fighting in the same areas shows that generally success only provided temporary 
respite from battle – it still needed to be publicised fully.165 Other emperors who 
enjoyed  less  success  than  Aurelian  throughout  the  course  of  their  reigns  still 
publicised any success which they had. Gallienus, for example, had a triumphal 
procession in Rome in order to celebrate his decennalia (HA Gall 7.4-9.1).166 This 
was an achievement which he did not take lightly since it was thirty years since 
any other emperor had been able to claim to have ruled for this long and fifty 
since an adult was able to do so ruling in his own right, showing that maintaining 
sufficient legitimacy was difficult throughout this time.
Probus also celebrated a triumph (HA Prob. 19.2).167 In this case it was for his 
victories  over  the  Blemmyes  from  Nubia,  various  Germanic  tribes  and 
confederations of brigands from Asia Minor, all of which showed his successes all 
along the  edges  of  the  Roman world  (HA Probus 19).168 Severus  Alexander’s 
triumph for his victory over the Persians was described by the Historia Augusta as 
163 Aurelian  succeeded  in  reuniting  the  empire,  a  task  which  had  proved  beyond  Gallienus. 
Claudius had not managed it either due to the brevity of his reign.
164 Watson (1999), p. 177.
165 Southern (2001), p. 114.
166 Brauer (1975), pp. 146-7.
167 triumphavit  de  Germanis  et  Blemmyis,  omnium gentium drungos  usque  ad  quinquagenos 
homines ante triumphum duxit. 
168 Brauer (1975), p. 253.
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triumpho  pulcherrimo and  he  promised  the  people  games  and  largess  while 
proclaiming  the  riches  he  had  captured  (HA Alex.  Sev. 56-58).  There  was  no 
formal end to this war, however, since Alexander had had to return primarily to 
deal with problems on his northern frontiers (Herodian 6.7.1-4). Therefore, the 
triumph  was  probably  more  for  show  than  any  substantial  success  that  the 
Romans enjoyed and probably  seemed quite  contrived to his  soldiers.  For the 
people of Rome, however, the display would have been important since it would 
have been designed to show them that their emperor was a successful military 
leader in the heroic mould of past Roman leaders and, consequently, boosted his 
charismatic  legitimacy  with  them.169 The  triumphal  style  of  an  emperor  was 
important at this time because of the huge amount of resources which went into 
the military and to which the people contributed. Everyone needed to know that 
the emperor had been successful because this confirmed his right to rule.170 
The outlandish shows of deference, such as prostration, would have been shunned 
by many of the earlier emperors just as the claim to be a deus would have been. 
The  elaborate  ceremonial,  however,  would  have  been  understandable  to  the 
peoples from outside the empire with whom the emperors had to deal. They would 
have seen the magnificence of the emperors and known they were the men in 
positions of authority.171 The emperor had long been sacrosanct because of their 
tribunician powers but tribunes and men holding the tribunician power in the past 
had not styled themselves in a way that separated them in such a way from other 
169 Weber (1994a), pp. 31-32.
170 McCormick (1986), pp. 4-5.
171 Southern (2001), p. 154.
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men  as  Aurelian  and  then  the  tetrarchs  did.  The  ceremonial  emphasised  the 
relationship of the emperor with the divine and was, therefore, legitimising the 
reign through its enhanced charismatic authority.172
The increase in ceremonial and reorganisation of the administration by Diocletian 
were linked. The complex administration reflected the complex status the emperor 
now  enjoyed  with  the  emperor  no  longer  princeps but  elevated  towards  the 
gods.173 Obeisance also dismissed any notion that there was some semblance of 
equality between the emperor and the Senate, such as existed earlier in the empire, 
since it put the subjects in a subservient position to the emperor (Pan. Lat. 11(3).
11.1-4).174 Public  appearances  became  stage  managed  with  the  clothing  and 
jewellery designed to enhance his image and even the symbols of the emperor, 
such  as  his  residence,  became  so  large  as  to  inspire  awe  and  feelings  of 
intimidation.175 Diocletian  maintained  the  formality  and magnificence  that  had 
become associated with the imperial position including wearing a gold-brocaded 
robe, silk, purple, jewelled sandals, being addressed as lord, adored and addressed 
as a god (Aur. Vict. Caes. 39.2-4 / Eutr. 9.26).176 The tetrarchs’ elevated standing 
included  elaborate  rituals  and  ceremonies,  ostentatious  dress,  imposing 
172 Weber (1994a), p. 31.
173 Gregory (2010), p. 40.
174 Williams (1985), p. 111.
175 See Aurelius Victor de Caes 39.1-8 about the clothing and jewellery in which Diocletian was 
clad.  N.H Ramage and A.  Ramage,  Roman Art:  Romulus  to  Constantine 2nd edition (London, 
1995), p. 270 discusses the enormous buildings that were built as a sign of the renewal of the 
greatness of Rome.
176 S. Price, ‘From Noble Funerals to Divine Cult: the Consecration of Roman Emperors,’ in D. 
Cannadine and S. Price, eds.,  Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies 
(Cambridge, 1987), pp. 98-99.
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architecture and a large number of courtiers.177 Access continued to be restricted 
and gold cloth and diadems were worn. Obeisance continued to be performed and 
was further refined as the emperors stylised themselves as more god-like than 
mortal (Aur. Vict.  Caes. 39.2-4 / Eutr. 9.26).178 The elevation of the emperors to 
having closer links to the gods increased their remoteness from other men as a 
consequence. The emperor had become accessible only through his officials and, 
although Constantine did promote his  accessibility,  this  limited access  did not 
actually change during his reign.179 This, again, was showing the relationship the 
emperor  enjoyed  with  the  divine  and  was  meant  to  increase  his  charismatic 
authority.180
Conclusions
The lengths which emperors went to in order to focus attention on any success 
which they had came about because of the pressure which they were under. The 
third century is littered with the corpses of emperors who were killed before their 
time and shows the need to keep the troops happy, as Septimius had foreshadowed 
to his sons (Cass. Dio  77.15.2). This occurred to emperors who were unable to 
sustain  belief  in  their  charisma  because  they  did  not  show  the  exemplary 
characteristics  which  were  needed  in  order  to  sustain  the  belief  but  does  not 
necessarily come about from the enrichment of the troops alone.181 Caracalla, for 
177 D.S. Potter, The Roman Empire at Bay: AD 180-395. (London, 2004), p. 288.
178 Williams (1985), p. 111.
179 S.  Corcoran, 'Before Constantine'.  In  N. Lenski,  The Cambridge Companion to the Age of  
Constantine, (Cambridge, 2006), p. 43.
180 Weber (1994a), p. 32.
181 Weber (1994a), pp. 32-33.
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example,  did enrich the troops but was still  unable to stop the successful plot 
against him whilst he was with his army.
Septimius, Diocletian and Constantine were amongst the few who died natural 
deaths, with some others such as Claudius Gothicus dying from illness rather than 
assassination.  Therefore,  any  success  an  emperor  had  needed  to  be  used  to 
promote their regime in order to reaffirm their legitimacy and to show that they 
were capable of maintaining the security of the empire. Victories needed to be 
publicised to have the desired boost to an emperor’s standing and the triumphs, 
victory titles,  images on coins and monuments as well  as increasingly explicit 
links to the gods were all meant to serve this purpose. These helped to create a 
belief  in  the  emperor's  heroism,  sanctity  and  exemplary  character  and, 
consequently, his charismatic legitimacy.182 Septimius’ legitimacy was enhanced 
by such things and most others received some boost to their auctoritas as a result 
of their successes and the publicity which they gave them. These characteristics, 
therefore, were in addition to the enrichment of the troops.
Success, however, needed to be genuine and needed to be maintained. Gallienus 
failed to enhance his legitimacy with the titles he claimed because of the failure to 
deal effectively with the loss of the western part of the empire and the apparent 
diminution of his authority in the east which were evident to one and all. Those 
who followed  Gallienus  had  to  show that  they  were  better  than  he  was  and, 
therefore, their claims through their titles had to be more grandiose in order to 
182 Weber (1994a), pp. 31-32.
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show their their charismatic qualities were superior.183 Legitimacy through such 
means was difficult  to maintain unless there was the ongoing military success 
with which to back it up. It could provide a short-term boost to a regime but this 
would only last as long as it took for the next political threat or military crisis to 
emerge. Emperors who sought to maintain their rule through their charisma alone 
were doomed to be overthrown eventually since over time charismatic authority 
needed to be routinised and traditional or legal authority became more important 
to the regime's legitimacy.184
183 Weber (1994a), p. 32.
184 Weber (1994a), p. 37.
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Conclusion
The claim of legitimacy was essential for a regime to establish itself in power 
since only legitimate regimes were the unchallenged source of authority within a 
state.1 When  authority  is  unchallenged  it  means  there  is  compliance  to  the 
regime's commands while those who are not considered legitimate find their right 
to rule challenged.2 Therefore, those subject to a regime need to believe in the 
right to rule of those in power.3 There is no agreement amongst scholars, however, 
as to what exactly makes a regime legitimate with academic debate leading to the 
existence  of  a  multitude  of  theories.4 This  thesis  has  examined  the  issue  of 
legitimacy using the model proposed by Max Weber, who was one of the earliest 
and most influential scholars in the field.5 
The  three  legitimation  principles  espoused  by  Weber  –  proclaimed  legality, 
tradition and charisma6 – all allowed each instance of an emperor establishing and 
maintaining  his  legitimacy to  be  explained.  This  categorisation  does  not  pass 
judgement on the desirability of the political system being considered and each of 
1 C.  Kadushin,  ‘Power  Circles  and  Legitimacy  in  Developed  Societies’ in  B.  Denitch,  ed., 
Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks of Analysis (London, 1979), p. 132.
2 D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London, 1991), p. 139.
3 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by G. Roth and C. 
Wittich (New York, 1968), p. 946.
4 For examples of different ideas of what can constitute a legitimate regime see M. Weber, Basic 
Concepts in Sociology, translated and introduced by H. P. Secher (London, 1962), pp. 81-83 and 
Beetham (1991), pp. 15-24.  
5 W. Heydebrand, 'Introduction' in M. Weber,  Sociological Writings,  edited by W. Heydebrand, 
(New York, 1994), p. vii.
6 Weber (1962), pp. 81-83.
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these categories can stand alone as a way of explaining an emperor's legitimacy.7 
Weber's theory does accommodate all different types of regimes and provide a 
basis for assessing their legitimation and ongoing legitimacy.
In the third century, the army was prominent in making and breaking regimes. 
According to the advice Cassius Dio believed Septimius Severus gave to his sons, 
legitimacy could be achieved by there being harmony in the imperial family or 
college, enriching the soldiers and not being concerned by anyone else (Cass. Dio. 
77.15.2).  He  was,  therefore,  making  the  importance  of  ensuring  the  ongoing 
support of the army for a regime's legitimacy explicit and believed that this was 
the  way  to  ensure  there  were  no  challenges  to  an  emperor's  authority  and 
compliance to his commands.
Numerous  emperors  throughout  the  third  century  faced  challenges  to  their 
authority regardless of whether they enriched the troops or not. Septimius' son, 
Caracalla, provided an example of this since he did enrich the soldiers and was 
very  popular  with  them  (Herodian  4.7.4).  He  did  not,  however,  sustain  his 
authority and was overthrown (Herodian 4.13.1-6 and Cass. Dio.79.6.4). Many 
other  emperors  were  also  deposed  when  their  right  to  rule  was  challenged. 
Gallienus provides an example with a number of usurpation attempts destabilising 
his legitimacy and resulting in a fragmented empire (Aur. Vict. Caes. 33). In spite 
of  this  he  had  remained  popular  with  the  majority  of  the  troops  under  his 
command (Zos 1.41.1). The deposition of Severus Alexander (Aur. Vict. Caes. 24) 
7 R. Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, 1990), p.77.
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and Trebonianus Gallus (Zos. 1.28.3) also demonstrated the consequences for an 
emperor when their  right to rule was challenged through their  failure to show 
suitable martial prowess. Their shortcomings were not because of their failure to 
enrich the troops alone. The emperors mentioned in these examples all had been 
established, legitimate emperors prior to their right to rule being challenged. 
In order to be considered a legitimate emperor in the first place, emperors needed 
to be proclaimed. Merely declaring one's self or having one's own troops issue a 
proclamation  was  not  enough.  In  order  to  be  considered  legitimate,  this 
declaration needed to come from a legal source.8 The Senate and the army were 
these sources and, later in the time discussed, the approval of the other emperors 
within the imperial college was the acknowledged source of legitimacy. All of 
those who ruled during this period were proclaimed in at least one of these ways. 
The story of the third century was one in which the army was supreme, with the 
Senate having a diminishing role to play so it was imperative that in every case 
the  army approved of  the  man who was in  charge.  The  Senate,  however,  did 
consist of former office holders in the Roman state and, consequently, was a legal 
source of legitimacy. The army could enforce obedience through coercion and this 
was recognised in the Roman world (Cass. Dio 57.24.5). A distinguishing feature 
of a state is that it controls the means of coercion.9 
8 Weber (1968), pp. 215-216.
9 M. Weber, 'Legitimacy, Politics and the State' in Legitimacy and the State, edited by W.Connelly, 
(Oxford, 1984), p. 33.
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In Rome, it was the emperor who controlled the army, although this could prove 
difficult  when  disaffection  occurred,  as  shown  by  those  emperors  the  army 
overthrew, with Trebonianus Gallus (Zos. 1.28.3) and Severus Alexander (Aur. 
Vict.  Caes. 24) again providing examples. They had, however, suffered from a 
delegitimation of their authority by the time they were overthrown. When there 
was imperial control over the troops, however, the legitimacy of an emperor was 
secure and he, therefore, controlled the means of coercion. For this reason, the 
Senate was unable to challenge an emperor supported by the army regardless of 
its  legal  status.  This  demonstrates  that  maintaining  control  of  the  means  of 
coercion  was  important  for  ensuring  legitimacy  and,  consequently,  supports 
somewhat the assertion Dio claimed Septimius made about the importance of the 
troops, although enriching them was by no means the only way to ensure their 
support. Severus Alexander's death, for example, shows that the troops were also 
concerned for the welfare of their loved ones (Herodian 6.7.3). Ultimately, during 
the course of the third century, the Senate was not consulted at all and the army 
had  become  the  only  authoritative  source  for  a  legal  proclamation  prior  to 
Diocletian  and the  tetrarchy.  Carus  provided  the  first  example  of  a  legitimate 
emperor not bothering to seek their approval (Aur. Vict. Caes. 38).
Septimius himself was proclaimed by the troops (Zos 1.8.1) and this was later 
ratified by the Senate (Cass. Dio 76.8.5). That he considered it necessary for there 
to be Senatorial approval of his position does show that he did not consider it 
necessary to despise all others when he was trying to secure his legitimacy. There 
was not, however, harmony. Before establishing himself in power, Septimius had 
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to deal with other contenders. This was relatively easily achieved against Julianus 
(HA Did. Iul. 8.6-7), but Albinus was offered the Caesarship in order to prevent 
Septimius having to face threats to his position from the east and the west (Cass. 
Dio 74.15.2). This should have meant that there would be harmony between the 
two men but after  Septimius had picked off  Niger,  he initiated civil  war with 
Albinus (Cass. Dio 76.4.1). As the victor, Septimius emerged with his legitimacy 
undiminished. He did, however, follow what Dio claimed he espoused to his sons 
in regard to enriching the soldiers (see Herodian 2.14.5 and 3.8.4-5).
Diocletian provided an example of an emperor who worked harmoniously with 
his colleagues in power (Aur. Vict.  Caes. 39). The tetrarchy,  however,  did not 
survive  once  pressure  was  exerted  by disaffected  potential-emperors  who had 
been  overlooked  for  promotion.  The  dynastic  claims  of  Maxentius  and 
Constantine meant that they both thought they should have received a promotion 
into the imperial college and had themselves declared emperors (Aur. Vict. Caes. 
40). Constantine was successful in pushing his claim and was recognised as a 
legally proclaimed emperor. He did not work harmoniously with his colleagues, 
however, and claimed dynastic attachments pre-dating the tetrarchy in order to 
promote his own standing (Pan. Lat. 6(7).2.1-3). Ultimately, when he defeated 
and removed Licinius from his position, he had ensured that there was no longer a 
tetrarchy, merely a Constantinian dynasty which he headed with sons waiting to 
succeed him.
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Legally  proclaimed  emperors,  in  order  to  maintain  their  position,  needed  to 
perform the functions expected of a princeps. This was the traditional expectation 
of an emperor. Having traditional authority meant that a leader exercised power in 
the ways which had been established in the society throughout the generations and 
their  actions  were  bound  by these  traditions  if  they  wished  to  maintain  their 
authority.10 The  imperial  role  had  become  a  traditional  one  by  the  time  of 
Septimius' accession with more than two centuries having passed since Augustus 
had become the first princeps. There is no evidence to suggest that any other form 
of governing the Roman Empire was considered during the turmoil of the third 
century. In fact, the prevalence of the number of men aspiring to be recognised as 
the legitimate emperor shows the strength of the institution even though many of 
the actual men in the role were not strong leaders themselves. Performing the 
roles traditionally expected of them would allow them to maintain the loyalty of 
these groups which conferred their legitimacy. 
The factors which belong in the traditional category were maintaining the security 
of the empire and ensuring the judicial and administrative systems were working 
effectively.11 Emperors  were  also  expected  to  respect  the  role  of  the  gods  in 
Roman society.12 In addition tradition decreed that the emperor had to be a man 
from the right  social  background,  meaning that  they were from the Senatorial 
order.  The  maintenance  of  the empire's  security was  the  critical  aspect  of  the 
10 Weber (1968), p. 215.
11 A. Wallace-Hadrill,  'The Emperor and His Virtues',  Historia: Zeitschrift  für Alte Geschichte. 
1981. Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 300.
12 Wallace-Hadrill (1981), p. 300.
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imperial role. Emperors throughout this period spent a lot of time either defending 
the empire or campaigning in enemy territory. Septimius was an example of an 
emperor  who  was  successful  in  maintaining  the  empire's  security  (Aur.  Vict. 
Caes. 20). His successes, notably against the Parthians, meant that he consolidated 
his  standing with the troops and ensured their  was no discontent  in  the ranks 
which could threaten their position. The examples of Trebonianus Gallus (Zos. 
1.28.3) and Severus Alexander (Aur. Vict. Caes. 24), however, showed that failing 
to maintain the empire's security or bargaining with enemies and, consequently, 
displaying  weakness  resulted  in  discontent  amongst  the  troops  and a  crisis  of 
legitimation for these men.
The emperor was expected to provide the empire with stable administration as a 
part  of  their  traditional  functions,  as  demonstrated  by  the  praise  given  to 
Septimius by Dio (Cass. Dio 77.17.2). His role as paymaster to the troops was 
what  promoted  the  need  for  administrative  efficiency.  Diocletian's  edict  on 
maximum prices13 provides an example of one way in which an emperor tried to 
solve this problem. The taxes which needed to be collected in order to ensure the 
troops were paid, however, were not popular. The disaffection which might result 
can be seen when Gordian I was proclaimed emperor in response to the harsh 
nature of Maximinus Thrax's administration (Herodian 7.4.2). This shows that the 
people could have an effect on an emperor's legitimacy, although they played a 
largely anonymous role throughout the majority of the period. It also shows that 
the  mismanagement  of  the  empire's  governance  could  affect  the  emperor's 
13 See  W.M. Leake, (ed.),  An Edict  of  Diocletian, fixing a Maximum of Prices throughout the  
Roman Empire, (London, 1826), p. 8.
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traditional  legitimacy.  Another  expectation  within  this  sphere  was  the  judicial 
expectations of the emperors and their representatives. The law was expected to 
be upheld. Diocletian14 and Septimius (Cass. Dio 77.17.2) have both left evidence 
of their attendance to their judicial duties and these were both men whose reigns 
were long and successful. Their performance of their expected duties contributed 
to  their  ongoing legitimacy and this  was,  therefore,  not entirely related to  the 
enrichment of the soldiers.
The  religious  fanaticism  of  Elagabalus  did  not  comply  with  that  which  was 
expected in Rome and this was another traditional aspect of leadership in Roman 
society which an emperor was supposed display (Herodian 5.5.7-5.6.10). Apart 
from Elagabalus, each of the emperors during the period did show the gods the 
respect expected in the way expected and so fulfilled their traditional role in this 
regard.  Elagabalus'  behaviour  showed  that  untraditional  extreme  behaviour, 
including that of a religious nature, could have an adverse effect on an emperor's 
legitimacy. The un-Roman practice which Elagabalus displayed was one of the 
variety of the reasons he was delegitimated and shows the problem for failing to 
fulfill  the  expected  duties  for  a  Roman  emperor  in  respect  to  the  divine. 
Conversely, those who did fulfill this function contributed to their own ongoing 
legitimacy.  These  religious  functions,  however,  do  not  relate  to  the  idea  of 
enriching the soldiers and despising all others so, in this regard, there was more to 
imperial legitimacy than what Septimius was said to have claimed.
14 See S. Corcoran, The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial Pronouncements and Government AD  
284-324. (Oxford, 1996), p. 1f.
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The other form of authority emperors could demonstrate in order to ensure the 
legitimacy  of  their  regime  was  charismatic  legitimacy.  This  existed  when 
emperors were able  to  demonstrate  their  exemplary characteristics  such as the 
success  of  their  troops  in  battle  and  their  relationship  with  the  gods.15 It  was 
focused on the individual's qualities rather than the institutional expectations of 
traditional legitimacy and allowed emperors to exercise their authority over others 
on the basis of these qualities.16 Victory titles provided an example of how an 
emperor would broadcast his success. These titles would appear on coins17 or in 
imperial edicts and they showed the people and soldiers that the empire was in 
safe hands. Examples include those listed in Diocletian's edict on maximum prices 
which listed the numerous victories the ruling regime had enjoyed against  the 
Sarmatians, Germans and Britains amongst others.18
The emperors' personal relationships which they claimed to have with the gods 
were a charismatic element of legitimacy whereas the respect shown to the gods 
through  the  performance  of  sacrifices  was  a  traditional  expectation  of  the 
emperor's  role.19 Examples  of  this  element  of  charismatic  legitimacy are  most 
prevalent  in  the latter  half  of  the century with Aurelian's  claim to be  deus et  
15 C. Noreňa, 'The Communication of the Emperor's Virtues', The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 
91 (2001), p. 146.
16 Weber (1968), p.215.
17 For example, Septimius advertises his success against Parthia with the title PART MAX on his 
coinage. See RIC 4.1 167a.
18 See Leake (ed.) (1826), p. 8.
19 See Wallace-Hadrill (1981), p. 300 for the traditional roles an emperor was expected to play. See 
R. Rees. Diocletian and the Tetrarchy. (Edinburgh, 2004), p. 50 for emperors linking themselves 
to gods.
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dominus20 and  Diocletian  and Maximian's  relationship  to  Jupiter  and  Hercules 
(Aur.  Vict.  Caes.  39)  being  the  most  notable.  The  ceremonial  which  came to 
surround the emperor and the elaborate dress which also distinguished him from 
other  men  and  added  to  the  perception  that  he  was  something  other  than  an 
ordinary  man.  This  perception  became  increasingly  important  because  of  the 
continuing crises of legitimacy that emperors had experienced through the middle 
of the third century which meant that there was a need for the people and the army 
to see the emperor  as beyond an ordinary man and ensure there was distance 
between them and him. Aurelian and the tetrarchs are again the examples for this 
increase  in  ceremonial,  although  Aurelian  was  not  successful  in  avoiding 
assassination.  
Triumphs  were  another  highly  visible  way  to  celebrate  emperors'  successes. 
Triumphs were also ceremonies with heavy religious elements and throughout the 
third century the relationship of the emperor to the gods became closer and closer. 
In the case of Elagabalus, this did not enhance his legitimacy at all. His god was 
not one with which Rome and his soldiers identified. Others who emphasised an 
association to the gods, such Aurelian, showed himself in league with those who 
were believed to provide protection for the empire. This personal association was 
designed to enhance the standing of the emperor. This was a charismatic element 
which helped to build the legitimacy of the emperor and presented him as being 
beyond an ordinary man.
20 A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire 324-1453: Volume 1, (Madison, 1952), p. 61.
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The charismatic nature of authority, therefore, does not necessarily need to enrich 
the soldiers to be successful but it was certainly helpful. Success in battle does, 
however,  mean that emperors were able to gain financially through the  aurum 
coronarium.21 This money, as well as spoils taken from the enemy, were methods 
emperors could use to gather money to give to the troops. This meant soldiers 
were keen to fight rather than accept negotiated settlements. What was not related 
to the enrichment of the troops, however, was the relationship which emperors 
created with the divine.
Charismatic authority is not stable enough in its own right to ensure the ongoing 
long-term  legitimacy  of  a  regime.  It  is  expected  that  over  time,  it  will  be 
routinised  and  take  a  legal  or  traditional  form.22 Even  though  each  of  the 
legitimation principles Weber espoused can act independently, this does show that 
there is a relationship between them. For example, the celebration of victories 
over foreign enemies by taking victory titles enhanced an emperor's charismatic 
legitimacy. This was related to the traditional expectation that the emperor will 
maintain  the  security  of  the  empire.  Septimius,  for  example,  used  the  title 
Parthicus Maximus after defeating the Parthians.23 These victory titles had to have 
substance, however, with Gallienus taking the same title for victories over Parthia 
(Zonar 24) when Odaenathus had control over the area and Gallienus' influence 
was minimal. Philip the Arab also took this title but had negotiated a settlement 
21 J. Bray, Gallienus: A Study in Reformist and Sexual Politics (Kent Town, 1997) p. 202.
22 Weber (1994a), p. 37.
23 See RIC 4.1 55cf and RIC 4.1 167a for examples.
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rather  than  actually  defeating  his  foe.24 Consequently,  even  though  the  titles 
promoted their success, these emperors did not gain in the long-term because their 
charismatic legitimacy was not routinised. The troops would have known Philip 
the Arab's campaign had not been successful and the empire remained fragmented 
under Gallienus regardless of his claim. 
Consequently, the need for harmony and enriching the soldiers while despising all 
others has been demonstrated to have been insufficient on its own to maintain an 
emperor's legitimacy as demonstrated when considering legitimacy in relation to 
the  principles  espoused  by  Weber's  theory  of  the  legitimation  of  regimes. 
Harmony  does  not  seem  to  have  been  an  overriding  factor  for  any  regime. 
Caracalla  consolidated  his  power  without  it  and  Constantine  dismantled  the 
tetrarchy with there being little harmonious about his overall relationship with his 
colleagues prior to his assumption of sole command. Greater harmony, however, 
may have helped Balbinus and Pupienus Maximus consolidate their rule as it had 
helped Diocletion through the dyarchic and tetrarchic periods.
Enriching  the  troops  was  important  but  emperors  could  find  themselves 
endangered by other factors as well. If Septimius did indeed exhort his sons to 
enrich the soldiers in order to secure their legitimacy, he may have been right but 
they also had to believe that their emperor was someone who could lead them to 
success and keep peace within the empire.25 Very few new regimes managed to 
24 CIL III.4634 (Partico Maximo) and III.10619 (Parthico Maximo).
25 Wallace-Hadrill (1981), p. 300.
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consolidate themselves in the longer term because of the pressure they faced from 
without  and  also  from within.  Regime  change occurred  regularly  because  too 
many emperors could not show the troops that they were worthy leaders and so 
de-legitimated  themselves  in  their  eyes.  Septimius'  statement  when  measured 
against the legitimacy of an emperor is, therefore, the truth, but not the whole 
truth. 
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